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Executive summary  
Introduction 
This study was designed to answer the question of whether resource performance 
depends more on good governance or existing institutional structures. The specific aims 
include clarifying the extent to which good governance and institutions promote small-scale 
gold mining businesses. The first aim is to explain the nature of the human rights challenges 
in the small-scale mining (SSM) industry, empirically from the perspective of mining 
managers. The second aim is to investigate the nature, determinants, and frequency of 
conflict that are associated with SSM. Finally, the third aim is to discuss the challenges SSM 
operations face and the methods to confront these. The findings demonstrate that in the 
context of the efforts to spur economic development, the exploitation of mineral resources 
has the potential to bring about far-reaching environmental and social changes. These 
changes can create opportunities, but they also represent a business risk for corporations and 
a social risk for communities. 
Consequently, there is a pressing need to investigate the recent threats to mineral 
resource exploration relating to economic development, peace, and stability and the survival 
of private businesses. These threats are particularly severe for less-developed countries that 
are net exporters of natural resources, and such nations could use these resources to drive 
economic development and decrease their dependence on aid from developed countries. In 
most cases, however, owing to the lack of strong institutions, mismanagement of mineral and 
other natural resources has fueled social conflict without producing meaningful development.  
In addition, there is often the perception in countries such as Ghana, the subject of this 
study, that mining, regardless of its benefits, is responsible for significant environmental 
damage and Human Rights Adverse Impacts (HRAI), including child labor and exploitation, 
displacement of rural households, and violence. Therefore, investments in the mining sector 
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and associated businesses have often faced stiff resistance. However, given the right 
institutions, small-scale gold mining and associated activities can prove beneficial to, and be 
accepted by, society and can attract further investment. On the contrary, under the wrong 
circumstances, this type of mining can affect society negatively. At the very least, poor 
management of SSM can prevent the nation from realizing the anticipated benefits from 
mining to the business community and the broader society. The evidence from large-scale 
mining (LSM), particularly in the wake of the civil war, indicates a correlation between 
mineral resources and conflict. We know less about the nature, frequency, and causes of 
conflicts that afflict households in Ghana’s SSM communities. Accordingly, there is a need 
to research methods for preventing human rights violations and creating shared value in the 
SSM sector through social development and renewed incentives for investment. This thesis 
represents an attempt to fill this gap by exploring whether the capacity of resources (in this 
case, gold mining) to spur economic development (by creating competitive SSM businesses, 
improving livelihoods, or reducing poverty) depends on governance structures and whether 
there is a correlation between SSM and conflict using the context of a non-civil war country.  
Three central ideas informed this thesis. The first concern is the challenges facing SSM 
activities that play a vital role in the Ghanaian economy. The second concern is the 
importance of the role played by institutions in the development of SSM amid a renewed 
interest in investment in this sector. The third concern is that the changing social expectations 
are a crucial aspect of sustainable mining and the protection of human rights.  
 
Research objectives, methods and thesis layout 
This thesis has three primary objectives. First, it probes the observational conditions of 
child labor by examining the reasons why SSM managers employ children. Second, it 
examines conflict and its frequency in SSM communities. Third, it explores ways to increase 
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the social acceptance of SSM as part of efforts to sustain the mining sector businesses by 
explicitly identifying the critical challenges involved. These objectives are addressed in 
Chapters 2 through 4. These three empirical chapters follow the introduction set out in 
Chapter 1 and precede a conclusion in Chapter 5. The study employs mixed methods, relying 
on both quantitative (Berman et al., 2012; Humphreys et al., 2008; Rustad et al., 2016) and 
qualitative approaches to address the issues discussed and thus makes use of direct 
observations, semi-structured interviews and informal conversations with key informants, 
representative data for Ghana, focus group discussions, and household surveys for data 
collection. Statistical software programs including STATA 14 and Microsoft Office 
applications were used for data management and analysis. The limitations of the data 
collection include the respondents’ reluctance to provide information about SSM owing to 
the secrecy associated with these operations in Ghana and security concerns; a further 
limitation concerned reaching the targeted sample size. After careful consideration of 
alternative extractive minerals, we decided to focus on gold. 
However, the focus on gold and a specific region does not limit the applicability of this 
study and the recommendations put forward. The insight offered by this research may be 




Chapter 2: Analyzing child labor issues in the Ghanaian SSM. Children employed in 
mining work in dangerous conditions, such as unprotected mining pits in rural areas due to 
lack of legal protection, and this has long been a problem in Ghana. The analytical 
considerations regarding mining-oriented development policies and practice indicate the need 
to restructure child-protection measures to address SSM. Additionally, there is a lack of 
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empirical research that can help to answer the following essential issues: the role of child 
labor in the supply chain of small-scale gold mining; the impact of SSM on child 
development; the reasons why SSM managers employ children; and how child labor relates 
to the aspects of mining governance such as site allocation, licensing, and market 
intermediaries are all unclear. Chapter 2 attempts to fill this gap in the research by exploring 
the perceptions of managers of small-scale gold mining operations about involving children 
in mining. The findings suggest that child labor is fundamentally driven by group inequalities 
among households and remains a particular problem in the SSM sector. Government policies 
have created an enabling environment, so new standards for monitoring and policy incentives 
are necessary to increase the effectiveness of institutions sufficiently to alter the current 
unacceptable behavior of corporations. Further, poor households in mining communities must 
receive appropriate social protection or alternative support if there is to be a significant 
decrease in child labor. 
Chapter 3: Analyzing the determinants of conflict in SSM in Ghana. Gold and other 
extractive resources have played a crucial role in spurring economic development in Ghana. 
Consequently, since 1983, this sector has been the recipient of a significant policy 
intervention, the Economic Recovery Program (ERP), which has served as a cornerstone of 
efforts to transform the economy. Currently, gold mining in the SSM sector is a critical 
component of national mineral exports and has the potential to improve macro-stability and 
rural livelihoods. The present restructuring policy, which was implemented to promote the 
mining sector, includes the dedication of a section of the Minerals Commission, among other 
institutions, to guide companies and hold them responsible for SSM development. The SSM 
sector has been responsible for around 35% of Ghana’s total gold production, a share that has 
been increasing since 2014. Historically, from the time when mining demonstrated its 
economic viability in Ghana, tough issues including human rights violations, widespread 
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violence, and the disruption of social cohesion have been associated with the sector. These 
negative impacts are nowhere more evident than in the mining communities of Ghana’s 
Ashanti Region, but empirical research on the determinants of violence in these contexts is 
scarce.  
The aim of Chapter 3 is to fill this gap in the research by presenting evidence from an 
empirical study involving a household survey of two districts in the Ashanti Region. This 
survey identified the challenges relating to land rights, socio-economic inequality, and the 
negative impact of mining itself as the three primary ways in which violence afflicts 
households in mining communities in a non-post-civil war context. The findings described in 
this chapter further demonstrate that artisanal mining is not itself the prime determinant of 
conflict and, if it is adequately managed, it can contribute to a reduction in the frequency of 
specific disputes while horizontal or group inequalities reinforce greed and grievances in 
ways that promote disputes involving households. Based on these considerations, a proactive 
governance mechanism appears necessary to mitigate the conflict associated with mining in 
Ashanti communities. Such an arrangement could ensure the adequate monitoring of mining 
standards and the enforcement of concession rights in ways that improve mining sector 
businesses.  
Chapter 4: Analyzing the impacts of mining on the social appreciation of mining. Could 
good governance and responsible mining practices on the part of corporations have prevented 
the current national crisis in Ghana’s SSM? Good governance plays a crucial role in 
managing resources in ways that positively affect the livelihood of the poor in countries like 
Ghana. As it happens, the nation’s SSM sector has been under a nationwide moratorium since 
July 2017. The moratorium action affected most areas of the Ghanaian economy, especially 
the mining companies, as might be expected. According to the arguments advanced here, the 
creation of enabling environments and working arrangements through institutional structures 
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can determine the success and failure of businesses. In this chapter, we proceed from the 
assumption that good governance and responsible mining practices are interrelated and 
undertake the following: (1) an assessment of the current empirical conditions under which 
mining companies operate as a step toward identifying the challenges with the social 
acceptance of SSM and (2) an account of the influence of governance on the social 
acceptance of mining, particularly in the context of the current moratorium on Ghana’s SSM.  
The findings presented in Chapter 4 demonstrate that currently in Ghana, the adverse 
effects of mining on society far outweigh the benefits, particularly when it comes to the 
degradation of environmental resources; indeed, this imbalance between disadvantages and 
advantages explains the current nationwide crisis. Thus, Ghanaian society is likely to 
continue to withhold social operating licenses (SOLs) from companies should the current 
behavior persist. A sound governance structure guided by a sound technical policy is 
recommended to incentivize managers to pursue responsible, clean mining practices that will 
encourage the reversal of the current ban. 
 
Main conclusions and policy recommendations 
The potential impact of the findings presented in this thesis extends beyond informing 
the debate regarding the relative importance of good governance and resource performance to 
the broader academic discussion of natural resource governance and conflict management in 
the field of institutional and developmental economics. This research also contributes to the 
discourse regarding the impacts of SSM, which has been primarily dominated by attempts to 
characterize and quantify SSM operations. Thus, much of the previous research has 
concentrated on untangling the dynamics of human rights and the environmental 
sustainability challenges associated with the SSM sector and elucidating the fundamental 
causes (and possible mitigations) of the current problems. This thesis adds to the literature on 
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the role of corporations and institutions in promoting SSM by examining the ways in which 
SSM can improve the way of life for the poorest residents of the Ashanti Region through 
clean, “responsible and sustainable mining” and work to minimize horizontal inequalities that 
reinforce greed and grievances among groups involved in mining conflicts. The support of 
both private corporations and state institutions is required to promote clean mining as a win-
win proposition for the small-scale gold mining sector.  
The thesis advocates for strict technical guidelines on sustainable and responsible mining 
practices in addition to efficient monitoring standards. While there is undoubtedly a need for 
better mining principles and improved monitoring, the concern here is to establish the 
necessary perspectives to observe the relationships between governance and resource 
performance and between resources and violence and then to suggest methods of mitigating 
mining-related conflicts. This work also highlights the need for good governance to promote 
SSM and related businesses and thereby improve the economy. Therefore, the sector must be 
able to co-exist alongside established income-generating activities with minimal or no human 
rights and environmental problems, unlike the current situation. Finally, we argue here that 
the SSM sector, while it contributes significantly to the income of rural households and is 
more effective in attracting both financial and human resources than other areas, is 
responsible for an enormous negative impact on society, and this makes it an unattractive 
sector. The implementation of good governance practices, including innovations that help 
businesses mitigate the adverse effects of SSM, has the potential to spur the sustainable 
development of Ghana’s economy.  
Concerning policy recommendations, the findings presented here demonstrate the need 
for a clear policy regarding innovative and responsible or “clean” mining and good 
governance. This would involve instituting “workable arrangements” through which essential 
stakeholders, including companies, communities, and local citizens, combinedly take 
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decisions concerning mining and mitigation processes. Good governance would also involve 
revamping child protection policies and developing safe working conditions beneficial
1
 to 
children. While serving as the basis for abolishing exploitive child labor in dangerous 
situations, good governance policies would involve pursuing an approach that targets conflict 
as a means to mitigate mining-related violence, and it would need to include the pursuance of 
mining development programs that complement current regulatory policies. In sum, 
innovative mining, together with post-mining reconstruction (as a means to conserve 
environmental resources) and appropriate alternative but similarly high-income-generating 
enterprises, represent vital steps for stabilizing communities such as those in Ghana’s Ashanti 
Region that have been ravaged by poorly managed SSM operations. 
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 That is, if the employment of a particular child supports his or her development in terms of education, health, 
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 1 
1. Introduction, research problem, and justifications 
 
1.1. Introduction 
This thesis offers an assessment of how SSM sector businesses are promoted and, in 
particular, the role of institutions in preventing and resolving mining-related conflicts in 
Ghana. This assessment has three main components. First, it takes into account the potential 
impediments to eradicating the child labor supply chain in SSM operations, which is in line 
with one of the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
2
 Additionally, this 
thesis represents the first attempt to make empirical, econometric (formal) estimations of the 
elements of conflict in Ghanaian communities dominated by SSM operations. Third, an 
attempt is made to unravel the challenges of appreciating the social dimensions of SSM in 
Ghana, with specific reference to the current moratorium on mining. We selected this 
structure as the best method for presenting the key findings, specifically because the 
performance of a natural resource depends on the governing institutions and the management 
of resources (in this case, mining) is related to conflict in a non-civil war setting. Also 
discussed in this chapter are the global perspectives on mining as they pertain to Ghana. The 
contribution of SSM to the Ghanaian economy is then explored in some detail and serves as a 
background for articulating the research problem and as a description of the reasons for 
completing this research, in particular, because of the significant gaps in the research 
mentioned above. The chapter concludes by demonstrating how the present study assists in 
filling this gap. The findings establish that mining has the potential to spur economic 
development and to generate social and environmental change with respect to work, health, 
land use, social interconnection, and the economy. There are both business risks for 
                                                     
2
 UN SDGs, 2015: No.8:8.7, “… taking immediate and effective measures to eradicate forced labor… 
elimination of ALL forms of child labor” by 2025. The potential challenges for researchers and policy actors in 




corporations (high costs of operation in the case of conflict, the objection to SOLs, etc.) and 
social risks for communities (social disintegration due to violence, child labor, environmental 
pollution, land degradation, etc.) in the exploitation of minerals (in the present case, through 
gold mining) that demand attention. 
 
1.2. Background  
Natural resources, both renewable and non-renewable, are crucial sectors of most 
economies. The manner in which natural resources are managed and exploited determines 
whether they are beneficial (a blessing) or not (a curse) to those who inhabit the countries in 
which they are found (Berman et al., 2013; Collier et al., 2004; Cuvelier et al., 2014; Parker, 
2015; Hilson and Yakovleva, 2007; Hoeffler, 2004; Frankel et al., 2010; Humphreys, 2008; 
Maystadt et al., 2014; OECD, 2005; Ross, 1999; USAID, 2005). Realizing the blessings 
without suffering from the curses requires responsible and active management by decision-
makers and other players in natural resource sectors. Extractive minerals and similar 
resources, such as gold, diamond, bauxite, gems, and oil and gas, have the potential to 
stimulate significant economic development in Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries such as 
Ghana (Ayee et al., 2011).  
In most SSA countries, including Ghana, improvement in the regulations governing the 
use of resources has had positive results in terms of attracting business investment in the 
mining sector (Akabzaa, 2009; Campbell, 2004, 2010, 2012; Hilson, 2012; Banchirigah, 
2006; Haselip and Hilson, 2005; Ayee, 2001). This renewed interest in investment has placed 
Ghana and many of the SSA countries in the global spotlight in discussions of mining 
development and the related issues of sustainability, human rights, and environmental safety; 
therefore, these issues are considered to have a profound impact on the quantity and duration 
of future investment in the region.  
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Amid assurances of economic development and prosperity for the poor, the mining 
sector, in particular SSM, is portrayed as being responsible, in some instances, for conflict 
and civil war (Drimmer et al., 2010; Frankel, et al., 2010; Macartan, Humphreys, and 
Weinstein, 2008; OECD, 2013; Hailu, et al., 2012; United States Institute of Peace, 2007; 
USAID, 2005; Wolff, 2004). Research has associated mining with environmental 
devastation, unsafe working conditions, damage to infrastructure, child labor, diseases, 
violence, and numerous other social problems (Armah et al., 2016; Hilson, 2009; Jennifer, 
2005; Kusi Appiah and Wieland, 2016; Tschakert and Singha, 2007). Mismanagement of 
mineral resources has been linked to civil wars in countries including the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), Angola, and Sierra Leone (OECD, 2013; USAID, 2005), while 
the anticipated benefits of these resources have not materialized. In the DRC, corrupt 
practices and unhealthy competition have given rise to the phenomenon of “conflict 
diamonds.”  
There is, of course, a rich body of literature on mining, but most of it that concerns 
conflict-affected countries is devoted to LSM operations (Bell and Wolford, 2014; Collier et 
al., 2004; Hoeffler, 2004; Maystadt et al., 2014; OECD, 2005; Ohmura, 2012). Of the few 
studies on SSM, Humphreys (2008) investigated the determinants of individuals’ 
participation in conflict in Sierra Leone. In the case of Ghana, research has mainly taken the 
form of qualitative assessments of the environmental effects (Hilson and Hilson, 2015; 
Hilson and Yakovleva, 2007; Jonathan and Isaac, 2014; Kessey and Arko, 2013), conflict 
(Armah et al., 2014; Bush, 2009; Crawford and Botchwey, 2016; Emmanuel, 2015; Hilson, 
2002; Hilson and Yakovleva, 2007), and the spatial dynamics thereof (Patel et al., 2016). 
Another important study by Andrews (2016) explored the challenges of corporate social 
responsibility in Ghana’s domestic mining sector from a mostly historical perspective. 
Reliable data and information on SSM are relatively scant (Ghana Chamber of Mines, 2015), 
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and no empirical inquiry into the role of governance in promoting SSM sector businesses, the 
sustainability of mineral resources, or preventing conflict associated with SSM is yet 
available.  
The argument put forth in this thesis is that the current interest in investment in the SSM 
sector can be sustained, and even stimulated, by the higher availability of reliable information 
on the dynamics of the social expectations relating to mining development. New evidence is 
presented here regarding the role of traditional institutions and corporations in creating and 
maintaining governance frameworks and responsible management. Through qualitative and 
quantitative assessments, this thesis provides evidence of the potential for SSM sector 
businesses to promote the well-being of communities and households in Ghana.  
 
1.3. The mineral economy of Ghana  
Ghana is the second-largest producer of gold in Sub-Saharan Africa, after South Africa. 
The country’s vast mineral resources also include manganese, bauxite, diamonds, mica, 
columbite, natural gas and oil, clays, tantalite, silica sand, salt, and quartz. Mining, along 
with other land and forestry sectors, has undergone a significant restructuring in terms of 
policies and regulations designed to attract capital investment (Carson et al., 2005). In Ghana, 
the mining sector is projected to have a significant positive economic impact on some 
industries and to help alleviate poverty in general, thus improving the standard of living 
(ICMM, 2007; African Trade Policy, 2011). Gold, however, remains the critical mineral 
resource contributing to Ghana’s economy, accounting for at least 95% of the annual 
mineral-related revenue (International Council on Mining & Metals, 2015; Minerals 
Commission of Ghana, 2015). Ghana’s extractive sector is responsible for 37% of the 
national exports, of which gold again makes up the bulk. Moreover, while the output of other 
minerals has been decreasing, the production of gold grew from 63 tons in 2004 to 
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approximately 80.5 tons in 2008 (Ghana Chamber of Mines, 2000–08; Mineral Commission, 
1996–2006). By another measure, gold production rose from 535,052 ounces in 1990 to 
4,313.190 ounces by 2012, remained relatively constant at 4,249.902 and 4,341.607 in 2013 
and 2014, respectively, and fell to 3,500.022 in 2015 (Figure 1).  
The reform of the minerals and mining law (PNDCL 153) under the ERP has been 
associated with a significant increase in Ghana’s gold production (Addy, 1998). In 2006, the 
current regulation, Act 703, was implemented under the auspices of the country’s Minerals 
Commission, which entrusts all public lands to the head of the government. This dictates that 
all mineral deposits in their natural state, underground or on the surface, in rivers or streams, 
including strategic economic zones covered by the territorial sea, are the property of the 
Republic of Ghana. There have been promising investments in the SSM and oil and gas 
sectors after the implementation of these mining reforms. However, the high cost of doing 
business and the challenges relating to, among other things, human rights, environmental 
sustainability, corruption, security arrangements, resettlement, and compensation have 
created conflict flashpoints in mining areas (Carson et al., 2005).  
 
 
Figure 1: Trend of Ghana’s total gold production from 1990-2015 
Source: Data from minerals Commission of Ghana, 2015 
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1.4. The contribution of artisanal mining in Ghana 
SSM is often considered in combination with artisanal mining as “artisanal and SSM” or 
the ASM sector, and this sector has grown in Ghana to the point where it has immense 
economic importance throughout the country. Indeed, regarding job creation and increased 
tax revenue and wealth in general, ASM is surpassed in importance in Ghana only by the 
agricultural and manufacturing sectors. Its enormous contribution to government revenue has 
been increasing over the years, especially since 2007 (PMMC, 2016, Figure 2), and the trend 
that began with the formalization process in 2006 is expected to continue.
3 
Mineral exports in 
2016 are reported to have increased by about 53%, with earnings of US$ 5,060 million 
(ISSER, 2016). The rise in the volume of gold exported and its unit market price is the cause 
of this change. 
 
 
Figure 2: Gold export from the small-scale mining 1989 – 2009 
Source: Data from the PMMC report, 2016 
 
                                                     
3
 Data from 2010 was not available for this research. However, gold production and export from the SSM sector 
is likely to double because of the recent expansion of operations throughout the country, the increase in 
prospecting, and the increase in the number of mining licenses that have been issued by the Minerals 
Commission in past years, as disclosed during interviews with the commission in Accra in 2015. 
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Furthermore, the contribution to Ghana’s total gold production by the ASM sector rose 
from 2.2% in 1989 to 34.4% in the year 2014 (MinCom, 2015; ICMM, 2015). The available 
data indicate an upward trend in ASM gold mining that mirrors the total national average 
output since 1990. Production, therefore, declined from 2015 (Figure 3). These statistics 




Figure 3: Share of Small-Scale gold mined to the total gold production in Ghana 
Data from the Minerals Commission of Ghana, 2017 
 
The ASM sector currently support over 4.5 million people (IIED, 2016). The labor tasks 
of people working in this sector are diverse, with skilled machine operators, general laborers, 
supervisors, secretaries, and translators. There is enormous diversity even in the ASM 
workforce in terms of age, education, gender, and social status. Therefore, children as young 
as eight and students of all educational levels (primary and high school, college, and post-
graduate) actively engage in small-scale gold mining. Approximately 70% of workers are 
unskilled and provide services such as cleaning, hauling, and on-site trading, while only 
approximately 30% perform technical tasks involving machinery or clerical functions.  
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The ASM sector, both legal and illegal, is currently booming. The growth in legal 
mining operations may be due to the effectiveness of the policy mentioned above and reforms 
in attracting private investors, while the increase in illegal mining may be due to mass 
unemployment (i.e., poverty-driven), inadequate enforcement of mining laws that make it 
easy for miners to ignore regulations, or a combination of both factors. The low capital costs 
required for starting ASM operations also drive the sector. Various barriers need to be 
surmounted to improve the efficiency and environmental sustainability of the industry. The 
2016 International Institute of Environment and Development report (IIED, 2016, p. 6) 
pointed to the lack of access to land, financing, and licenses as significant barriers.  
It is worth observing again that the ASM sector is believed to play a role in many 
pressing social, environmental, and human rights challenges in Ghana. Comprehensive and 
credible research that can inform policies designed to address these challenges is accordingly 
highly desirable. The information generated by such research can assist mining developers, 
investors, and other policy actors in constructing development strategies for the sustainable 
development of the Ghanaian mining industry. 
 
1.5. Research problem, objectives, and goals 
The following discussion places the research problem, objectives, and normative 
justifications for the approach taken in the context of relevant literature.  
 
1.5.1. The problem statement  
The restructuring and formalization of the SSM sector are expected to reduce gold 
smuggling, increase the national gold production and private investment, create employment, 
and improve the standard of living because of the competition among small-sized companies 
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(SSC). The ERP implemented in 1983 was developed to safeguard businesses in the export 
sector. The mining sector was identified as one of the key sectors in this effort to revitalize 
the economy, with the formalization of SSM operations given particular attention. Of the 
natural resources promoted by the national policy to attract investment in Ghana, gold has 
long been of particular strategic economic importance.  
Nevertheless, SSM operations and related businesses are struggling to cope with the 
growing demands that they assume the social, ethical, and environmental responsibility for 
their actions in the communities in which they are located. Dissatisfaction has arisen owing to 
the lack of effective institutional services in terms of the issuing of concessions, monitoring 
of land ownership rights and mining activities, and enforcement of mining standards, and 
because of the cooperation among stakeholders. Mining communities have suffered forced 
evictions from farmlands and violent attacks. The primary motivation for this thesis is the 
need to appraise institutional roles and their impact on the sustainable development of SSM 
businesses critically, in particular, a study that takes into account supply chains, human 
rights, adverse environmental impacts, and sustainable management. To fill this gap in the 
literature, this thesis has assembled evidence from the Amansie West and Bosomtwe Districts 
of Ghana’s Ashanti Region to answer three critical questions regarding mining, human rights, 
and environmental challenges: 
 
1. What are the empirical realities of child labor in SSM operations? 
2. What are the causes of violence in the SSM sector? 
3. How do the empirical conditions under which mining companies and institutions operate 




Objectives: To address the above research questions, this thesis presents the analyses of 
human rights and environmental challenges relating to the SSM supply chain and the 
influence of governing institutions, examining specifically the relationship between resource 
performance and governance structures. In an effort to assess the motivations for corporations 
to take responsibility for their actions, the empirical analysis will explore the nature and 
determinants of child labor and violence in mining communities and how institutions, 
including corporations, promote sustainable and responsible management of SSM. More 
specifically, the thesis: 
1. describes the empirical conditions of SSM and child labor issues, 
2. identifies the determinants of violent conflict in SSM, and 
3. analyzes the influence of SSM and institutions on the development of a SOL under the 
observed current conditions. 
 
1.5.2. The justifications and rationale of the study 
In addition to providing answers to the analytical assessment of institutional roles and 
their impact on the sustainable development of the SSM sector, this section of the thesis takes 
a normative stand in justifying the need for an assessment of SSM in Ghana.  
 
1.5.3. Normative justification of the problem 
Although problems relating to extractive minerals in Ghana are significant, they do not 
justify the classification of the output of Ghanaian mines as conflict minerals under the U.S. 
Dodd-Frank Act or the Heidelberg classification scale (HIIK, 2015) (see section 3.1), as is 
the case with crystals from countries such as the DRC. Nevertheless, the rate at which SSM 
operations are arising throughout Ghana, together with the violent conflict, the unsustainable 
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exploitation of natural resources (in particular, relating to water and land), and other 
environmental challenges, deserve investigation. The goal here is to characterize SSM-related 
conflicts, to identify the major causes of these conflicts, to estimate their impact on human 
rights, and to describe the best practices for the economic organization of transactions 
through workable institutions or cooperation. These issues are crucial to the survival and 
development of the mining sector and the full realization of the social benefits that it can 
offer. 
Ineffective institutional management around the monitoring of mining standards and the 
enforcement of regulations and land property rights (as a means to ensure conflict-free 
concessions) relating to SSM sector businesses fosters human rights violations, most 
dramatically in the form of violent conflict. While Ghana’s exploitation of natural resources 
is expected to boost the country’s economy, it remains uncertain whether this sector is 
immune to the so-called resources curse syndrome (ICMM, 2007). If this is the case, the 
scarcity of current information regarding child labor and exploitation, environmental 
destruction, and food insecurity in mining communities provides the normative justification 
for the present research inquiry. The consideration of fundamental human rights, such as the 
right to live, provides another rationale for the research into any activity that has the potential 
to incite violence, as according to the United Nations Guiding Principles (UN 2011, pp. 5-6), 
every individual has the right to enjoy peace and not be killed. This thesis seeks to contribute 
to the discussion of the prevention and proper management of conflict as a means to address 
these problems and to improve the understanding of how institutions and corporations can 




1.5.4. Relevance of the argumentation and contribution to the literature 
Previous studies of Ghana’s mining sector have focused on the problems faced by large-
scale operations. Thus, for example, to assess the impact of minerals on the country’s macro-
economy, Ayee et al. (2004) examined the economic and business prospects of Ghana’s 
mineral extraction industry, including oil and gas exploration. Similarly, Hilson and 
Yakovleva (2007) conducted a critical analysis of mining-related conflict through a case 
study of the Gold Star Mining Company, a large-scale firm. Large-scale environmental 
destruction and human rights abuses, including child labor and violent conflicts, however, 
usually involve small-scale gold mines. The current IIED (2016) report sought to identify the 
main barriers in the formalization of ASM in Ghana.  
Moreover, there has only been limited analysis of the role of institutions in promoting 
SSM sector businesses. In the case of Ghana’s Ashanti Region, where the country’s major 
mining activities take place, studies on the effectiveness of institutions in these efforts and 
conflict prevention and resolution are lacking in particular. A survey of earlier studies 
demonstrates that the focus has been on post-conflict reconstruction (Maconachie, 2016) and 
that this work has relied on a cross-country data set while failing to consider micro-level 
factors (Collier et al., 2004; Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; Hoeffler, 2004; Ross, 2014). There 
has been some analysis of the debate on granting social and legal mining licenses (Jenkins 
and Yakovleva, 2006; Kurlander, 2001; Lynch-Wood and Williamson, 2007; Moffat and 
Zhang, 2014; N. Ghauri, 2015; Owen and Kemp, 2012; Prno and Slocombe, 2012), but there 
has been far less research on the topic in pre-conflict settings or at the level of sub-national 
data (Koubi et al., 2014).  
In attempting to fill this literature gap, this thesis approaches the issues involved from 
multiple perspectives, taking into account the business, political, and social dimensions of 
SSM-related activities using approaches developed in the field of institutional and 
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developmental economics. Presented here are detailed discussions of mining supply chain 
challenges, including child labor and violence, based on observations of pre-conflict settings. 
Additionally, this thesis offers insights into the conditions under which mining companies 
operate and their role in shaping the social perceptions of mining licenses. More importantly, 
this thesis provides a unique insight into the field of resource management regarding the 
promotion of businesses in a volatile sector. The discussion of social and legal licenses for 
mining demonstrates the power of merging concepts to improve the responses to emerging or 
persistent issues relating to sustainability. In this respect, the focus moves away somewhat 
from the role of government policy in coordinating SSM activities in Ghana in light of the 
prevalence of problems associated with SSM. In sum, the thesis is presented as a theoretically 
sound scientific monograph intended to make a meaningful contribution to the knowledge 
base that informs policy practitioners and managers in the extractive minerals industry and to 
inspire other researchers. 
This thesis employs an empirical approach that provides the basis for a comprehensive 
understanding of issues surrounding SSM businesses and the role of government mining 
policies and institutions. Formal survey techniques combined with qualitative techniques 
assist in supporting the findings and observations to guarantee a more accurate picture of the 
situation on the ground. Anthropological approaches can be of use in interpreting insights 
from the perspectives of local actors, structures, and power relations, but in isolation, they are 
insufficient in providing a comprehensive account of a wide array of intervening variables. A 
mixed-methods approach accordingly seems appropriate for the analysis carried out in this 
thesis. For this analysis, we selected two districts with similar characteristics from within a 
single region in consultation with various experts from Ghana’s Minerals Commission at the 




1.6. Choosing the study region 
Figure 4 below depicts the regional boundaries of the Ashanti Region on a mineral map 
of Ghana. The region was chosen for this research because of its long-standing economic 
importance to the country based on its agriculture and extractive minerals, including both 
SSM and LSM of gold and diamonds. The Ashanti Region is significant for Ghana’s food 
security; it grows most of the country’s staple foods and commercial cash crops, including 
cocoa beans, owing in part to its rich tropical forest. Indeed, cocoa farming, which is a 
significant source of foreign exchange in the agricultural sector, is threatened by small-scale 
gold mining and the associated violent conflict. According to Ghana’s Population and 
Housing Census (2010), the Ashanti Region was home to 19.4% (amounting to 4,780,280 
people) of the country’s total population in 2010.  
While the conditions of doing business in Ashanti are similar to those in most other 
developing countries, the cost of doing business is relatively lower than in other parts of 
Ghana. Thus, it is estimated that the investment cost per job in the SSM sector in this region 
ranges from 10 to 12 USD, and so investing is economically feasible (UN, 1992). The 
industry thus remains attractive despite numerous social and human rights problems. All 





Figure 4: Small-scale mining areas 
Source: Adapted from Amankwah (2015) in IIED (2016) 
 
 
According to the 2010 Population and Housing Census, the Ashanti Region has a high 
rate of working children aged 5-14 years, with higher rates in rural areas (8.2%) than in urban 
areas (2.1%). The mining sector employs children aged between 8 and 14 years and more 
girls (4.8%) than boys (4.7%).
4
 Furthermore, the presence of a significant proportion of 
economically inactive women, especially in the 35-39 age group, calls for investigation, as 
such inactivity is not expected among those aged less than 70 (GLSS, 2010). On the contrary, 
the agriculture sector employs the most significant percentage of workers (30.5%), most of 
                                                     
4
 Ghana Statistical Service, 2010, Population and Housing Census for Ashanti Region, p. 108. 
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whom are women. It might be the case that women are excluded from SSM jobs, and this 
makes them turn to farm activities. These considerations were the primary reasons for the 
Ashanti Region to be chosen as the focus of this study.  
 
1.6.1. Selection of study districts  
Based on discussions with experts regarding Ashanti areas where SSM activities and 
businesses are concentrated, two districts (Figure 5), Amansie West and Bosomtwe, were 
selected (see section 3.5.2). The economic importance accorded to these districts is consistent 
with statements from SSM management officials at Ghana’s Mineral Commission, Accra. 
The two districts have similar socio-economic characteristics regarding mining-related 
conflict and its effects and their contribution to the production of the region’s food, fish, and 
cash crops such as cocoa in the case of Amansie West. The current national census report 
identified agriculture as the leading employment sector in these districts, accounting for 
59.2% in Amansie West (Ghana Statistical Service 2014a) and 28.1% in Bosomtwe (GSS, 
2014). 
According to Ghana’s Minerals Commission, Amansie West is one of the districts in the 
Ashanti Region most affected by SSM activities, ahead of Amansie Central, Atwima 
Mponua, and the Adanse South. Mining and quarrying employ 16.5% of the labor force in 
Amansie West, making it the second-largest source of employment after the agricultural 
sector. The sector employs only a few laborers in Bosomtwe, but mining activities in that 
district are expanding rapidly. As mentioned earlier, SSM is estimated to employ millions of 




1.6.2. Amansie West district  
The district is located within Longitude 6.05 º, 6.35 º and Latitude 1.40 º, 2.05 º North, 
with a total land area of about 1,230 sq km. As one of the largest districts in the Ashanti 
region, it hosts major and minor rivers that include the Offin, Oda, Jeni, Pumpin, and Emuna; 
all of these are essential for fishing, farming, and as a source of drinking water to most rural 
communities. In addition, the district has four central forest reserves, but illegal mining is 
threatening the existence of these forests. They include the Oda River Forest Reserve, 
Apanprama Forest Reserve, Jimira Forest Reserve, and Gyeni River Forest Reserve. 
 
1.6.3. Bosomtwe district  
The Bosomtwe district is one of the largest in the Ashanti Region. The area is found 
within the Latitudes 6º 24º South and 6º 43º North and 6º 43º North and Longitudes 1º 15º 
East and 1º 46º West, with a total land area of about 422,5 sq km. Major and minor rivers run 
through the district, including the Oda, Butu, Sisi, Supan and Adanbanwe, which are essential 
for fishing, farming, and as a source of drinking water for most of the rural communities in 
Amansie West. Among the natural resources endowed with the district include gold, clay, 
rocks, sand and stone deposits, forest resources, and Lake Bosomtwe, all of which are 




Figure 5: District map showing Amansie West and Bosomtwe districts 
Source: Atlas map of Ghana 
 
 
Each argument put forward in support of this study helps understand why governance 
structures are crucial in promoting or preventing companies to embark on sustainable and 
clean mining concerning human rights and socio-economic and environmental issues. 
 
1.6.4. Theory applications and argumentations  
This thesis primarily applies governance theories in assessing the influence of 
institutions on the management of SSM activities. However, we used other specific 
supportive theories in discussing the various themes that emerged in each thematic chapter. A 
functional governance structure must be in place to promote the small-scale gold mining 
sector businesses through the coordination of activities of critical levels in the supply chain. 
Achieving clean mining requires unflinching coordination of efforts from all key institutions 
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to align their operations within a sound economic governance structure (Kirsten et al., 
2009:35).  
Figure 6 displays the general governance conceptual framework for this study, which 
was adopted from Kirsten et al. (2009). For conceptualizing particular objectives, in each 
chapter, we referenced the specific governance theory. Society is believed to own the useful 
capital necessary for the establishment of businesses and the development for mutual gains. 
According to the Department for International Development (DFID) guidelines on 
sustainable livelihoods (DFID, 1999), this includes natural (tangible and intangible such as 
clean environment, land, forest, and minerals among others), physical (the necessary 
infrastructure to support life necessities; physical environment, adequate water supply and 
sanitation, clean and affordable energy, and access to information among others), human 
(skills, knowledge, capacity to labor, and good health), social (resources upon which people 
draw to pursue their livelihood objectives; membership groups, networks and connectedness; 
and so forth), and financial (the availability of cash or equivalent that supports production or 
consumption) capital. The existence of these assets may also influence the functional 
efficiency of intervening structures. For instance, some natural resources capital has been 
demonstrated as being associated with civil war (Cuvelier et al., 2014; OECD - Development 
Assistance Committee, 2005; M. L. Ross, 2008; Rustad et al., 2016). The capital is 
transformed to achieve the desired objectives by both policy actors, business, and the society 
through the transformation of structures and processes by the intermediate structures of 
government organization and the private sector utilizing the peculiar method. The social 
livelihood plan (SLP) demonstrates how society combines available assets to construct 
diverse portfolios of activities, shaped by the intervening process, to achieve their livelihood 
objectives. The expected social livelihood outcome (SLO) would include improved income 
status (that is less or no poverty), enhanced human rights protection (less child labor and less 
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violence at mining sites), increased well-being (including a safe and clean environment from 
clean mining), improved food security, and a more sustainable use of natural resources. The 
first proposition is that the SLO is achievable if institutions are efficient, that is, the economic 
performance of natural resources in alleviating poverty depends on governance structures. 
 
Figure 6: Governance framework 
Source: Ideas adapted from (DFID, 1999; Drinkwater and Care, 1999; Ellis, 1999; Dorward 
and Omamo., 2009:97) 
 
 
A governance organization can have both short- and long-term effects on the concerns of 
the private sector, such as SSM, through its policies, laws and regulations, institutions, and 
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the second proposition is that, when good governance creates an enabling environment, the 
private sector, including mining companies, stands to benefit and will produce social output 
that improves SLOs. Thus, we argue here that SLOs cannot ensure human rights and 
environmental sustainability when SSM companies employ exploitative strategies and suffer 
from poor management, thereby increasing social costs as well as the companies’ own 
operating costs in the long term. A non-exploitative approach, by contrast, involves none of 
these drawbacks. 
 
1.7.  Justifications for the application of governance theory 
Economic governance theories, which represent one branch of governance theory, are 
useful for the examination of the order, structure, and workability of arrangements for the 
management of certain specific economic transactions (Wieland, 2014; Williamson, 2005). 
The commercial activities involved in the production and distribution of resources require 
coordination and monitoring of traditional and non-traditional institutions (Kirsten et al., 
2009) in what Williamson (2005) termed “workable arrangements.” According to various 
conflict theories, the problems relating to inequality are the primary source of the social life 
competition that leads to all forms of conflict
5
 (Collins, 2012; Corte and Montolio, 2014).  
The governance of economic transactions involving the harnessing of natural resources, 
that is, the use and management of natural resources including mining, is intended to reshape 
the interest and rationale of economic agents in producing social outcomes in hosting 
communities and countries. To ensure desirable social results, including maintaining 
competitive industries and corporations in the exploitation of extractive minerals, sound 
governance is necessary for ordering economic transactions through working arrangements 
                                                     
5
 Lewis Coase (1913-2003) described this competition as “a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, 
power, and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure, or eliminate their rivals.”  
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that accommodate both traditional and non-traditional institutions. Economic management is 
a vital aspect of this effort, and therefore we acknowledge the causal relationship between 
institutional efficiency and economic development as Chang (2017) argues. Some studies 
have demonstrated that the interests of shareholders, customers, and regulators are at least in 
part conflicting and that these stakeholders have little power to coerce companies to mitigate 
the unintended social consequences for people and the environment (Salzmann and Ionescu-
somers, 2005). Hence, managers and shareholders alone cannot be responsible for reducing 
the adverse effects of mining on the broader society. In other words, we cannot look to 
companies alone for mitigation strategies. Therefore, there is a need for a holistic governance 
structure for the economic activities of the mining sector. 
There are of course other approaches to natural resources management beyond 
governance, including transaction costs theory, property rights theory, institutional theories, 
and legitimacy theories. To manage the adverse effects associated with mining appropriately, 
this study applies the economic governance theory in the discussions on how to achieve this 
objective. Part of the appeal of this approach lies in its flexibility when it comes to its use in 
combination with other theories. 
To be more specific, the economic governance theory helps to assess the various factors 
that shape the behavior of economic agents in the SSM sector regarding the management of 
extractive minerals and land resources and therefore plays a role in determining the levels of 
conflict, environmental destruction, and adverse effects on the rural way of life, child labor, 
and exploitation. These issues involve politics, society, and business and require the careful 
attention of economic governance structures to realize both social and competitive outcomes. 
This study explores and synthesizes the benefits of the unwritten rules of society that have 
guided SSM transactions as much as codified formal laws. Economic governance can be 
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integrated into existing arrangements to update or re-orient them by forming or strengthening 
working arrangements that favor social and economic harmony.  
The argument here is that the best way to create social value in the mining supply chain 
is through the application of a sound economic governance theory in preference to other 
theories. Thus, for instance, the property rights theory concerns efforts to ensure effective 
ownership rights of various resources but is by itself insufficient to address the human rights 
challenges associated with the management of the mining supply chain. Moreover, equal 
property rights alone cannot ensure the effective functioning of the extractive minerals trade 
when it comes to managing the adverse impacts associated with mining since it assumes an 
efficient land market. Unfortunately, owing to weak governance and limited institutional 
capacity, such a market environment barely exists for either farming or mining land in 
Ghana. The land market that is available for infrastructural development remains insufficient 
to mitigate the conflicts in this sector. Therefore, an effective institutional framework at the 
economic governance level is necessary (Williamson, 1994, p. 3).  
Similarly, the transaction cost theory as proposed by Coase (1990) is not applicable here 
owing to the non-zero costs of transactions for negotiations, such as valuing assets for 
contracts, contract tendering, bidding, and the transfer and purchase of the rights of a given 
resource. At a more fundamental level, the unending steps of the various bureaucratic 
procedures that must be followed by applicants for mining licenses in Ghana are just one 
example of the transaction costs involved in SSM activities.
6
 Furthermore, based on the 
agency theory, the proposal to reduce the high cost of monitoring transactions and agents is 
not feasible owing to unavoidable shirking in the management of the problem at hand. The 
issues of violent conflict, child labor and exploitation, land rights disputes, and the 
unintended negative impact of mining on the environment and the livelihood of rural mining 
                                                     
6
 For the procedures involved in obtaining a mining license, see the Minerals Commission’s mining policy 
document in Mining Act 703 of 2006. 
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households cannot be coordinated expertly by the various agents in the absence of effective 
mining governance. This proposal would instead increase transaction costs without solving 
the problem of agents’ self-interest. 
Suchman (1995, p. 574) defined the legitimacy theory as the “generalized perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values beliefs, and definitions.” Although companies manage 
legitimacy as a means of surviving by adapting to social expectations and selecting 
stakeholders that support their agendas (Oliver et al., 2006), this approach is less useful for 
managing the problem at hand. As companies are unable to predict the (changing) 
expectations of society, the legitimacy theory is only of limited use in explaining how to deal 
with a specific issue. It is useful to note that the perceptions and expectations of a society are 
not static; they evolve in response to the empirical conditions of companies. In this respect, 
the impact of mining on the social, environmental, and economic structures of host 
communities would be expected to shape societal perceptions in ways that cannot be 
accounted for by the legitimacy theory.  
By focusing on institutions and a set of related rules for governing the interactions of 
economic agents within the action arena, economic governance theory offers a framework for 
understanding the nature of both formal and informal institutions regarding the fundamental 
economic problems that they try to solve. These problems include management of shared 
resources, such as fish stock, pastures, land, minerals (mining), woods, lakes, and 
groundwater (Ostrom, 1990). The crucial aspects of formal institutions include rules, 
regulations, and monitoring enforcement strategies that protect property rights and transfer. 
Essential elements of informal institutions involve working arrangements that support 
production and transactions involving specific economic or social goods outside the context 
of the markets (cf. Williamson, 2005; Wieland, 2014). 
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Wieland (2014, p. 16) has characterized governance ethics concerning the realization of 
the inherent moral dimensions of economic transactions. These include formal and informal 
institutions at work within a given institutional setting, individual self-monitoring, the 
mechanism of the person involved, and the nature of the coordination and corporation 
mechanisms of economic organizations. In other words, governance ethics help to integrate 
morality into commercial transactions.
7
 This thesis empirically discusses and analyses the 
critical aspects of moral-economic problems relating to Wieland’s governance ethics, such as 
child labor and food security threats in mining communities. Data from field observations can 
reveal how small- and medium-sized mining companies obtain SOLs. The goal, then, is to 
examine how the management of moral, economic problems shapes the perceptions of 
society regarding a company’s right to mine. 
No attempt is made to integrate Wieland’s propositions in this thesis; rather, the analysis 
focuses on how institutions and mining corporations through their functions govern or 
manage human rights and environmental challenges, for example, by promoting clean mining 
and a competitive SSM sector within the framework of economic governance. State 
institutions have the power to inhibit the provision of public goods through private 
investments (Berman et al., 2014). As a contribution to the literature on private investment in 
the SSM sector, this thesis examines Ghana’s mining policy to identify the functions of 
institutions and modes of economic governance that can promote SSM sector businesses. 
 
                                                     
7
 Wieland, Governance Ethics, Springer, 2014. For Wieland, governance ethics concerns the performance 
capacity of the economy in realizing a society’s moral claims in terms of integrity, compliance management 
(e.g., the avoidance of child labor, violent conflicts, and environmental destruction in mining areas), and social 
responsibility in economic activities. 
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1.8. Overview of key concepts and definitions 
In the discussions that follow, this thesis emphasizes sustainability, mining supply chain 
human rights, child labor, and conflict management, and the interplay between good 
governance, institutions, and companies concerning resource management; concepts that will 
be discussed in turn. 
 
1.8.1. Theoretical definition of terms 
1.8.1.1. Good governance principles and institutional structures 
Good governance used in international development literature describes how public 
institutions lead public affairs and supervise public resources (Cundill and Fabricus, 2010). 
Governance provides the social environment that allows rulemaking, joint decision action, 
and institutions for social coordination (Dietz et al., 2003). This thesis, therefore, defines the 
term good governance to include the interaction among the various structures such as 
traditional Ghanaian society (social structures), the political institutions (mainly state 
institutions), and the corporate body and how these bodies make decisions, share power, and 
exercise responsibilities that ensure clean mining including accountability toward the 
management of natural resources. Good governance would support the interest of 
stakeholders of a company and the community’s in a balance concerning clean mining.  
An interplay between good governance exists (for example, making rules and laws and 
law enforcement) and providing an enabling environment, for instance, constituting viable 
institutions to make sure that structures are in place to support the correct observation of 
conventions, codes of conduct, and rules by all stakeholders including companies. Weak 
governance and institutional infrastructure, for example, may have a direct adverse effect on 
growth (El Anshasy & Katsaiti, 2013), even though poor growth may also be brought about 
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by weak governance, and vice versa. The causal relation may account for the interplay 
between good governance (both political and traditional structures), institutions, and 
company practices.  
 This study argues that good governance principles would ensure that political structures 
support the effective functioning of institutions and could make institutions viable tools that 
encourage responsible mining practices. The institutions here would include both state 
political, regulatory institutions (the lands commission, minerals commission, environmental 
protection agencies, and so forth) and non-state traditional institutions such as local 
traditional leaders, and the peace council. 
 
1.8.2. Human rights challenges of the mining supply chain 
At this point, we survey some of the human rights challenges or violations associated 
with mining discussed in the literature. There are challenges peculiar to artisanal mining in 
developing countries, including Ghana, regarding the United Nations Human Rights guiding 
the principles of business (2011).  
These guiding principles recognize that businesses play vital roles in the societies in 
which they operate. The first and second principles emphasize the responsibilities of 
companies to respect international and national rules relating to human rights and to prevent 
abuses thereof; the third principle ensures that corporations enforce international, federal, and 
local human rights laws. Respect for human rights in business operations must take into 
account not only workers but also the broader society. The state, on the other hand, has 
human rights duties regarding legislation and enforcement, effective governance, and 
supporting institutions that protect their citizens’ rights to live in a healthy environment, to 
benefit from natural resources, and to enjoy peace in their communities. These considerations 
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are essential in light of the potential risks that mining activities pose to Ghanaian 
communities.  
Businesses in gold mining and other extractive enterprises have long been associated 
with high social risks, including those relating to human rights and the environment. It is 
these external aspects that threaten the appeal and competitiveness of extractive industries 
(Rees et al., 2012). Exploitation of minerals in Ghana does not differ qualitatively from 
elsewhere; there have been significant unintended effects on humans and the environment. 
Extractive minerals such as gold, tin, tungsten, coltan, and copper are important for domestic 
and industrial uses in appliances, machinery, and tools in daily activities, including the 
components of automotive and aircraft engines (the transportation and aviation sectors), 
surgical instruments (health), and capacitors (electronic and consumer industries). This sector 
deserves more significant attention because of the worldwide demand for minerals and the 
supply chain challenges associated with them. 
However, the mining of these metals in most cases involves children who often face 
severe risks to their health, safety, and prospects, especially in ASM activities (Hinton, 2005; 
ILO, 2005). Violence and conflict over the exploitation of natural resources, including 
mining, is a related area of concern. The petroleum industry has been associated with 
economic inequality, elite capture, denial of access to resources, poverty, and political 
corruption (Langer and Stewart, 2013; Humphreys et al., 2008). The literature described 
individual countries as having a high risk of conflict owing to the civil war that was caused 
by the mismanagement of mining operations (OECD, 2013).  
 
1.8.3. Sustainability 
Attempts to address sustainability have become management tools for resolving conflict 
in large-scale projects (Franks et al., 2014) and crucial considerations concerning business 
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survival and community growth (Popa and Salanță, 2014). Thus, firms that behave 
responsibly and have impressive records for sustainability may enjoy enhanced 
competitiveness owing to positive relations with the communities in which they operate. The 
demand for sustainability in the mining sector requires managers to think creatively about 
identifying efficient ways of using natural resources that minimize the environmental impact 
on the broader society. The success of most activities that significantly affect the 
environment depends on the sustainable management of these effects on society, mining 
governance and policy schemes, and the empirical conditions of mining operations. The 
understanding of sustainability in this thesis refers to mining activities that promote less 
negative (or more positive) social outputs as well as competition among corporations through 
the efficient use of both the environment and workers. To be precise, ensuring clean mining 
as proposed by this thesis involves facilitating sustainability regarding environmental and 
socio-economic structures and SSM enterprises. 
 
1.8.4. Organization of the thesis 
The critical observations presented in this study relate to the reality of child labor in 
SSM. Among the main issues addressed include whether mining causes conflict; whether 
gold itself or instead management of its extraction is problematic; why land resource 
ownership issues are associated with conflict between households and mining communities; 
whether mining offers greater remuneration than farming; and, if so, why rural households 
and Ghanaian society, in general, oppose granting SOLs to small-scale gold mining 
businesses through the present moratorium. 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 focuses on child labor in 
SSM at the supply level, using a mixed methods approach to identify the reasons why mining 
managers employ children. Specific questions explored include the continued employment of 
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children when machines are available and why parents encourage or allow their children to 
participate in such a dangerous activity. Chapter 2, in short, presents an empirical analysis of 
the human rights challenges confronting the SSM sector in the Ashanti Region.  
Chapter 3 provides the econometric estimations of the frequency and determinants of 
human rights violations in SSM communities and concludes by identifying the predictive 
factors, such as horizontal inequalities and insufficient regulatory monitoring of land rights, 
for the adverse outcomes of mining, in particular demonstrating the association of a 
significant ethnic group with certain types of violence in mining communities. The discussion 
in this chapter touches on the nature of common forms of conflict in these communities, the 
frequency with which and ways in which households encounter conflict, and potential 
mitigation policies; it thus centers on the horizontal inequality and greed and grievance 
hypotheses.  
Chapter 4 presents empirical evidence on the role of governance in the development of 
the small-scale gold mining sector. In promoting this development, the two critical issues are 
the negative impacts of mining on the perceptions of social licenses for mining and the 
empirical conditions of extraction in the context of the current moratorium on SSM in Ghana. 
In this chapter, the analysis focuses on the influence of governance and mining corporations 
on the availability of SOLs in SSM communities in the Ashanti Region. The study in this 
chapter is designed to reveal the influence (roles) of institutions and the empirical conditions 
of mining corporations on obtaining an SOL. Taken into account are situations in which the 
impact (mainly harmful) of mining on aspects of the environment, such as water and land 
resources, has been significant.  
Chapter 5 offers a summary of the thesis, a discussion of the significant results, and the 
critical policy propositions. This concluding chapter also highlights the challenges that need 
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to be explored in future research. As a further contribution to the literature on SSM, this 
thesis hopes to serve as the basis for a published book.  
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2. Analysis of child labor issues in Ghanaian SSM  
 
Abstract  
In Ghana, children are employed for various reasons, including child exploitation or jobs 
for their development such as working to finance education, and so forth. Consequently, the 
employment of children at dangerous mining sites is commonplace and seems unending. 
Empirical accounts from the sector advocate for the need to protect children. However, there 
is a shortage of information to allow us to address the following questions: What motivates 
managers to employ children despite existing regulations? How does mining governance 
affect child labor? The chapter applied country representative data and direct interviews with 
regulatory institutions for assessment. It argues that understanding the current trends, 
challenges, and experiences of miners will provide a better way of organizing policies toward 
child labor eradication and contribute toward effective implementation and realization of the 
new Sustainable Development Goal, 8:8.7 “…effective measures to eradicate forced labor...” 
(UN, SDGs, 2015). The results reveal that child labor still exists in the Amansie West and 
Bosomtwe districts of Ghana. The existence of the inadequate monitoring of mining practices 
on both mining operators and gold buyers in the sector, connected with unsuitable social 
intervention programs to support the vulnerable, including the homeless and single-parent 
households, encourages child labor. In addition, the unethical operator acquisition of 
concessional land and the unhealthy competition on the part of on-site gold buyers reinforce 
the negative behavior of operators and encourage child labor. An institutional and market-
oriented shared-value creation is discussed to alleviate child labor.
 8
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Since the Gold Coast era, Ghana has demonstrated a long history of mineral resources 
endowment. Studies have established that the contribution of mineral proceeds to the 
country’s development is uncertain. Therefore, factors such as bad contractual arrangements, 
incentive problems that characterized institutional and political challenges, among others, 
impede the progress, as found by Ayee J, Soreide T, Shukla G, and Le T. (2011) and Jensen 
W. (2004). Since 1999, gold has been the primary single forex earner yet its contribution to 
the socioeconomic effects on Ghanaian people is minimally felt, and this has been declining 
ever since. As predicted, the mineral economy is expected to affect Ghana’s economy 
positively (African Trade Policy 2011; Hinton 2007). The Minerals Commission estimates 
that small-scale miners contribute to about 28% of total gold production in 2011. It 
significantly contributes to employment generation by employing over one million active 
workers (including the “galamsey”; unregulated peasant miners) more than the total 
employment offered by LSM [ISSER, 2008]. Unintentionally, most of the benefits trade-off 
with a social cost: child labor in the SSM sector. 
The United Nations new 2030 agenda for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
[United Nations, 2015], that seeks to protect the people, the planet, and prosperity, will not be 
realized entirely in low and middle-income countries especially goal number 8, section 8.7; 
“taking immediate and effective measures to eradicate forced labor and all worst forms of 
child labor.” The goal, in general, is requesting the effort of all countries, businesses, and 
non-governmental organizations to promote sustained, inclusive, and sustainable economic 
growth, and full and productive employment for all including decent work by the year 2025. 
This goal will be lost by low- and middle-income countries if child labor in the SSM sector is 
not critically examined. Inequitable distribution of income and unhealthy competition for 
scarce but limited natural resources as argued by Kusi Appiah et al. (2014), persists in low 
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and middle-income (less developed and developing) countries. Similarly, in Ghana, these 
conditions compel children from most households in mining communities into mining, 
despite the significant contribution of gold to the Ghanaian economy as reported by the 
Ghana Chamber of Mines in 2014. 
Child labor threatens middle and low-income countries because of its driving forces and 
effects. Some reports allude that child labor affects and generates poverty, broken homes, 
outdated cultural practices, escalating unemployment rates, and illiteracy, among some of the 
intricacies (GLSS, 2014). The SSM sector records some of the worst forms of child labor 
nationwide amid a high rate of gold production. We further estimated that the Ashanti region 
is third on the list of areas where mining is the primary economic activity after the Upper 
East and Western regions with 23%, 27%, and 26% respectively.
9
 From the same data, the 
area has 654 communities where mining is the dominant economic activity, with 504 of these 
hosting SSM and 364 communities hosting child laborers. Most children aged 5 to 17 work, 
on average, 31 to 105 hours per 7 days in activities that are classified as the worst forms of 
child labor by the International Labour Organization (ILO, 1999) in the region. The Amansie 
West and Bosomtwe districts of Ashanti are on the list of the most affected communities in 
the area. This alarming rate of child labor, if not checked, would lead to tremendous adverse 
effects more significant than those posed by the agricultural and the service sectors, the 
current sectors with the most child labor. The rest of the sections are organized as follows; 
section two presents the background and related research, section three presents the results, 
and section four presents the discussion, findings, and lessons learned. Most Sub-Saharan 
African countries are exasperated with the primary forms of child labor in the SSM sector, 
which includes family-related child labor, bonded child labor, and self-employed child labor 
(Hinton, 2005). Bonded child labor, as discussed by Hinton (2005), is used for loan 
                                                     
9
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resettlements, and the child is provided for this resettlement. This arrangement is usually 
against the will of the child and endangers their health and development. Family-related child 
labor occurs when the family’s primary source of income activity is mining, and therefore the 
children automatically become mining workers who contribute to the household income. 
Self-employed child labor is a survival plan often for the poorest, neglected, and orphaned 
children.  
 
2.2. Background and related research 
Some studies on the sector have covered the Northern region of Ghana and explicitly the 
regulatory and ecological challenges, while others such as Hilson (2009) analyzed the 
progress of interventions by local NGOs to withdraw about 150 children from mining work. 
That research found that the NGOs intervention program did not tackle the underlying issues 
and therefore ended up creating more confusion in that study area. Relatedly, the ILO studies 
and reports on child labor in artisanal mining from Ghana, Peru, and the United Republic of 
Tanzania (2007) focused on girl’s roles and the effect on their livelihoods. It found that most 
girls were promised a better life by their parents if they migrated to work on mining sites. 
The study also contends that more girls than boys constitute the 49% of child labor found 
doing hazardous work. Other studies including the United Kingdom’s Department for 
International Development (DFID) report (2000), which analyzed the negative and positive 
effects of SSM on the environment and economy extensively. As part of an integrated review 
of development planning, Hinton (2005) found significant adverse environmental effects of 
artisanal mining and considerable income gains to beneficiaries from her work on 
communities and SSM. Additionally, Hoedoafia (2014) examined the effects of SSM on 
living conditions in the Gonja West district of Ghana and found that child labor has an 
adverse effect on SSM.  
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Other researchers attribute the inability to monitor child labor in illegal mining, the lack 
of social infrastructure, and poor living conditions in rural communities (IPEC, 2004; Gunn 
and Priester, 2004; Wasserman, 1999) as the fundamental causes. There are fewer available 
studies that investigate child labor issues from the perspective of small-scale mining 
operators (SSMOs) in the Amansie West district, especially on what motivates them to 
employ children to acquire mining concessions. In addition, less is known about the 
possibilities of the regulatory bodies in creating shared-value toward child labor mitigation 
for the study districts. This chapter helps bridge this grey area by providing the current 
insights and contributes to the development of effective policies toward child labor mitigation 
and the implementation of SDG goal number 8.  
This chapter also offers mitigation strategies to the underlying causes of child labor in 
the study region. We can achieve the above SDG by drawing upon findings from key 
informant interviews in the industry, in addition to the current country representative data 
from the Ghana Statistical Service- Living Standard Survey round six (GLSS 6). We 
conclude that child labor activities exist in the SSM sector, and companies will face business 
risks if child labor is poorly managed.  
 
2.3.  Mining policy and child labor 
SSM or artisanal mining currently forms an integral part of Ghana’s economy. Since 
1989, the PNDCL 218 has regularized SSM activities, which were then illegal prior to the 
enactment of that law. This statutory framework was enacted to promote and regulate the 
orderly development of the sector and to reverse the mass smuggling of gold out of Ghana. 
The Precious Minerals Marketing Corporation, now the Precious Minerals Marketing 
Company (PMMC), was inaugurated to promote the development of small-scale gold and 
diamond mining including outright purchase from miners and the issuing of licenses for 
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private investments on their behalf. In addition, to regularize the activities of illegal mining to 
acceptable practices, the Minerals Commission of Ghana is mandated to issue licenses for all 
SSM activities.  
Ghana’s framework for child labor supported by the Children’s Act 560 of 1980, cited in 
the Ghana Statistical Service child labor report (2014, b.p.1), explains that children under 15 
years are not allowed to work in any form of formal job, with a few exceptions to non-
dangerous family work for children aged 13 to 14 years, who can do non-profit or paid light 
activities for their families. Although this Act is complemented by the 1999 International 
Labour Organizations Convention on the eradication of all of the worst forms of child labor, 
unfortunately, it has not realized a strong effect on Ghana’s SSM sector. The same report 
indicates three significant remedial policies: the Ghana Child Labour Monitoring System 
(GCLMS), the Hazardous Activity Framework for the Cocoa Sectors of Ghana (HAF), and 
the Standard Operating Procedures and Guidelines (SOPs) for Child Labour Elimination in 
Ghana. These were designed specifically for Ghana to correct the problem but they are often 
ignored, and there is limited implementation due to governance challenges. 
In addition, the minerals commission believes that the Minerals and Mining Act 703 of 
2006 allows only Ghanaians of 18 years and above to acquire and operate SSM concessions 
that cater for child labor. The Commission further trusts that the 2012 mining regulation also 
allows only adults over the age of 21 and above to work in underground mining activities. 
Both laws in addition to the mentioned policies are supposed to reduce child labor in the 
mining sector. Similarly, as argued (Stewart, 2011; Stewart and Brown, 2007; ILO, 2007), 
the remedial policies to address inequalities including those leading to child labor in mining, 




2.4. Methods and data 
2.4.1. Study area 
Reliable statistics demonstrate that children account for about 43.0% of households in 
both districts with the average household size of 4.5 per household (GSS, 2010a). In addition, 
the districts have a higher dependency ratio of 84.9% and 83.2% (GSS, 2010: a and b), 
respectively (Amansie West and Bosomtwe), with respective higher age dependency ratio for 
boys (85% and 87%) than girls (84.5% and 80%). Of these children, approximately 66% have 
attained economic age (15 years and above), but are unemployed and searching for jobs in 
Amansie West, which is less than their compatriots in Bosomtwe district (73%) [GSS, 
2010b]. The main mining activities in both areas are SSM operations. However, few of the 
existing industrial operations such as cassava processing and local dry gin distillation obtain 
their raw materials from agriculture for the Amansie West while agriculture, fishery, forestry, 
and carving make up the dominant industry for the Bosomtwe district. These characteristics 
indicate that there is a high tendency for poor households in the communities to intensify 
mining activities, a feature that is peculiar to low- and middle-income countries with less 
alternative economic activities as argued by Hinton (2005). Research has demonstrated that 
the impact of SSM is predicted to be significant in improving the lives of poor people. More 
so, a substantial number of people depend on artisanal mining as put forward by an ILO 
meeting in Geneva (2003), and this view is shared among poor household communities 
including the residents of the Amansie West and Bosomtwe districts of Ghana. 
The Minerals Commission identifies Amansie West district as one of the areas with the 
highest incidences of child labor in the country. It is ranked first on the list of areas that host 
child activities in SSM ahead of other districts such as the Amansie Central, Atwima 
Mponua, the Adanse South, and Bosomtwe districts. Ghana’s 2010 population and housing 
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census found that 16.5% of labor in Amansie West is in the mining sector while 0.6% of 
labor in the Bosomtwe district is in the mining sector (GSS, 2014a). A majority of the 
employment in both districts was in the private informal sector (approximately 94%). The 
same reports illustrate that although general economic conditions and living conditions for 
access to basic needs are weak, over the past eight years there has been a migration of 
economically active labor to the region and both districts. 
 
2.4.2. Methods and data 
The study uses descriptive statistics and a qualitative analysis to examine the evidence 
via perceptions and secondary data obtained. Valuable information was sourced from 
essential institutions such as the Minerals Commission, Precious Minerals Marketing 
Company (PMMC), and eight SSMOs. Secondary data was collected from the Ghana 
Statistical Service (GSS), whereas key-informant and in-depth interviews were conducted 
first with the regulatory institutions such as the Minerals Commission division for SSM and 
the PMMC and then followed up with semi-structured interviews with SSMOs. The GLSS 6 
data on child labor has valuable indicators for monitoring the worst forms of child labor in 
Ghana at national, regional, district, and community levels. Indicators captured from the 
mining sector include income, hours of work, age distribution, among others. The GLSS 6 
data is national representative data for monitoring the impact of programs and policies on the 
welfare of the Ghanaian population. The study gathered useful information and follow-up via 




2.4.3. Observations from the key interviews 
Brief observations demonstrate that the Minerals Commission, which manages the 
certification of SSM operators, does little to monitor SSM activities, and managers affirmed 
this during field observation and interviews. Doubtfully, the Commission asserts that child 
labor only occurs with illegal miners. Furthermore, the PMMC as the state-owned enterprise 
is backed by the Limited Liability Companies Act 179 of 1963 and authorizes the purchase of 
licenses to potential individuals and companies to purchase gold and diamond from small-
scale miners. Furthermore, it also buys gold and diamond from artisanal miners, and exports 
all diamonds from Ghana under the 2003 Kimberly Certification Act, backed by Ghana’s law 
652. However, the organization only works with for-profit businesses and show no concern 
for other social and environmental issues. Furthermore, the PMMC fails to regulate or 
monitor the activities of their clients (private buyers of gold from SSMs) whom they have 
authorized (issued buying license) to do business on their behalf. 
 
2.5. Results and discussions 
The analysis from GLSS 6 data illustrates that children begin working at mining sites 
arduously as young as five years old as a minimum, 11 years old as the average, and 17 years 








Table 1: History of child work 
When carrying out work 
Student    Frequency Non-Student Frequency 
After school    40 During the day, 6 am to 6 pm      1,335 
Before school     4 Evening/night      13 
Both before and after school    7 Both day and evening      31 
On the weekends    363 Weekends      214 
During missed school hours     47 Sometimes, daytime      20 
Vacation    13   
Source: Estimated from Ghana Living Standard Survey 6 data 
 
 
Table 1 illustrates that (out of 2,220 households sampled) more children between the 
ages of 5 and 17 are engaged in SSM, and those who are not in school carry out activities 
between 6 am and 6 pm (1,335). Other children from the same category work on weekends 
and at night, with most students working on weekends (363). Additionally, some students 
miss school for mining work in the Ashanti region. The data demonstrates 1,613 cases of 
child labor for non-school going children and 474 school-going children. Some child miners 
work on average four and half hours per day with an extreme ranging from 10 to 15 working 
hours per day. Correspondingly, we estimate from the same data that child workers receive 
on average 417 Ghana cedis per week (60 a day) and maximum earnings of 3,450 cedis per 
week (492 a day)
10
, for those children who devote most of their time to working at mining 
sites as their primary source of economic activity (GLSS 6).  
The analysis from the field interviews illustrated in Figure 7 demonstrates that 88% of 
the mining operators employed children at their SSM site (first exhibit from Figure 7). Most 
of the respondents (78%), also responded that they employ children below 17 years old 
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 One Ghana cedi (¢) is equivalent to 0.23 US$ based on 2017 interbank rates at the Bank of Ghana. 
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(second exhibit from Figure 7). Comparatively, several revelations existed within and across 
different working operator groups per their definition of license holdings for mining; license 
holders (group a, third exhibit) and non-license holders (group b, third exhibit). Figure 7, the 
third exhibit, reports that only 33% of the SSM operators indicated that they operate with a 
license. When the managers responded to their awareness of any law that debars offering 
children employment, their views were equally divided into “yes” and “no” (50% toward 
each level, exhibit number 4 from the left). Awareness of both national laws and local 
community regulations on child labor, especially at mining sites, were indicated by those who 
knew about the existing rules against child labor. 
 
 
Figure 7: General descriptive statistics 
Source: Estimated from field data 
  
 
The findings indicate that the licensed miners were less associated with child labor than 
their peers. This result could be explained by the weak monitoring and enforcement of 
regulations since miners are aware of the existing laws yet act against the rules on mining and 
child labor. In addition, there are other reasons besides poverty and weak law enforcement 




2.5.1.  Mining concessions 
Further subgroups among the non-license holder group (b) were identified (fifth exhibit 
from the left in Figure 2). The two sub-groups consist of those working with other people’s 
licenses (83%) and those who engage in mining without any permit (33%). For instance, two 
operators indicated that they work with their own license (category 1), two others work with 
someone else’s license (group 2), and the other four work without any permit (group 3) [see 
Figure 8]. Those who owned licenses also indicated that they obtained mining concessions 
from a state official (100%). However, above 50% (2/4) of the non-licensed miners of all 
types (Figure 8) obtained mining concessions from either a political party official, state 
official or a traditional head, while 20% obtained concessions from intermediary people 
popularly known as “middle men/women.” Specific examples across the group of non-
licensed managers revealed that those who work with someone else’s license, but received 
mining concessions from a household head, do not employ children at their site. Except for 
acquiring the mining site from the heads of households, we also found that miners who 
received mining concessions from bodies other than the Minerals Commission were more 





Figure 8: Sources of mining concession and child labor 
Source: Estimated from field data 
  
 
2.5.2. Major child labor activities at mining sites 
According to the mining operators, the major activities undertaken by children at the 
mining sites include; self-service (below 15%), which is what they termed as “working 
without been hired,” transporting of sand (20%), water fetching and stonewashing (over 25% 
each), and digging (below 10%) as portrayed in Figure 9. The findings were that children 
suffer significant life-threatening health and physical conditions, aside from the 
psychological consequences, which are widely discussed in the literature (Hinton, 2005; 
Gunn and Preister, 2004; IPEC–ILO, 2004). This damage usually arises from exposure to 
dangerous substances including mercury, acidic drainages, cyanide, and extreme heat due to 
lack of proper ventilation because of poor working conditions and lack of appropriate 




Figure 9: Major child activity type at a mining site 
Source: From field data 
 
 
2.5.3.  Reasons for employing children 
The analysis of the reasons for using child labor in mining sites revealed that the 
majority of operators argue in favor of child employment. Some reasons included that the 
parents brought the children to the mine for paid jobs (27% of responses), and others (20%) 
argued for children to work at the mines to enable the children to pay their school fees. 
Approximately 13% of respondents were in favor of child labor because it offered jobs to 
homeless children or it reduces operational costs. In addition, 7% were in favor of child labor 





Figure 10: Reasons for or against child employment 
Source: Estimated from field data 
 
 
Similarly, views within the groups do not differ much from the previous reasons for 
employing children. For instance, license holders who engage children are of the opinion that 
children come to search for gold themselves and their parents bring them at other times. 
Although non-license holders hire children to reduce operational costs (about 15% of 
responses), 23% of reactions indicate (for each) that the children informed them that they 
needed the work to pay their school fees; sometimes, their parents brought them for work. 
More so, approximately 7% of respondents indicated that one could meet children already 
working on the mining sites because “they come by themselves,” or “others are homeless,” 
respectively. In addition, 7% of respondents are also of the view that children lack the skills 
to be employed on mining sites as a reason to reject their labor; whereas an insignificant 
number of respondents refused to comment on this question (see Figure 11.)  
These findings support the results by the Afrikid’s “Operation Sunlight Feedback 
Report” that concluded that concession holders target children as cheap labor in the Northern 
region of Ghana. This could be because their parents brought them to the mining sites or 
because most children offered themselves to work on the mining sites by their own free will. 
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This is in contrast to the findings by Hinton (2005) that most children in Tanzania were 
forced to work on mines; this demonstrates that child labor in Ghana is different to other 
countries. We found further evidence that child labor in Ghana is poverty motivated, which is 
in agreement with the findings from Hilson (2010) and is also consistent with some research 
(Hentschel et al., 2003) that found that low family income influences parents’ decisions to 
persuade their children to undertake mining activities. The lack of formal social support for 
impoverished households coupled with a lack of alternative employment in the rural 
communities explains this outcome. From the manager’s perspective, weak institutional 
capacity in services and inadequate monitoring of mining standards concerning child labor 
significantly influence the existence of child labor. Factors such as illegal mining, the lack of 
proper concessions, lack of access to adequate wages (in particular from mining) that created 
a good livelihood, may not have the need for their children to work, and the lack of social 
support to rural households are the key challenges to consider in mitigating policies. 
 
 
Figure 11: Why employ child? Views among groups 




2.5.4. SSM license authority  
Although all the operators who responded to the survey were aware of the existing 
international laws (12%), national laws (25%), and community laws (63%) that prohibit child 
labor, they still used arguments from the indicated reasons in support of their decision to 
employ children (Figure 12). Mining operators of all types engage children for various 
reasons. Therefore, it is interesting to question the source of their license. In general, 80% 
cited the Minerals Commission as the issuer of their license, and even though only the 
commission can issue a valid license, the rest claimed that traditional leaders issued their 
license. Further inquiry within the permit holding groups revealed split sources of mining 
permits. Approximately 50% received mining permits from either a traditional leader or the 
Minerals Commission. All the non-license holders, except those working with licenses other 
than their own, cited the Commission as the issuer. 
 
 
     Figure 12: Licensing authority 





2.5.5. A market outlet for gold mining 
Market access or the outlet of daily gold mined was examined to determine how the gold 
market could influence child labor using appropriate mitigating strategies. Inquiries into the 
market outlet for the daily gold mined indicates that most of the gold is sold to foreign private 
individuals, followed by Ghanaian private individuals, and the rest is sold to other 
unidentified buyers in the district. Knowledge of this informs the useful mitigations by 
demonstrating the dominant hand in the market (see Figure 13.) Gold-mined is either sold on 
the mining site, at offices located in the community, at nearby villages, in the city, or at 
undisclosed locations to individual Ghanaians (over 50% of responses), foreigners (above 
40% of responses), or to unidentified gold merchants (less than 10% of responses). The 
results indicate that the depth of the private market involvement in the SSM of gold is not 
carefully monitored. Therefore, a good governance mechanism must be put in place for 
effective child labor regulation and to prevent the sector from becoming a place for 
converting child workers into child mercenaries that could support illegal armed activities. 
 
 
Figure 13: Market outlet of gold-mined 




2.5.6. Social responsibility knowledge of business partners 
Informatively from Figure 14, we reported that most respondents are of the view that 
their business collaborators care less about their health, and the health of the community in 
general, and that 75% of respondents across the group affirm this position. However, only 
13% of illegal miners suggested that their business partners care for the health of the 
community and that of their workers. Meanwhile, 100% of legal miners were of the view that 
their partner buyers do not care about the health of suppliers or of the mining communities. 
We found that 66% of managers working with other people’s license hold similar views, with 
16% of them indicating that their clients care for the health of workers and the communities 
health. Marginally, the views among illegal miners, the third category, are similar with 50% 
registering their disappointment on the neglected social responsibilities and 25% believing 
that buyers care about their suppliers’ health and the health of the community inhabitants.  
 
 
Figure 14: Social responsibilities from gold buyers 





2.5.7. Training on responsible mining and environmental safety 
When asked about training skills on better mining standards for the environment, safety, 
and responsible sourcing, 75% of the respondents said they had received training and the 
remainder said they had not. Within the category groups, all the license holders deny 
receiving training on best mining practices. Likewise, 66% of the illegal miners held similar 
views (Figure 15). The results here suggest that the establishment of a future relationship 
between the miners and the communities in which they operate would be negative due to the 
































Figure 15: Mining training received 





2.5.8. Mitigating child labor at mining sites 
Among the SSM operators interviewed, the results suggest that putting guidelines in 
place to guide child employment in the sector would be the best strategy to mitigate child 
labor rather than an outward ban. Government guidelines, for instance, should allow 
teenagers from ages 16 to 17 years to work on vacation and at weekends. Some members of 
the community are already implementing this strategy in some cities, and this is proving 
successful. We suggest that an exception should cover children from single parents who 
cannot meet the financial responsibilities of their children’s education completely. These 
children must be allowed to work to support their education should the requirement be met. 
More so, local traditional leaders together with the unit committees (a Unit committee is a 
state elected members at the local level which carry out other functions including setting out 
particular guidelines in agreement with local traditional leaders, etc.) should be motivated to 
monitor the locally agreed guidelines jointly. This collaboration will ensure that miners 
strictly respect the guidelines to protect their children’s interest.  
As argued by Anker (2000), child labor (child gainful activities at that is not exploitative) 
is for the benefit of the child, which includes working to pay school fees, for food, and 
medical services, while child labor (exploitation) is against the interest of the child. In 
relation to this, we identified that the monitoring of child labor associated with SSM is 
insufficient. The results suggest that the district has not received any formal policies on 
mitigating this type of child labor, from either the state or non-state actors. Comprehensive 
information on this would enable policy actors to distinguish child employment from child 
exploitation. Clear guidelines are needed in this direction to ensure the sustainability of 




2.6. Findings and discussions 
The results on earnings suggest that children between 11 and 17 years old earn on 
average 417 cedis (106 $ at 2016 February rate) for 31 hours of work per week, a substantial 
amount for working at mining sites. This revelation demonstrates that children work, on 
average, over 4 hours per day for an amount of 60 cedis (15.29 $ at 2016 February rate). Due 
to this tempting wage, in addition to poverty, the unhealthy competition for resources, the 
lack of alternative jobs for vulnerable households, and less or no social support for families, 
parents are compelled to persuade their children into mining jobs. Consistent with the 
findings of other studies and reports such as Hoedoafia (2014), DFID (2000), and ILO 
(2007), children engage in strenuous activities in the SSM sector such as manual digging, 
draining water from pits, and transporting and washing sand mingled with mercury.  
We establish further that mining land concession rights influence the manager’s decision 
to employ children or otherwise. For instance, managers who obtain site concessions through 
unapproved channels encouraged child exploitation. Those who received grants from political 
party affiliates, state officials, or traditional heads tend to violate child labor laws and employ 
children on site. However, those who acquired sites through private intermediaries recorded 
low incidences of child labor, while those who obtained sites from household heads 
employed relatively fewer children. Certainty on both ownership and the transfer of land 
rights lowered the operational cost of companies by paying the right amount and so 
employing children on mining sites to defray the costs was not necessary. On the other hand, 
if concession acquisition is not transparent and somewhat bureaucratic through the political 
options, the operational costs of securing concessions increases due to bribery and corruption. 
Profit-motivated operators are tempted to hire desperate and vulnerable children and exploit 
them to offset their management costs. 
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Revealingly, with social responsibilities, we established that gold buyers do nothing or 
very little in the communities where they mine the resource (see Figure 14). These views did 
not differ among and across the various groups of small-scale miners we interviewed, which 
affirms the position of the communities. The buyers only care about the gold and are 
unconcerned about all the other things in the community including healthy working 
conditions and the health of the city. This portrays the irresponsible sourcing of gold in 
contrast to the existing international working guidelines on due diligence and responsible 
sourcing such as the guidelines of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD, 2013). Companies should invest in social projects that would improve 
the incomes of poor households, thus reducing the incidence of pushing the community 
toward mining jobs.  
The views shared among license holder operators on offering children jobs as child 
miners indicate that children avail themselves for work irrespective of any other reasons 
because the operators were ready to employ them whether they were sacrificing school or not 
or forced to work or not. Noticeably, the views differ within the non-licensed operator 
groups; the majority in this group responded that children needed money to pay for school 
fees, or that the children’s parents forced them into employment. Others employ homeless 
children to help the homeless children and help society, in addition to the cost reduction 
argument. Finally, some of the respondents based their decisions to employ children on the 
ease of controlling them and others did not work with children because children lack the 
required skills (Figure 10). The children viewed the operators as helping them to survive or 
improve their lives and those of their families.  
We found that the managers were aware of the existing laws; however, they acted 
contrary to these laws due to weak law enforcement. Another probable factor is the existence 
of favoritism that favors a few political affiliates in the mining concession bidding processes, 
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which encourages corruption. Subsequently, offenders go unpunished by the law. The finding 
that SSM is coupled with bribery and corruption is consistent with the findings from an ILO 
report (2003). Respondents confirmed this during the interviews when some of the 
respondents reacted, “our big boss paid our way with the police and the chiefs, so we do not 
have any problems with our activities.” That is, they have exchanged money for protection 
from the law irrespective of what they do.  
We found that the appropriate guidelines and incentives for mitigating child labor are 
insufficient. Child labor can be reduced by putting the appropriate guidelines in place 
notwithstanding the reasons provided by the respondents as to why they employ children. A 
practical direction should be independent of all the factors outside of what the instructions 
specify and should be drawn in collaboration with mining operators and the local community 
leaders, together with the state. The revelations demonstrate that child labor in the mining 
sector needs close collaboration with both the mining operators and local community leaders, 
and strict state monitoring would be an effective way of combating the problem. It further 
demonstrated that local associations of small miners succeeded in controlling and preventing 
pupils from working on school days. In most cases, they turned down school going children 
who offered their labor instead of attending school. This was co-implemented by the unit 
committee, which demonstrates that state collaboration can be a useful tool to reduce child 
labor. 
Unfortunately, most of the operators interviewed affirmed that they had not received any 
formal or informal training on best mining and environmental practices, or safety. This 
catalyzed the exposure of workers including children to injury and unsafe practices, such as 
handling dangerous chemicals that lead to illness and the significant degradation of water and 
land resources. Consequently, this reinforced the poverty cycle in the sector. This finding is 
consistent with Hinton’s results for her policy development planning initiatives for SSM in 
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Peru, Sri Lanka, and Ghana (2007). Due to the lack of operational safety, children face 
illness, and injury, especially with illegal mining (IPEC, 2004; Gunn and Priester, 2004; 
Wasserman, 1999), and worst of all, the persistent occurrence of violent outbreaks. We 
discovered that problems such as physical assaults among miners, becoming trapped in pits, 
frequent gun attacks, and police attacks were some of the incidences that workers usually 
experienced at mining sites (see chapter 3). Hence, children witness most of this violence, 
and this is unhealthy for their emotional and psychological development, as discussed by 
Collier and Hoeffler (2003) and the OECD (2013) report.  
Market outlets consisting of foreign and local nationals have a significant role in 
contributing to the eradication of child labor as a form of creating shared value. If this 
happens, society will better understand that business competition and profits are not at the 
expense of social safety, thus ensuring long-term mining investments. As child labor in SSM 
affects child development, addressing both the economic and social problems means creating 
shared values that are based on win-win principles (Pies et al., 2009). The PMMC, operating 
under the Kimberly standards certification, has a role in monitoring the sources of gold and 
diamonds from their downstream suppliers to make sure they are free from subjecting 
children to harsh conditions (long hours of work) during the extraction processes.  
Apart from the market initiatives of the PMMC, the mineral buyers have a role of 
creating shared value by redefining productivity in the value chain to include the responsible 
sourcing of gold devoid of the worse forms of child labor on the part of their clients. In 
addition, as social harms can create internal costs for firms as argued by Michael Porter and 
Mark R. Kramer (2011), the SSM sector market players should consider the decisions and 
opportunities in integrating child labor mitigation strategies into their production function as 
a way of creating shared value for a win-win case to both the society and the business. 
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Operationally, companies (both local and developing country multinationals) in the sector 
can undertake community-based initiatives to monitor the mitigation of child labor. 
Even though some remedial policies have been proposed and implemented, new ones are 
expected to commence concerning free secondary education. The open and compulsory 
primary education policy is already underway yet most children are not in school. Some 
policy analysts interviewed attributed primary school dropout rates to the ineffective 
government system of making the financial commitment to ensure that children are in school 
and are adequately cared for. This revelation confirms the position of some parents that the 
free basic school program is not realistic as parents must still support the school with 
studying materials including desks and other learning materials, which is the largest part of 
the burden. This finding supports the ILO (2007) results that found that effective remedial 
policies to reduce child labor in the small-scale gold mining sector are insufficient.  
 
2.6.1. Conclusions and lessons 
In general, the findings concur with the results of Hailu et al. (2012) that the exploitation 
of diffuse mineral deposits compared to point deposits are likely to be associated with child 
labor. The reason is due to the flourish of artisanal miners who are more likely to use child 
labor compared to LSM.  
The findings indicate two possibilities or forms of child employment in the SSM sector 
based on the motives of parents that need exhaustive research and policy attention: first, child 
employment for the development of children, especially for school going children, and 
second, teenagers (non-students) with mining as their primary employment. Irrespective, of 
the nature of the working conditions, dangerous or safe, these two arguments form the basis 





 Two children indicated that they were working to support their family budget and 
the remainder stated that they were working for their education (buying food, books, tables, 
and shoes for school). This revelation demonstrated that more research is necessary to guide 
the existing forms of child labor and support safe child employment that will promote child 
development and discourage all other activities that exploit and impede child development. 
We could also infer that child employment has implications for households, children, the 
government, and the businesses involved. Close examination and analysis are required to put 
children safety and development ahead of all other interests. Most of the working hours of 
children occurred either after school hours or on weekends (Table 1). This phenomenon 
indicates that some children work mainly to be economically active and this may be good for 
their development if the right conditions are met; the conditions include a safe environment, 
with appropriate working and safety tools; the non-interference of any of their development 
processes including education; non-exploitative work; and good health. 
Generally, both license-issuing bodies through their indirect or direct mandates affect the 
prevalence of child labor in the SSM sector. Moreover, we found a lack of good governance 
and poverty as the primary factors driving child labor in the SSM sector. These include 
specific factors such as monitoring, lack of alternative jobs and social support, land property 
rights, and concessional bidding and awarding. Thus, effective governance for example in 
land rights adjudication, for the discussed reasons, is the reduction or eradication of child 
labor. Therefore, future studies should consider analyzing the inter-relations and governance 
structures (including the role of traditional African institutions) in the management of SSM 
sector related issues. Finally, companies including both local and internationally (upstream 
and downstream) sponsored have a significant role via sponsoring programs and conducting 
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 Two 13-year-old boys and three 15-year-olds (a girl and 2 boys). In the presence of site operators, and with 
his permission, taking both the position of a parent and a manager at that time. 
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due diligence of their clients toward child labor, and mitigation as a form of creating shared 
value while supporting competitiveness in this sector.  
Furthermore, we conclude that a high number of children are still employed in the SSM 
sector in the Amansie West and Bosomtwe districts. Cash incentives and other compelling 
factors, such as poverty and the lack of appropriate intervention policies, entice children into 
employment and working for extended hours. Children offer themselves to work on their free 
will or work under the influence of their parents. However, mining operators on their part 
lack training in responsible resourcing and are willing to employ the services of children that 
will allow them to control child workers easily, and this reduces operational costs. In 
contrast, few operators will hire children if they do not have the required skills.  
The revelations here demonstrate that the child labor challenges in SSM in Ghana fall 
under two of the three conditions of child labor discussed by Hinton (2015); for the districts 
in this research, child labor is either self-employed or the family context form of child labor, 
with no incidences of forced child labor. Furthermore, we found that self-employed children 
have no alternative to whom they sell their gold other than the given site manager (section 
2.6.2). 
Lessons toward the successful implementation and achievement of 8.8 of the Sustainable 
Development Goals Agenda 2025, that is, eradication of all of the worst forms of child labor, 
require critically analyzing Ghana’s SSM sector. However, the nature of child labor problems 
in the SSM sector from the study districts is complex. Therefore, we recommend critical 
considerations of the industry due to the various circumstances surrounding the 
socioeconomic dynamics. Despite existing regulations in the country, factors such as the high 
rates of poverty, parentless or orphaned children, single parents, and inadequate social 
protection support for vulnerable households in the districts still impede the efforts to 
eradicate child labor. Policy focus should factor the perspectives of SSM operators in drafting 
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supportive policies for the affected communities. The following recommendations should be 
synchronized to create synergy toward mitigation. 
The concessional lands process, monitoring of land rights, and mining license acquisition 
should all be less bureaucratic but fair to eliminate corruption and favoritism. Traditional 
leaders and landowners should condition concessional transfers on the reduction of child 
labor at the mining sites. We recommend that both landowners and the Mineral Commission 
should monitor and enforce these agreements as a base for concession acquisition. The 
enforcement of concession monitoring will be a positive step toward shared value creation for 
the society. More so, warranting that the children who are an economically active labor force 
are schoolchildren, the establishment and monitoring of collaborative guidelines on 
employment during vacations and weekends, and on minimum working hours might help 
ensure the safety of children. Furthermore, age specifications and rules for vacations and 
weekends should be in place, before allowing this age group to work on “light” activities as 




In the absence of social support such as the appropriate interventions for homeless 
children and children from single parents, there will be children who cannot meet their basic 
education needs. Therefore, comprehensive guidelines for working on vacations or weekends 
for economically active children are recommended to reduce the negative effects of child 
employment. Instructions in that direction are highly recommended if this action does not 
impair the education, development, and health of children. Since this has proven successful in 
some communities when implemented in conjunction with local traditional leaders and local 
committees, it needs more policy focus; therefore, further research is required to achieve this 
objective. 
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 This can be reviewed to include realistic permitted hours if it is found to support the development of children, 
in particular homeless children. 
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Furthermore, the free market has a role especially the buyers that influence child labor 
eradication in the SSM sector. Therefore, good governance can change the behaviors of 
market players through regulations and market incentives to counter child labor. We 
recommend that the policies targeting private entities should discourage child labor as the 
private market plays an invaluable role in the SSM gold market. More decisively, certificate 
conditions must tie punitive measures to buyers who violate the rules by buying from mining 
operators who encourage children and operators who utilize child labor and reward managers 
who desist from child labor. Additionally, monitoring the activities of buyers is necessary to 
reduce child labor in the sector. To implement institutional good practice with regard to the 
regulatory bodies, we recommend that all institutions including the PMMC, partner buyers 
and exporters of gold and diamonds mined by small-scale companies on behalf of the 
government, and the Minerals Commission (issuer of mining license) monitor the activities of 
license holders (their clients) in order to correct the behavior of violators. Doing so would 
mean creating win-win shared value for the businesses and society. 
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3. Analyzing the determinants of conflict in SSM in Ghana 
 
Abstract  
Recent renewed interest in investment in the mining sector in developing countries holds 
the promise of spurring development in Africa. In many African countries, however, the 
rising hope of profits from gold mining is leading to gold rush phenomena and the associated 
violence. In Ghana, this raises public concerns about mining investments and security threats 
in host communities. This chapter empirically examines the nature and determinants of SSM 
conflicts at the community level, focusing on two districts in the Ashanti region where there 
are high rates of conflict. Drawing on field-based research, our findings suggest that artisanal 
gold mining in these communities is coupled with violence. The adverse outcomes of mining 
produce certain experiential conditions for violence. The situations worsen when the socio-
economic inequalities connected with land rights issues and mining failures are unresolved. 
Exacerbated differences underpin group formation along prevailing ethnic affiliations and 
household size, increasing the risk of conflict. The prevailing weak enforcement of land 
rights is a key predictor of both conflict and the incidence of higher categories of certain 
types of violence. However, the provision of alternative employment opportunities, including 
farming and relative equality in asset ownership, should reduce the frequency of encountering 
specific conflict. A better comprehension of the nature of mining-related conflict is 
indispensable for attracting and sustaining the flow of investment to the mining sector and 




3.1.  Introduction 
In recent years, many middle-income and developing countries with natural resources 
available for potential extraction have reshaped their minerals policies to attract investment 
from wealthy nations. Mining policy reforms have increased mineral production 
tremendously, providing an alternative source of employment in many sub-Saharan African 
countries, including Ghana (Hilson and Yakovleva 2007; Rodriguez et al., 2004). However, 
the growth of this sector has also crowded out local labor from the agricultural sector. Thus, 
small-scale gold mining communities in Ghana are afflicted by the continuous occurrence of 
numerous types of conflict. This has led to a public outcry against the security threat 
stemming from mining communities. Maintaining peace has become a crucial concern for 
stakeholders in the artisanal mining sector. The multinational companies, the hosting society 
or communities, research practitioners and policymakers, among others, are all interested in 
accomplishing this objective. An ongoing debate on natural resources and conflict is thus 
receiving full attention in the academic literature on developing countries.  
The Ghanaian case is not qualitatively different from the overall recent global trend of 
natural resource extraction leading to conflict. Nonetheless, Ghana’s conflict situation has not 
reached the worst conflict-massacre levels as measured by the Heidelberg conflict 
classifications (HIIK, 2015). The HIIK approach classifies conflict as low intensity when it 
involves a dispute, it defines non-violent crisis or medium intensity conflict as crisis and 
limited war, and high-intensity strife is marked by warfare. 
Most developing countries that enjoy natural resources in abundance have the potential 
to use these resources to fuel economic development, which would lessen their over-
dependence on aid from developed countries (Maconachie, 2016; Maconachie and Binns, 
2007), for example. In Ghana, natural resources such as gold and diamonds, among other 
extractive minerals, have been the most significant contributor of foreign exchange earnings 
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to general economic development (Owusu et al., 2016). As in many African countries, 
revenue from natural resources serves as a significant source of income supporting the 
livelihoods of many rural households (Armah et al., 2016; Banchirigah and Hilson, 2010; 
Hilson and Garforth, 2013; Nick and Janvier, 2016). The role of mineral resources in 
economic and conflict development has received extensive attention in the political economy 
literature (Armah et al., 2016; Bush, 2009; Collier et al., 2004; Collier and Hoeffler 1998; 
Geenen, 2013; Geenen and Claessen 2014; Hilson, 2001, 2013; Hilson and Garforth, 2013) 
and in policy groups (International Labour Organizations, 2007).  
Although the mining sector in Ghana on aggregate, at the national level, provides less 
employment than agriculture, it offers a higher number of work hours (48.1:35.6) per week 
with an hourly income of GH₵ 3.7 (US$ 0.96 at 2016 rate) compared to 0.85 (US$ 0.22 at 
2016 rate) Ghanaian cedis, respectively (Ghana Statistical Service, 2014a). The country’s 
global gold output is about 108.2 tons per year, making Ghana the tenth largest producer, 
representing 3.4% of world mining production in the year 2014 (Ghana Chamber of Mines, 
2014). Although gold production from SSM makes up 34% of the country’s total output 
(ibid.), it comes at the cost of human rights abuses (World Bank, 2011) that result from 
mining-related violent conflict. Can investors and policy actors continue to invest in the SSM 
sector in the face of growing violence? This concern broadly calls for in-depth discussions on 
the determinants of the developing violence in artisanal gold mining. 
There is no doubt that Ghana has observed the relatively diminishing incidence of long-
standing tensions between organized artisanal miners and major LSM companies such as 
AngloGold Ashanti, for example, in the Obuasi Municipal. Unfortunately, this situation is 
changing for the worse. Some scholars attribute the positive peace development to the forged 
agreement of allowing ASM workers to encroach on AngloGold’s concessions (Hilson and 
Garforth, 2013).  
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Even as practitioners, researchers, and policy-makers observe emerging mining-related 
violence in Ghana (Armah et al., 2016; Bush, 2009; Carson et al., 2005; Hilson and Garforth, 
2013; Hilson and Potter, 2005; Hilson and Yakvleva, 2007; Patel et al., 2016; Tschakert and 
Singha, 2007), empirical analysis of the nature of the conflict and its determinants at the 
household level in the pre-civil-war setting is, nonetheless, limited. Some observers attribute 
Ghana’s mining conflict to a lack of political communication, while some national 
representative survey reports site land disputes and chieftaincy issues as the primary source 
of conflict (GLSS 6, 2014a, pp. 183–184). Not much is known about the nature of the 
disputes that households experience in Ghana’s artisanal mining communities, what 
determines individual household exposure to these conflict, or the frequency of such disputes.  
The past challenges suggest that individual households might face similar challenges in 
these communities considering the number of mineral discoveries (such as gold) has 
increased nationwide and therefore requires attention. With this current situation, for 
instance, it would be interesting to know what happens to households in mining communities 
as unfair competition for mining concessions rises. Research in this area is justified for 
several reasons. First, violence in SSM poses a renewed and continuous security threat, and it 
constitutes a primary source of income for rural inhabitants (Kayla et al., 2016; Hilson and 
Potter, 2003; Hilson and Garforth, 2012). Second, the fact that SSM makes a significant 
contribution to Ghana’s total gold production coupled with the recent nationwide gold rush 
and accompanying violence warrants this timely research on the nature and determinants of 
violent conflict in the sector in hopes of guiding violence abatement policies.  
This chapter aims to address the following empirical problems: What is the nature of 
violence involving households in artisanal mining communities? What factors determine a 
household’s chances of encountering violence and how frequently do the various categories 
of violence occur? To investigate these issues, the chapter offers a more coherent empirical 
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evaluation of the nature and determinants of conflict associated with artisanal mining by 
discussing how horizontal inequalities and the greed versus grievance hypothesis influence 
how households encounter conflict. It then identifies the possible pathways of the 
households’ encounters with conflict in the Ghanaian mining context. It further attempts to 
quantify the factors that influence the households’ encounters with conflict statistically and 
estimate the frequency of such encounters using evidence from a selection of mining 
communities in the Ashanti region of Ghana.  
Therefore, this thesis offers a better understanding of the nature of conflict to guide 
effective mitigation strategies for existing and emerging conflicts in the sector. Its findings 
should also contribute to the development of early warnings for violent conflict and possible 
mining-related civil war as widely argued in the “conflict-minerals” literature (Bush, 2009; 
Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Ross 2013). Better still, this focus should inevitably enhance and 
sustain renewed incentives for financial investment and promote a good business 
environment that creates societal and business shared value through social development and 
the prevention of human rights violations (Owusu et al., 2016; Porter and Kramer, 2011). 
To tackle the research problem posed above, first, we present the general application 
and a review of the literature on the determinants of mining-related conflict followed by the 
materials and methods. In the penultimate section of the chapter, we describe the data 
collection strategy and outline its empirical estimations in identifying the factors that affect 
households’ encounters with violent conflict and the frequency of those encounters by 
category. In the last section of the chapter, we present the discussion of the empirical results 




3.2. Determinants of mining conflicts: Theories and the related literature 
This section provides a brief overview of the theoretical attempts to explain the 
pathways of artisanal mining and conflict and identify the determining factors of conflict at 
the micro level. Drawing on these existing theories, this section categorizes the plausible 
pathways and mechanisms through which violence can occur in artisanal mining 
communities. From the burgeoning literature, we find the following theories useful in 
explaining drivers of conflict in mining: the horizontal inequality hypothesis, the greed 
hypothesis, and the grievance hypothesis.  
According to the horizontal inequality hypothesis, economic, social, political, and 
cultural inequalities among groups of people (such as households in this case) are more likely 
to stimulate the development of conflict (Langer and Stewart, 2013). Inequalities in such 
areas as asset ownership, resource ownership, and educational opportunities, for instance, 
which disadvantage many of the population in the society, induce violence. Disadvantaged 
individuals, in this situation, are motivated to seek justice through violence (Gurr, 1970; 
Stewart, 2000). Therefore, households might be more prone to provoke conflict in mining 
communities where issues of land resource inequalities exist, primarily when the resource or 
asset serves as a competing resource for both mining and farming.  
The grievance theory perspective surmises that individuals turn their grievances into a 
violent quest for justice when they get frustrated with deprivation, mainly from natural 
resource rents. It further posits that the horizontal facets might constitute grievances that in 
turn create incentives for political mobilization or rebellion due to political inequalities. 
Inequalities in employment, resource acquisition, access to use of resources (e.g., land, water 
resources, and forests) or non-benefit from rents, may lead to grievances and rebellious 
conflict in resource-abundant communities (Hinton, 2005). It is noteworthy to mention that 
the intensity of violence induced by socioeconomic inequality may depend on whether the 
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community or household is resource-dependent or not. Researchers argue that grievance and 
rebellion are encouraged by factors such as wealth, education, and material offers, which are 
highly likely to motivate combatants to take part in conflict (Humphreys et al., 2008). This 
suggests that a multifaceted group of inequalities relating to cultural identity and 
socioeconomic and political conditions jointly increase the probability of violent conflict. 
Economically, resource and income inequalities are the major causes of civil wars (Collier 
and Hoeffler, 1998), while rebellions might be enhanced through ethnic or religious 
affiliation (Collier et al., 2004). To a more considerable extent, the horizontal inequality 
hypothesis buttresses grievance (Langer and Stewart, 2013; Stewart, 2000).  
Proponents of the greed theory, on the other hand, support the assessment that the 
presence of natural resources is the most critical determinant of civil wars as opposed to 
political factors (Collier, 1998). The interest and pursuit of control over natural resources is 
the root source of civil conflict in countries with abundant natural resources. In brief, the 
primary tenet of greed theory is that greed over resources, production, ownership, and control 
of resources including its rent, is likely to stimulate the onset of civil war.  
These theories have been indirectly used and argued in many ways to explain the 
relations between natural resources and conflict with exciting conclusions, especially in the 
post-civil-war setting (Cuvelier et al., 2014). This study makes noteworthy references to 
earlier literature that provide a useful context for analyzing the determinants of violence in a 
non-post-civil war setting. Some earlier work has centered discussions on the link between 
resource rents and armed conflict (Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom, 2004; Meger, 2010; 
Rustad et al., 2016); others argue for the importance of resources and economic development 
(Aryee, 2001), while some explore the abundance and physiognomies of certain natural 
resources and their potential to pose governance challenges (Ross, 2008, 2011). Oil, in 
particular, has been found to be a catalyst for conflict, favoring the development of rebellion 
 
 85 
(Foreign Affairs, 2008). It has also been found to be a potential instrument for weakening 
governance in democratic states, although some researchers argue against a positive 
correlation between oil discoveries and conflict (Cotet and Tsui 2010: 2013). 
The work of Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) is of high relevance to this discussion. 
These authors document the influence of poverty, material wellbeing (assets ownership), lack 
of access to education and political alienation on individuals’ choices to engage in armed 
conflict in mining regions. Their findings suggest that the opportunistic behavior of resource 
actors is a problem peculiar to natural resource exploitation, especially with the inequalities 
of artisanal mining in employment opportunities, access to resources, resource usage and 
ownership, and resource management. 
 In the case of Ghana’s SSM, empirical estimations of the nature and determinants of 
violent conflict among households in mining communities are less known, although many 
studies have found a relationship between natural resources competition and disputes (Kusi 
Appiah et al., 2014; Collier and Hoeffler, 2014; Ross 2004). Researchers have attempted to 
explain conflict on a spatial dynamic (Patel et al., 2016), as a gender disparity among miners 
(Armah et al., 2014), or by using a case study of the conflict between illegal SSM and 
Bogoso Gold Limited (Hilson and Yakovleva, 2007). Both studies by Hilson et al. (2007) and 
Bush (2005) found that poor SSM policy among other factors was the leading cause of 
conflict, while Patel et al. (2016) identified the Ashanti region as hosting the highest number 
of mining companies and a significant conflict zone where encroachment on LSM 
concessions by small-scale miners were common. On the other hand, Armah et al. (2014) 
identified trust and world market prices for gold as the main factors determining artisanal 
mining conflict. 
In Ghana, artisanal miners are known occasionally to encroach on LSM concessions 
(Armah et al., 2016; Bush, 2009; Carson, Cottrell, Dickman, Lee, and Miao, 2005; Hilson, 
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2001; Hilson and Garforth, 2013; Hilson and Potter, 2005; Hilson and Yakvleva, 2007; Patel 
et al., 2016; Tschakert and Singha, 2007). In addition, artisanal gold mining activities are 
branded as entangled with inevitable conflict. The conflict inflicts social disturbances due to 
the mobility nature of the work and its associated social vices from activities like drug and 
alcohol abuse, child labor, school dropouts, militarization of some artisanal groups and 
environmental degradation (Armah et al., 2014; Carson et al., 2005; Kusi et al., 2016). 
Grounded in existing theories, the academic literature on violence and artisanal mining, 
and developing evidence from policymakers, the current thesis identifies land rights 
challenges, economic inequalities, and the adverse effects of mining as the potential paths 
through which artisanal gold mining heightens the possibility of a household encountering 
violence in a non-post-civil-war conflict setting. 
 
3.3.  Mining conflict pathways in Ghana 
In this subsection, we apply the lessons from resource conflict literature to the narrow 
case of Ghanaian artisanal mining. Households from Ghanaian mining communities are 
likely to experience violence through any of the three primary mechanisms identified, which 
are briefly explained here.  
First, gross socioeconomic inequalities among rural households based on access to 
resources and the distribution of resource rents may undoubtedly be a source of violence in 
mining communities. Suspiciously, mining is perceived in Ghana, as in many other 
developing countries, as enabling a quantum jump in job creation to solve the unemployment 
problems that bedevil these nations. As a result, households may have false hopes and 
expectations of windfall gains from mining income (Stoop et al., 2016). Families in mining 
communities thus become more exposed to land rights disputes due to the high rates of gold 
discovery as their expectations from mining increase.  
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It is widely believed that artisanal mining offers a reliable new source of direct and 
indirect employment and rent due to land resource ownership and transfer. However, the 
expected gainful jobs and related benefits are mostly unrealistic for rural households. 
Consequently, increased mining activities in mining communities result in land use conflict, 
instead of employment. Generally, mining is more likely to create conditions that worsen 
inequalities among groups in rural communities because of the highly contested livelihood 
opportunities it brings, contrary to expectations (Owusu et al., 2016). The lack of alternative 
employment opportunities and land tenure security may be an even higher source of mining 
conflict in Ghana. Indeed, the failure of the state to allocate land appropriately to small-scale 
miners is usually believed to be one of the major causes of conflict in Ghana (Hilson and 
Yakovleva, 2007). 
Second, the adverse consequences of mining and the illegal conversion of farming lands 
to mining land are also likely sources of violence in mining communities. Uncontrolled 
adverse outcomes, such as the open pits that represent direct safety hazards for humans and 
breeding sites for mosquitoes, along with massive pollution of major rivers and water bodies 
(Ramah et al., 2013), are likely to spur local mining community households, the direct 
victims of these negative consequences, to seek justice through violence. Some observers 
attribute violent conflict in Ghana to a lack of community engagement and consultation 
between stakeholders and because of the differing expectations of the impact of mining on 
socioeconomic conditions (Armah et al., 2016). Hilson and Potter (2005) report mixed 
findings and argue against government capacity limitations as the critical trigger rather than 
the lack of government interest in establishing artisanal mining on a solid footing. In addition 
to adverse environmental effects, some have pointed to the lack of knowledge about 
community dynamics as the major indirect contributor to the ecological consequences of 
artisanal mining (Tschakert and Singha, 2007). More importantly, this may provide possible 
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evidence that mineral discovery and exploitation and their undesirable adverse effects in or to 
the society are the main issues that induce violence (Davis and Franks, 2014).  
Natural resource management, including the improper management of land rights, could 
be a third source of conflict in Ghanaian mining communities. As stated above, fierce 
competition over resource use makes land rights disputes a significant path for the 
development of mining-related violence in Ghana. Lax monitoring and enforcement of land 
issues, including mining concessions, in predominantly farming communities may be a 
significant catalyst for violence. Most mining communities in Ghana are now spatially 
characterized as zones with heightened competition over mineral-rich lands (Kayla et al., 
2016). The discovery of minerals such as gold and diamonds including their rent has been 
identified as the primary cause of conflict in some regions of Ghana (Ababio, 2015). Others 
have argued that the provision of certain kinds of government services, such as effective 
institutions for management purposes and the rule of infrastructure, reduces violence 
(Berman and Felter, 2014). This suggests that the effective institutional management of land 
rights is essential to violence mitigation because land resources serve as a primary but 
competitive resource for farming and mining in Ghana. Poor management of land disputes 
arising from weak institutional capacity is thus probably a catalyst for violence.  
The literature reviewed in this thesis indicates that natural resources such as oil and gas; 
land; water; forests; and other extractive minerals like gold, tin, and diamonds are the most 
critical resources of interest for the outbreak, duration, and reoccurrence of conflict. We, 
therefore, argue that unresolved land rights disputes and worsening mining conditions and the 
adverse effects of mining may be important variables to look at when examining mining 
community households’ encounters with conflict, including the frequency of occurrence. 
Moreover, horizontal inequalities in asset ownership especially land resource ownership, 
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socioeconomic disparities between minority and majority ethnic groups classified by land 
resource access, and discrimination concerning rights to mine can be sources of conflict.  
Despite methodological disagreements on establishing the relationship between natural 
resources and conflict, specifically in finding appropriate and correct ways to measure these 
relationships (Ross, 2006), limited evidence also exists to support this relationship in post-
war-conflict settings (Cuvelier et al., 2014). There is, therefore, a need for more insight from 
non-post-war conflict settings. By addressing that need, this thesis hopes to contribute to the 
more profound understanding of the nature of the conflict and its determinants. 
 
3.4. Materials and methods  
3.4.1. Data description 
Several data collection strategies were used concurrently to try to achieve a broader 
comprehension of the specific social reality of conflict situations in mining communities. 
Credibility, internal and external validity, and objectivity were ensured by sourcing data from 
a wide range of respondents through household surveys, expert interviews, and focus group 
discussions (Bitsch, 2005; Shenton, 2004; Guba, 1989). The data were collected between July 
and October 2015. First, we conducted expert and key informant interviews with 
representatives of various institutions to obtain the district and community level sample 
frame. The focused institutions were the Minerals Commission (the national and Ashanti 
region district offices), the Ghana Cocoa Board Research Centre (Amansie West), and the 
Ministry of Lands and Natural Resource Division (national and Ashanti region district 
offices). We focused on the Ashanti region, where ASM activity and conflict are intense. 
Two districts (Amansie West and Bosomtwe) were selected strategically and purposefully, 
followed by a selection of ten communities from the sample due to research interest, resource 
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availability, and for economic reasons. Out of this sample, 250 household (HH) heads from 
both mining and non-mining households were randomly selected for the HH survey as a 
means of gaining useful information about what is happening in the communities. Second, 
eight focus group discussions (FGDs) were held in select communities with 3 to 4 (a total of 
37) participants to obtain community-level information on the diverse aspects of ASM and 
conflict, before community household-level interviews were conducted. The representatives 
of FGDs included the affected farmer's groups, traditional leaders (a community chief or 
queen mother when present), artisanal miners, community youth who were non-farmers, 
assembly-women, district stool lands administration, and palace elders. Via semi-structured 
questionnaires, focus group participants deliberated on the relationship between ASM 
activities and conflict, the types of conflict and their causes, and the effect of conflict over the 
last 12 months. The group employed a simple majority rule on some decisions on differing 
views, but the researcher captured all of the different observations and outcomes for a holistic 
view. 
A relatively large sample size of 291 participants was used in this study, although it was 
challenging to select respondents due to the dangerous nature of the ASM business (Geenen 
and Claessen, 2013; Nik et al., 2016). The HH questionnaires gathered detailed information 
on households’ experience of violence, the number of times violence occurred per year, 
whether AS mining has happened on their land before, or whether their property had been 




3.4.2. Empirical estimations 
3.4.3. Determinants of conflict 
To examine the nature and types of factors that affect households’ encounters with 
conflict in the SSM communities, we specified and estimated the probability of household 
conflict experience in general (Models 1 through 4). This was followed by the estimation of 
the number of times household experienced conflict that had occurred in the districts of 
Ashanti in Ghana that were studied (Models 5 through 7). Probit and ordered probit models 
were used in the respective estimations. We conducted a diagnostic test to detect the presence 
of collinearity by computing variance inflation factor (VIF) and Pearson’s correlation 
estimates for all variables of interest in the models. STATA 14 was used for all the 
estimations. 
 
3.4.4. Estimation of the factors that influence households encountering conflict  
The household survey element determined the exposure to or experience of conflict 
variable: “Have you encountered violent conflicts in this neighborhood or community in the 
last 12 months?” The dependent variable, “encounters with conflict in general (Yi),” assumes 
only two values: “1” if a household experienced any conflict in the community and “0” if a 
household did not experience any conflict.  
Following the literature, probit models were employed in the measurement of the 
determinants of conflict related to extractive minerals (Maystadt et al., 2014; Berman et al., 
2014; Besley and Persson, 2011; Humphreys 2008). We further employed probit models to 
measure the factors that influence the probability that a sampled household encounters 
conflict and the number of times they encountered conflict. The estimates from the probit 
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model extend the likelihood of the probability density function in predicting the factors that 
influence households encountering conflict. The empirical model is then expressed as: 
 
Equation 1: Probit model for estimating conflict encounters  
Yi  =  Xii + i (1) 
 
where Xi is the vector of explanatory variables that influence conflict, i is the 
coefficients of the explanatory variables, and i is the error term capturing all the 
unmeasurable factors that affect a household’s encounter with conflict.  
Equation (1) is estimated using probit models for determining the factors that affect 
households encountering conflict in general (see the results in Table 3, Model 1). As the 
factors might differ for various conflict types, the estimation procedure is then repeated 
separately for each important conflict type as the dependent variables in determining the 
factors that influence encounters with the respective conflict types. The reported cases of 
major types of conflict, such as physical violence, threats, and security guard
13
 attacks, are 
relatively less skewed toward very low conflict or otherwise (see Table A. 2). Other minor 
conflict types, such as tribal conflict, community versus artisanal miners’ conflict, targeted 
robbery, and “other conflicts” were excluded from the model due to their high distribution 
toward minimal conflict. The dependent variables for the second level are also the dummy: 
Each takes a value of “1” if the household encountered any of the respective conflict types 
and “0” if not. The descriptions of the predictor variables are presented in the following 
section. 
 
                                                     
13
 Security guard threats and attacks are from a mob or armed group (usually illegal) that guards land property. 
These are typical in Ghana, and the guards threaten, physically assault and in some cases, kill individuals in 
affected communities over land ownership disputes. 
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3.4.5. Description of explanatory variables 
In general, as guided by discussed theories (see section 3.2), the determinants of conflict 
can be observed at the individual level (Macartan, Humphreys, and Weinstein 2008), 
community level, and group level (Collier et al., 2004; Newman and DeRouen, 2014), and at 
economic status level implicit in horizontal inequality (Langer and Steward, 2013). The 
discussed literature guided the choice of the explanatory variables. Table 2 summarizes the 
explanatory variables used, their definitions, and their expected relations with conflict. In this 
thesis, we do not claim a causal relationship between artisanal mining and violent conflict 
based on the estimations because the dataset is a cross-section. Nonetheless, the analysis 
yields expedient and insightful inferences from the supporting empirical evidence and the 
theories discussed. Farming is used as a proxy for capturing the main employment type of the 
communities where the primary employer is farming. 
 
Table 2: Explanatory variables used, their definitions, and their relations with conflict  






A continuous variable 
measuring the total number of 
household members  
HHs with a higher family size are 
more likely to encounter conflict if 
they depend heavily on farming 








The gender of HH main 
decision maker. Male=1, 
female=0 
Females are less likely to become 
involved in violence than males 








Farming as head's major 
employment. If HH head is a 
farmer=1, 0=non-farmer 
HHs with a head who is a farmer 
are more likely to encounter 
conflict involving miners as they 








Marital status of a HH head is 
Married=1, unmarried=0 
Married HH head is more risk-
averse to conflict due to family 




Ethnicity Major ethnic affiliation of head-
of-household. 1 if belongs to a 
major ethnic group, 0 otherwise 
HHs with a head belonging to a 
major ethnic group is expected to 
influence conflict if mining 
significantly affect their livelihood 
Humphreys, 
2008; Collier 




Whether small-scale mining 
occurred on household's land. 
1=yes, 0=no 
HH head who witnessed mining 






Land Assert Measure HH’s ownership of 
Land Assert. Yes=1 if own a 
land, 0=no 
HHs with a large land asset 
holdings are less poor and less 




Perception    
Poverty  HH’s perception of the relation 
between poverty and conflict. 
Yes=1, if HHs perceive poverty 
as the primary cause of conflict, 
no=0 
HHs that are relatively less poor 
would be less likely to support 
conflict, and less likely to ascribe 
poverty as a driver of conflict in a 






HH's perception of land rights 
issues as a major cause of 
violent conflict. Yes=1, 0=no 
HHs who perceive that land rights 
enforcement is weak and issues 
unresolved are more motivated to 
encounter conflict to protect their 





HH’s perception of mining-
related negative effects as 
causes of violent conflict in the 
community. Yes=1, no=0 
HHs in a mining community are 
more likely to encounter a conflict 
when negative effects from mining 
are not addressed 
Armah et al., 
2016 
Source: Table generated by author 
 
 
3.4.6. Estimating factors that influence the frequency of conflict encounters 
 
To capture the number of times specific conflict types were experienced by households, 
the frequency of conflict occurrence measured the number of times families experienced an 
unavoidable conflict in the community in the past twelve months. An ordered probit model 
was used in this estimation as it yields consistent and best estimates to overcome weaknesses 
faced by generalized and hierarchical ordered probit models (Greene and Hensher, 2009). 
Besides, knowing that the kinds of conflict occurring or encountered by households per given 
period differs, an ordered probit model is appropriate to explain separately the factors that 
influence the number of times such disputes arose. 
Furthermore, we expect that knowledge of the frequency of conflict has a significant 
influence on conflict development. An understanding of the number of times specific types of 
conflict have been encountered will guide conflict intensity classifications by conflict actors 
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as being low, medium, or high (HIIK, 2015). Therefore, knowing the number of times, major 
conflict types have occurred is crucial for future conflict mitigation strategies. In predicting 
the probability of the number of times a head of household encountered a given kind of 
conflict, we compute the marginal possibilities for each conflict type. The ordered probit 
model is presented by  
 
Equation 2: Ordered probit model for estimating frequency of conflict encounters 
y*  =  X  +  (2) 
 
where the dependent variable (y*) is the unobserved latent and an ordered categorical 
variable containing the number of times households encountered a particular conflict 
category over twelve months. The categorization is as follows: “0” represents a very low 
number of conflict encounters (zero or no conflict), which is a dummy when the variable 
does not fall under any of the given categories. “1” represents a low number of conflict 
encounters, experiencing a particular conflict at least once but less than three times (1 to 2). 
A high number of conflict encounters takes a value of “2” if the number of times of 
experiencing the conflict is between 3 and 4, and a value of “3” for a very high number of 
conflict encounters (6 to 8) [Table 6].  
X is the vector of the coefficients of the explanatory variables and  is the error term 
capturing all the unmeasurable factors that influence the number of times a household 
experiences a given conflict, and it is assumed to be normally distributed. The independent 
variables are household size, employment, artisanal mining, gender, marital status, poverty, 
ethnicity, land rights issues, mining-related negative effects, and asset ownership.  
The dependent variables are the categorical variables containing the frequency of the 
threat of conflict, the rate of physical violence, and the frequency of security guard attacks. 
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The frequency of violent fights measures any form of conflict that involves a physical attack 
that leaves the targets injured or dead. The frequency of the threat measures the number of 
reported forms of verbal threats including the threat of assault, the risk of legal summons, the 
danger of vandalism, and the threat of arson, ambush, and curses. The frequency of security 
guard attacks measures the number of attacks specifically from a gang of people using 
various dangerous tools or weapons (e.g., machete, guns, or bow and arrow), to prevent other 
parties from using a particular piece of land.  
The independent variables hold their usual meaning (as discussed in section 3.4.5, Table 
2). The choice of variables does not derive from an earlier model, but primarily on the 
theories reviewed and partly on research interest (see 1.2). An index model (Equation 2) for a 
single latent variable y* is only observable when it crosses the threshold or cut points y 
(Equations 3 through 4). The probability of observing outcome 1 corresponds to the 
probability that the estimated function, in addition to the random error, falls within the range 
of cut points (categories) estimated for the outcome: 
Equation 3: Estimating the marginal probabilities of frequency of conflict encounters 
  
Pr (outcome j = i)   =  p (y =j) = Pr (j-1  <  y*  ≤ j) (3) 
 
The model estimates X together with the cut points 1, 2, …, j-1, where j is the 
number of possible outcomes. The 0 assumes a negative infinity, and j also implies a 
positive infinity. The F-statistic of the ordered probit model assumes the conventional 






Equation 4: The CDF of the standard normal distribution 
 
y    =  j if j-1 < y* ≤ j   (4) 
 
Due to the highly skewed nature of some conflict group variables toward very low or no 
conflict (having a higher percentage of zeros), these are not included in the ordered probit 
models in the determination of factors that influence the frequency of specific conflict 
occurrence (Table 7). They were excluded to improve the robustness of the models for more 
meaningful results and discussions. The omitted variables include theft, family, or tribal 
disputes; conflict between community and illegal miners; and those categorized as “other” 
conflict types.  
 
3.5. Results and discussions 
This section presents a discussion of the results from the analysis of the nature of the 
conflict, and the determinants of household encounters with conflict. It begins briefly with 
the summary of the general characteristics of the 250 households’ respondents. 
Characteristically, half (50%) of the households sampled are employed in the 
agricultural sector as farmers (28% were employed in mining). About 37 % of the sample had 
witnessed AS mining on their land or had converted farming land to mining. The socio-
economic history of the respondents includes an average household size of 3, 78% of 
respondents owned land assets, 40% of households were female-headed, over 50% were 
married, and a majority (90%) belong to the dominant ethnic group: the Akan. Regarding the 
causes of conflict, few households believe that poverty is the leading cause of disputes 
(11%), 24% mentioned land rights disputes as the cause of conflict, and 30% attributed the 
violence exclusively to mining and related adverse factors (Table 3).  
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
                                                                 Observations = 250 
Variables 
Standard 
deviation Mean Min. Max. 
Conflict encounter 
        Experience of conflicts since the last 12 months 0.31 0.89 0 1 
    Violent fight  0.50 0.56 0 1 
    Verbal threat of assault 0.45 0.72 0 1 
     Land guard attacks 0.36 0.16 0 1 
     Family or tribal disputes as a conflict type 0.13 0.02 0 1 
     Other conflicts 0.13 0.02 0 1 
     Community vs. Miners violence  0.26 0.07 0 1 
Socioeconomics 
        House hold size 2.24 3.23 1 9 
    Gender of household head          0.49  0.61    0    1 
    Major employment type 0.50 0.51 0 1 
    Marital status of household head 0.50 0.54 0 1 
    Major ethnic affiliation of household head 0.30 0.90 0 1 
    House hold ownership of Land Asset 0.42 0.78 0 1 
    Whether small scale mining occurred on head’s land 0.49 0.38 0 1 
Perceptions on causes of conflict 
        Poverty as the major cause of conflict 0.32 0.11 0 1 
    Land right issues as a major cause of violence 0.43 0.24 0 1 




3.5.1.  Types of conflict 
This sub-section describes the conflict classifications based on the conflict types 
reported during the focus group discussions and the household interviews in the community, 
as well as the frequency of the encounters with conflict. Nearly all of the families (89%) in 
the sample indicated that they had been exposed to conflict (Table 3), which supports the 
 
 100 
findings from post-civil-war settings that artisan mining is associated with violence (Berman 
et al., 2014). Exposure to certain types of conflict in the community in each period differs 
across households. Hence, we report that families encountered different conflict at least once 
within twelve months. 
 
Figure 16 illustrates the results about the nature of the conflict experienced in the artisanal 
mining communities as experienced by households. Based on the outcomes of the focus 
group discussions, the conflict situations of the two districts are characterized broadly by 
theft, threat, and physical assault. We classified the level of this dispute as a low-intensity 
conflict, following the Heidelberg Methodological Approach (HMA) (HIIK, 2015). 
According to the qualitative characteristics classification of the HMA approach, the results 
from Ghana’s mining conflict demonstrate a mixture of disputes and violence.  
 
 
      Figure 16: Characterisation of conflict types in the mining communities 





Most of the households reported threats as the most common type of conflict in their 
communities (73%). Reported risks of assault also include verbal assaults and security guard 
threats. Per the households’ account, security guard threats come in multiple forms, such as 
threatening to confiscate a piece of land or threatening to prevent a party or group of parties 
(the community) from accessing the disputed land, death threats, and threats of ambush. In 
addition, some focus group participants mentioned isolated cases of individual-level threats 
of curses when the traditional chief’s palace summons fails. It is important to note that 
although the traditional chief’s palace summons (locally known in the Akan language as 
“ahenfie-nsaman”) may seem trivial, the consequences of a failure to obtain an amicable 
settlement for such a threat would be non-trivial in these communities. As one of the 
functional mechanisms for preventing further conflict, when this medium fails, it further 
threatens social cohesion and security. Most local people appeal to this as an oath to suspend 
a threat from materializing or de-escalating the threat of conflict. The majority of the 
respondents raised concerns about frequent threats of assault, ambush, security guard attacks, 
and curses. Importantly, some respondents hinted that most individuals in the community 
who invoke curses usually try to mobilize support for a group attack if the condition does not 
improve.  
The second major identifiable conflict in the study communities is physical assault. 
About 65% of the experiences of conflict fell under this category. This type of conflict 
usually originates from groups such groups of mining workers with individuals from families 
taking opposing sides, between communities and a given mining group, among mining 
groups, and in some cases between community youth and community leaders.  
Theft and robbery, on the other hand, is the third most noted type of violence 
experienced by households. This comprises both domestic and industrial theft, as well as 
robbery. Approximately 6% of the respondents indicated that they had experienced theft 
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activities frequently. Some attributed the theft to mining activities, which had brought “bad 
people” to the neighborhood. Others reasoned that robberies against non-local citizens were 
related to mining activities. Some were of the view that with the inception of mining, mass 
theft of dried cocoa beans and domestic animals occurred whenever the police halted mining 
activities.  
Further inquiry into specific conflict encountered by households demonstrated that 
over 72% of households reported having experienced verbal threats, and 16% said the attacks 
came from security guards preventing their families from accessing their property (Figure 
17). The security guard attacks usually follow previous threats or actual instances of conflict. 
According to the respondents, assaults from armed security guards were very high during the 
periods of gold prospecting, discovery, and mining. As these processes arise, cases of 
security guard attacks also increase.  
Approximately 56% of respondents also listed violent brawls as the second most 
common type of conflict they encountered. The respondents indicated that this type of 
physical violence is exclusively mining-activity-related assaults such as open fights among 
groups of artisanal miners or attacks on other SSM groups that led to injuries and in some 
cases fatalities. This type of conflict hurts social cohesion and public order. 
Some respondents (7%) encountered attacks and counterattacks between sections of 
the community and AS miners (both legal and illegal). We established that negligence of 
mining safety practices, leading to the deaths of children and adults alike from accidental 
falls into open pits, as the leading cause. In addition to this, others hinted that the community 
protested against the destruction, pollution, and extinction of major rivers that serve both 
domestic and agricultural purposes (for drinking water and irrigation). Examples of essential 
water resources that have been affected include Lake Bosomtwe and the Oda River in the 
Bosomtwe and Amansie West districts, respectively. 
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About 6% of respondents reported targeted theft as the current conflict. Another 
important revelation from the interviews was the high number of targeted robberies and 
robberies, especially against non-native miners in the communities during intense mining 
activities. Most of the victims of robbery attacks were foreign nationals such as Chinese 
workers, who formed the majority of foreign nationals actively engaging in artisanal mining 
in Ghana and Ghanaians from communities other than the mining communities in question. 
However, about 2% of respondents listed violence resulting from family or tribal disputes 
over land, as well as “other” unclassified violence, as the type of conflict they encountered 
the most. Tribal disputes often emerged from prolonged tensions built up due to the exclusion 
of either a household member or the entire household of a particular tribe from the mining 
land. The exclusion order may come from the family, a traditional authority, or a politician 
and lead to violent confrontations among families or fierce opposition against the miners or 
whoever buys or works on the disputed land.  
 
 
         Figure 17: Conflict types reported in the mining communities 





Figure 18 illustrates the recorded conflict categories (for very low conflict or dummies 
to the categories, see Table 7). On average, the results for the number of times households 
experienced specific conflict categories demonstrated that particular conflicts were 
encountered in the community at least once during the twelve-month period. Most homes on 
average met a low amount of friction for all the conflict types recorded, followed by high and 
very high categories, respectively. A significant number of households (39%) encountered 
high numbers of threats; 24% experienced physical violence; 5% experienced security guard 
attacks; and less than 4% encountered incidents such as theft, conflict between communities 
and artisanal miners, and other conflicts. Approximately 29% of households faced a low 
number of physical violence and threat conflict encounters; 9% faced security guard attacks; 
while less than 5% encountered theft, tribal disputes, disputes between communities and 
artisanal miners, and other conflicts. 
 
 
          Figure 18: Distribution of conflict categories recorded 






3.5.2. Empirical results and findings 
We discovered that apart from factors such as employment, ethnicity, and artisan 
mining occurring, the rest of the variables were significant determinants of household 
encounters with conflict (Model 1). The results demonstrate that the influence of artisan gold 
mining on the land and ethnic affiliation of families is significant and more likely to influence 
the experience of conflict in general, while farmers are less likely to encounter conflict in 
general, holding other variables constant at their mean values. Consistent with the findings of 
other studies, the presence of minerals itself and its exploration is found to influence 
violence, particularly conflict instigated by greed and grievances (Berman et al., 2014; 
USAID, 2005).  
Table 4 reports the results of the probit models that were estimated independently for 
each critical conflict type. The results demonstrate that the overall model is generally 
significant for each model. More so, results from the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and 
correlation checks indicated that the models do not suffer from multicollinearity, which is a 
common challenge of cross-sectional data. The average VIF values for each probit model 
were below 3.0, thus indicating no sign of a multicollinearity problem (Midi et al., 2010). 
The Pearson’s correlation estimates (see Tables 8 and 9) demonstrated that no autocorrelation 
exists among the variables for the models. However, due to high individual VIF values (of 
about 6), we dropped both the land asset variable from Model 1 (average VIF value of about 
3.4) and the primary ethnicity variable (average VIF value of about 3.05) from Models 2 
through 4. Excluding these variables from the models when necessary does not influence the 




3.5.3. Household encounters with general conflict (Model 1) 
We discovered that except for factors such as employment, ethnicity, and artisan 
mining, the rest of the variables were insignificant determinants of household encounters with 
conflict (Model 1). The results demonstrated that the influence of artisan gold mining on the 
land and ethnic affiliation of families is significant and more likely to influence the 
experience of conflict, while farmers are less likely to encounter conflict, holding other 
variables constant at their mean values. As with the findings of other studies, the presence of 
minerals itself and its exploration is found to induce violence and tends to influence greed 




Table 4: Factors that influence households’ encounters with conflict 
Probit Models 











Land Guard Ass. 
House hold size       -0.0528     -0.0254     0.1031**         -0.0712 
 
[0.0541] [0.0431] [0.0493] [0.0549] 
Gender        -0.1319    0.3650**      -0.1115 -0.0315 
 
[0.2462] [0.1762] [0.1925] [0.2229] 
Main employment   -0.5835** -0.1499      -0.3011 -0.2017 
 
[0.2682] [0.1756] [0.1962] [0.2208] 
Marital status         -0.3175      -0.5536*** 0.2350 0.1766 
 
[0.2667] [0.1839] [0.1997] [0.2276] 
Major ethnic group       0.9128***    
 
[0.3342]    
Land Assert ownership      -0.0974 -0.6009** 0.1202 
  
[0.2309] [0.2525] [0.3181] 
Poverty  -0.0976     -0.9008*** 0.1779 
 
 [0.2697] [0.2815] [0.3226] 
AS mining occurring    0.7237** -0.3273      0.4434**         -0.0116 
 
[0.2838] [0.1823] [0.2023] [0.2256] 
Land right issues         0.5745***       0.7217***      1.0225*** 
 
 [0.2115] [0.2524] [0.2274] 
Mining related causes of violent conflict       0.5464***       0.2760      0.6097*** 
 
 [0.1913] [0.2109] [0.2234] 
*** P< 0.001; **P < 0.03.  Robust standard errors are in squared brackets [ ] 




In other words, mining communities where the heads of households engage in 
farming as their principal occupation and significant numbers belong to the dominant ethnic 
group and offer land for ASM are less likely to encounter mining-related conflict (Models 1 
through 4) than their peers who are farmers in similar conditions but deprived of farming. We 
explain this by the fact that agriculture and mining compete for the same scarce land 
resources. As expected, the easy and illegitimate conversion of farmlands into land for 
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mining unquestionably sparked conflict (occurrence and encounter) between miners and 
farmers in communities where most households are farmers.  
As expected, households who belong to the dominant ethnic group in this situation 
will resort to violence to prevent the loss of their livelihood. We discovered that this was 
consistent with the inequality thesis and partly consistent with Gurr’s (1970) hypothesis that 
meeting job security aspirations will prevent individuals from redirecting their grievances 
into violence.  
Generally, households are more likely to encounter physical violence when the rapid 
and indiscriminate sale or conversion of farmland for mining persists. An additional 
contributing factor to this effect is the weak enforcement of land rights, especially when land 
rights disputes go unresolved. Hence, as people offer less farmland for mining, this decreases 
the likelihood of conflict occurring and being encountered by households in communities 
where mining and farming compete. Comparatively similar outcomes are also achievable 
when either land transfers or receipt of land rent is completed satisfactorily between given 
parties. Moreover, if the heads of the household also support the public perception that 
mining itself brings violent conflict due to its negative consequences, this is more likely to 
influence conflict encounters positively. Consistently, ethnicity is found to be fundamental as 
it instigates most conflicts, except for those spurred by the growth of inequality (be it social, 
political, or economic) across ethnic lines (Steward and Brown, 2007). It is therefore 
discernible that depriving groups of people of their significant livelihood sources, which 
contribute to inequality, might encourage dominant ethnic groups to increase their 




3.5.4. Encounters with specific types of conflict (Table 4, Models 2 through 4) 
A further analysis of the determinants of household encounters with significant disputes 
(such as physical violence, verbal threats, and security guard attacks) found that household 
size, gender, marital status, land asset ownership, mining-related adverse effects, poverty, 
land rights issues, and offers of land for mining determine household encounters with certain 
types of violence. The main occupation types demonstrated a negative relationship but were 
not a significant predictor of contact with the primary conflict types. Generally, the findings 
here agree with the inequalities hypothesis (Langer and Stewart, 2013) that argues that when 
inequality of resource distribution and access exists, this provides a foundation for group 
mobilization, which thereby influences conflict through socioeconomic factors such as 
gender, marital status, and household size. 
 
3.5.5. Perceptual determinants  
The findings regarding perceptual factors demonstrated that the negative consequences 
of mining-related activities are more likely to induce encounters with physical violence and 
security guard attacks, while poverty is less likely to influence threats. During field 
observations, it was evident that the harmful effects of mining activities (e.g., destruction of 
farmland, pollution, contamination, damage of primary water sources, and abandoned and 
unprotected mining pits) were common causes of violence in the communities.  
We discovered that most households were ready to use violence to protect their lives, 
natural resources, and livelihood properties including their farmland. The rural people who 
suffer most from those effects perceive mining as a threat to their livelihood. Hence, they are 
more likely to pursue violence, including engaging in physical abuse or securing the services 
of security guards. In addition, other significant adverse effects reported include the deaths of 
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innocent people who fall into uncovered pits, the destruction and obstruction of nearby farms 
because of mining, and the high rate of concessional mining disputes among artisanal miners, 
both legal and illegal.  
Noticeably, aside from the harmful effects to society, households face two common 
experiential outcomes from mining that support Davis and Frank (2014) who demonstrated 
that two specific negative consequences of mining generate violence; unforeseen tension 
build-up and the labor surplus effect. The first effect is mounting tension build-up, which 
exists in most mining communities that suffer from the adverse mining effects. That was 
evident during focus group discussions in which people mentioned that the neglect of post-
mining responsibilities was responsible for many deaths. Participants, whose family members 
were victims of abandoned pits, spoke vehemently against the abandonment of post-mining 
land that has caused the deaths of innocent people. Deductively, we established that 
unresolved tension build-up is likely to result in violence.  
Some affected families also indicated that in many instances the police failed to assist 
them in achieving justice. Therefore, they contemplated whether to resort to violence by 
taking the law into their own hands to demand justice for the loss of their loved ones. As 
some affected participants recounted, “… we [the affected] know the families of the mining 
contractors who led the Chinese to excavate the pit that is killing our children, we [the 
affected] can retaliate if the police are not doing anything about this! There are death traps 
everywhere, and we [the community] have no strength to cover the pits ourselves alone” 
(male participant, focus group discussion, a community in Amansie West District, 2015).  
Second, we found that the increased discovery and exploration of gold was the primary 
cause of the common experiential outcome of mining, which results in social insecurity 
including the illegal trading of arms. This finding supports the findings of Davis and Frank 
(2014) that a high rate of gold mineral resource discovery leads to increased activities of 
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unlawful armed activities. Surprisingly, field observations demonstrated that the crowding of 
mining activities reinforces security guard attacks on farm laborers. Some respondents 
revealed that mine labor pays higher wages than farming and therefore, mining can 
outcompete and draw work away from agriculture. Thus, a surplus active labor force might 
exist because mining operators usually arrive with their employees, who mostly do not come 
from the local community.  
The surplus labor population who remain unemployed do not find employment in 
farming either (likely due to their high cost to farmers) and usually end up taking security 
guard jobs, which in turn contributes to security guard violence. The conditions created are 
also seen as an adverse outcome of mining, which supports the argument that the adverse 
consequences of mining are likely to reinforce the grievances that lead to encounters with 
conflict among farming households in mining communities. This indicates that increasing 
unresolved tension will probably lead to future violence in mining communities. These 
results further support the contention that the negative consequences of mining do indeed 
induce violence. 
For the perception of poverty as a cause of conflict, the results was expected, although it 
is equally possible that conflict can affect the occurrence of poverty. The reason could be that 
as households who depend mainly on natural resources such as land become poor and more 
impoverished, holding all other factors at their means would result in violence to resist 
deprivation from land access. We provide evidence from the results, which demonstrate that 
most respondents believed that poverty was not a significant cause of violent conflict in their 
communities (89% see Table 3).  
Land rights disputes, on the other hand, are more associated with the three main 
violence types. Significantly, the existence of unsolved land disputes in the communities over 
a long time explains the positive influence of land rights disputes on conflict. This increases 
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the likelihood that households in such locales encounter physical violence, threats, and 
security guard attacks as the number of artisan gold mining activities rise. Moreover, 
confounding problems such as the improper enforcement of land titles, the number of 
families that refuse to convert their land from significant cash crop farming to mining, and 
the poor quality of transfer negotiations, the sale of the same area to more than one person, 
and the excavation of soil before agreements are made with the owners, might be the 
catalyzing factors. Respondents mentioned that many land right disputes persist in the 
communities, leaving the affected with no way to address their grievances and thus resulting 
to conflict. It is worth noting that the affected local people in most rural communities are 
generally weak and usually not able to pay for the legitimate services of police intervention. 
They would mainly use other, relatively costless, means at their disposal to seek justice. 
Conflict resulting from unresolved land rights disputes is likely to escalate as more gold 
discoveries are made (Ababa, 2015). The above revelation meets research expectations as 
millions of Ghanaians join the nationwide gold rush currently underway.  
 
3.5.6. Socioeconomic determinants 
The results of this research demonstrated that household size is a better predictor of the 
threats encountered and gender and marital status can predict physical violence. The 
confident prediction of household size could be because as the family size of a household 
increases it is more likely to be involved in threats, which are the most common type of 
conflict (see Table 3, Model 5), in communities in which most people are farmers who 
compete with miners for scarce land resources. In contrast, married heads of households are 
less associated with using physical violence to address their grievances and might be 
interested in using other means of registering their protest, probably due to family ties. 
Gender also plays a vital role in the determination of conflict. Men in comparison to women 
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were more at risk of physically engaging in a dispute. Therefore, this means that mining 
communities with most households headed by men (66% in the sample) are more likely to 
encounter physical violence.  
Moreover, artisan mining and land asset ownership predict household encounters with 
threats of violence respectively. As explained (in section 3.6.3), when households offer land 
for artisanal gold mining, it is expected to increase their likelihood of encountering threats. 
We attribute this observation to the development of land disputes or land adjudication 
challenges. Households in these circumstances are more likely to confront threats of violence 
compared to their peers in similar situations who offer less or do not offer land for artisan 
mining, holding other variables at their means.  
An analysis of land asset ownership demonstrated contra-effects. Landownership also 
displays one’s level of economic status in developing countries, as well as social class 
(Humphreys et al., 2008). When households possess land, they are economically better off 
and are less likely to become involved in threat conflict (especially in the high threat 
category; see Table 5, Model 5), all things being equal. This outcome also meets a priori 
expectations in a setting in which the resource involved serves as the competing core function 
for mining and farming, and thus has a high monetary value. It is worth noting that owning a 
land asset in Ghana, as in many developing countries, demonstrates that the household is 
relatively less poor because it has a convertible property. It is able, for instance, to use land as 
collateral for loans or to secure financial credit in both the formal and non-formal sectors. 
Hence, reducing the occurrence of land asset deprivation will decrease violence, as proposed 
by the grievance and horizontal inequality hypotheses. Thus, reduction of this conflict type is 
more achievable when resources at stake generate relatively equitable benefits through 
ownership, distribution, and usability for many households in the community (Langer and 
Stewart, 2013). Marital status demonstrates a negative and significant association with the 
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physical violence conflict type. We explain this phenomenon by the fact that as heads of 
households get married, they become less prone to violence, probably because of family ties.  
 
3.5.7.  Factors influencing the frequency of specific conflict encounters 
Table 5 illustrates the estimates of the marginal effects from the ordered probity models 
explaining the factors that affect the number of times households experienced at least one of 
the significant reported conflict. For simplicity, marginal probability estimates were for very 
low conflict categories (for details on the alternative to the itemized types, see Appendix, 
Table 6). We established that only threats had all the three groups of conflict among the most 
crucial conflict types reported. Nonetheless, none of the variables was statistically significant 
in predicting the number of times households encountered very high cases of threats. Gender 
was inconsequential to the number of times families faced specific conflict categories. 
 
Table 5: Estimates of factors influencing the number of times conflict was encountered 
Marginal effects from ordered probit models 
Dependent variables: 
                          Model 5 
                          Threat  
     Model 6 
Violent Fight 
Model 7 
Land Guard attack 
Occurrence Categories Very high  High  Low High  Low High    Low 
Independent Variables 
House Hold Size 
0.0013 0.0327** -0.0027 0.0133 0.0046 -0.0070 -0.0105 
[0.0010] [0.0139] [0.0022] [0.0117] [0.0042] [0.0043] [0.0065] 
Gender  -0.0006 -0.0155 0.0013 0.0586 0.0218 0.0021 0.0032 
 
[0.0023] [0.0571] [0.0052] [0.0454] [0.0187] [0.0161] [0.0246] 
Marital Status 
0.0007 0.0189 -0.0016 -0.1465*** -0.0465** 0.0097 0.0148 
[0.0023] [0.0573] [0.0047] [0.0491] [0.0180] [0.0163] [0.0248] 
Ethnicity 0.0028 0.0898 -0.0003 0.1304** 0.0774 
  
 




AS. Mining Occurring 0.0029 0.0686 -0.007 -0.1072** -0.0425 0.0010 0.0007 
 
[0.0033] [0.0571] [0.0078] [0.0450] [0.0212] [0.0164] [0.0248] 
Employment -0.0049 -0.1192** 0.0101 -0.0790 -0.0272 -0.0157 -0.0237 
 
[0.0040] [0.0565] [0.0085] [0.0472] [0.0170] [0.0164] [0.0245] 
Poverty -0.0053 -0.2116*** -0.026 -0.0457 -0.0193 0.0058 0.0086 
 
[0.0040] [0.0705] [0.0297] [0.0640] [0.0322] [0.0270] [0.0385] 
Land Rights Is. 0.0091 0.1667** -0.0281 0.1474** 0.0321*** 0.0927** 0.1041*** 
 
[0.0075] [0.0655] [0.0190] [0.0628] [0.0122] [0.0360] [0.0387] 
Mining-Related Is. 0.0020 0.0476 -0.0049 0.1208* 0.0315** 0.0305 0.0424 
 
[0.0030] [0.0602] [0.0079] [0.0538] [0.0132] [0.0218] [0.0276] 
Asset Ownership -0.0144 -0.2224*** 0.0456 -0.6448 -0.1826 0.0121 0.0192 
  [0.0113] [0.0751] [0.0267] [0.0692] [0.0161] [0.0193] [0.0320] 
***: p < 0.001; **: p< 0.01; *: p< 0.02.  Observations = 250. Standard errors in squared brackets [] 
  
 
3.5.8. Perceptual determinants of the frequency of conflict encounters 
 
The findings demonstrate that land rights disputes are 16%, 14%, and 9% more likely to 
predict encounters with high levels of threats, physical violence, and security guard violence, 
respectively. Land rights dispute were expected to be common in the country since all three 
violence types in mining communities mostly arise over land disputes. Threats usually 
precede the other two kinds of conflict such as security guard attacks or physical violence. 
The outcome of the threat variable equally confirms a priori predictions that increased gold 
discovery leads to the emergence of more land acquisitions and transfer issues, which tends 
to heighten the probability of households encountering land disputes. Additional explanations 
could be the existence of unattractive alternative employment, including farming, as 
compared to mining, and the lack of institutional capacity for supervising mining standards 
and enforcing landownership rights. 
 
 116 
Opinions on poverty as a cause of violence were 21% less likely to induce encounters in 
the higher threat conflict category. As argued earlier (in sections 2.5 and 3.2.1), if individual 
farmers have access to land resources for farming and are less miserable because of this, they 
are less likely to perceive poverty as a cause of violence occurring over land disputes. This 
supports the idea that when households enjoy relative equality (less horizontal inequality) in 
resource ownership, resource access, and equal employment opportunities, they are less 
likely to encounter violent conflict.  
In addition, the adverse effect of mining on households was 3% and 12% more likely to 
affect households’ encounters with the low and high categories of violent conflict, 
respectively. This demonstrates that the more a society experiences the worsened conditions 
from mining outcomes and land disputes, the more frequently its members encounter threats 
of violence, at least three times in twelve months. If the adverse effects of mining are 
neglected, and land disputes cases go unsettled, as we have found, then we expect that 
households will repeatedly encounter common conflict types. This finding is also consistent 
with the conclusion that unresolved land dispute cases increase the tendency of appeals of 
landownership legitimacy, which is found to impede mining concession negotiations 
(Geenen, 2014; Geenen and Claessens, 2013). The possibility of conflict breaking out is more 
specific when talks fail and slow down the commencement of businesses activities in the 
extractive sector. This, therefore, will thwart the effort of securing capital investment in the 
industry. 
 
3.5.9. Socioeconomic determinants of the frequency of conflict encounters 
Whereas the addition of one member to the family is more likely to induce conflict with 
a high threat category by 3%, the availability of farm employment and ownership of land 
assets are 11% and 22% less likely to cause the higher types of threat encounters, 
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respectively (see section 3.5.1 for an explanation), holding all other factors at their mean 
values. Noticeably on the low ranking of the frequency of the conflicts that households 
experienced, it was found that none of the elements were significantly consequential to threat 
encounters. 
Analogously, the primary ethnic affiliation of a household was 13% more likely to 
predict encounters with the high category of physical violence, while offers of land for 
mining and married heads of households were 10% and 14% less prone to encounter high 
levels of physical violence conflict, respectively. This also demonstrates that the presence of 
artisanal gold mining itself might not be the only problem, but rather that other factors, like 
land and gold resource management processes, are also at work. When these processes are 
malfunctioning, households from major ethnic groups with large families will capitalize on 
their numbers to influence conflict to their favor and hence engage in violence with higher 
frequency. Married heads of households in mining communities are usually risk-averse and 
are mostly predicted to be reluctant to encounter the high category of physical abuse, even 
though they seem to demonstrate a positive but insignificant association with encounters with 
the other two conflict types.  
The findings suggest that the presence of artisanal gold mining itself predicts more 
household encounters with conflict in general and the threat of conflict but anticipates fewer 
encounters with high levels of physical violence. A reasonable inference from the findings is 
therefore that not only does mining per se contribute to conflict in mining communities, but 
so do other factors, including the mismanagement of affairs in the mining sector by existing 
institutions. It is worth noting that the mismanagement of the negative consequences of 
mining and their experiential outcomes on society also influences the number of conflict 
encounters (see section 3.2). This is consistent with the findings from resource policy and 
political and conflict studies (Maconachie, 2007; Ross, 2002, 2004, 2008: Collier et al. 2004). 
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Pollution of vital natural resources might be one of the rationalizations behind the 
argument that mining and artisanal farming cannot coexist (Davis and Frank, 2014; Hilson, 
2002). Currently, the two may coexist, at the expense of peace, if the situation does not 
improve. This finding is moreover consistent with the results of Maystadt et al. (2012) that 
mineral activities such as mining concessions increase the frequency of conflict.  
 
3.6.  Conclusion and the policy recommendations from key findings 
The heightened media reports and public outcry against mining and its negative 
consequences in Ghana, including the increasing cases of violence in some communities, 
provides clues that support the leading account of linkages between natural resource 
exploitation and conflict among academics, policy experts, and practitioners. To contribute to 
the greater comprehension of the problem, in the interest of sustaining monetary investment 
in the ASM sector, we have analyzed and described the nature of conflict among households 
of artisanal gold mining communities. In this chapter, we have empirically estimated the 
factors that predict household encounters with conflict, and the frequency of these conflicts. 
We have also identified land rights challenges, socioeconomic inequalities, and the adverse 
effects of mining as the three main ways in which households in mining communities 
encounter violence in this non-post-civil-war conflict setting. 
While affirming the importance of these separate factors, the analysis nonetheless also 
finds evidence to support the possibility that artisanal gold mining and its related activities 
are concomitant with certain types of violence in the Amansie and Bosomtwe districts of 
Ashanti. It further reveals that household encounters with conflict are more prevalent when 
socioeconomic inequalities including land rights and mining-related problems go unresolved. 
As a result, as household size increases, the concomitant enlargement of tribal networks 
enforces conflict encounters. Interestingly, the availability and type of employment 
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opportunities for households correctly predict fewer conflict encounters. Relatedly, marital 
status, the perception of poverty, and land asset ownership on the causes of violence make 
similar predictions for encounters with certain conflict types. Ethnicity and conversion of 
farmlands to mining predict household encounters with conflict positively, while gender, 
adverse effects from mining, and land rights inequalities make parallel predictions for 
specific types of violence. Regarding the frequency with which conflict types are 
encountered, persisting land rights disputes, adverse mining effects, and household size are 
found to predict the development of conflict encounters positively. However, variables such 
as the availability of employment alternatives, the perception of poverty, asset ownership, 
marital status of the heads of households, and providing land for artisanal mining are less 
likely to predict the frequency of certain types of conflict.  
The findings in this chapter suggest that households in Ghanaian mining communities 
are at risk of encountering violence. Sources such as the management of natural resources 
(e.g., land and gold) and its extraction, distribution of resource rents, as well as negative 
externalities from resource extraction in the hosting society induce violence in artisanal gold 
mining areas. SSM itself should not be seen in isolation as the only primal catalyst of 
conflict. Instead, we found mining to have properties capable of reducing the frequency of 
certain disputes, if the activities are managed well. Given the insightful statistical evidence on 
the determinants of household encounters with conflict in artisan mining communities in a 
non-post-civil war context, there is a need to develop comprehensive countermeasures to 
mitigate the heightened risk of group-based violence in mining areas. However, management 
policies during the awarding of mining licenses and the conclusion of concessional 
contracting should be conscious of the tendency of socioeconomic inequalities, land rights 
challenges, and environmental consequences to foster violence.  
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On the above basis, we make the strong inference that active monitoring and 
enforcement of land rights and SSM activities might be able to minimize or curtail violent 
conflicts in mining communities. A desirable preventive measure toward developing 
holistically sustainable mining and conflict management should involve the local institutions, 
the artisanal miners, and the LSM companies as partners in mitigation. We recommend that 
other vital stakeholders including the local citizens (not only local leaders), government, and 
non-governmental organizations must be on board for the targeting and mitigation of the 
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Table 6: Distributions of conflict levels or categories (for table A.2) 
Observations 250.                         Per cent of the frequency of conflict occurrence 
Conflict Classification Categories Violent fight Threat Land guard att. Theft  F. Disputes Other Com-ASM 
Very low (0) 0 47 31 86 94 98.8 98.8 92.8 
Low (1-2) 1 29 29 9 3 1.2 0.8 4 
High (3-4) 2 24 39 5 3 
 
0.4 3.2 
Very high (6-8) 3 
 
1 









Table 7: Results from the Variance Inflation Factor for the models 1 through 4 
 
    Average VIF values With Asset With Ethnicity 
Model 1 2.78 3.41 
 Model 2 2.4 
 
3.05 
Model 3 2.4 
 
3.05 
Model 4 2.4 
 
3.05 




Table 8: Marginal effects estimates for very low conflict category (for table A1) 
Dependent variables: Threat Violent fight Land guard 
Categories Very low Very low Very low 
Independent Variables 
   House Hold Size -0.0312** -0.018 0.0174 
 
[0.0132] [0.0157] [0.0103] 
Employment 0.1139 0.1062 0.0394 
 
[0.0539] [0.0628] [0.040] 
AS. Mining Occurring -0.0646 0.1497* -0.0012 
 
[0.0530] [0.0644] [0.041] 
Gender  0.01474 -0.0804 -0.0052 
 
[0.0533] [0.0634] [0.040] 
Marital Status -0.018 0.1930*** -0.0244 
 
[0.0550] [0.0627] [0.041] 
Poverty 0.2429** 0.0650 -0.0144 
 
[0.0976] [0.0960] [0.0654] 




 Land Rights Is. -0.1478*** -0.1795*** -0.1968*** 
 
[0.0573] [0.0690] [0.0614] 




[0.0555] [0.0635] [0.0478] 
Asset Ownership 0.1912*** 0.0827 -0.0313 
 
[0.0584] [0.0845] [0.0510] 
***: p < 0.001; **: p< 0.01; *: p< 0.02. Observations = 250. Standard errors in squared brackets [] 
 
 
Table 9: Pearson’s correlation coefficients (Table A.3) 
 
Household size Employment ASM Occ. Gender Marital St. Poverty Land Rights Is. 
Household size 1 
      Employment 0.1452 1 
     ASM Occ. 0.1301 -0.0289 1 
    Gender -0.078 -0.1347 -0.0533 1 
   Marital Status 0.3073 0.2235 0.0806 0.1038 1 
  Poverty -0.0939 0.0331 0.0226 -0.0902 -0.0437 1 
 Land Rights Is. -0.0423 -0.1674 0.232 -0.0017 0.034 -0.0476 1 
Mining-Related Is. 0.018 -0.0017 0.0685 0.0787 0.0736 0.0534 0.0752 
Asset ownership 0.3925 0.0182 0.2328 -0.0704 0.1148 0.0604 0.1668 
Ethnicity 0.0943 0.2054 0.0936 -0.1038 0.0696 0.0301 0.0652 
        
 
Mining-Related Is. Asset ownership Ethnicity 
    Mining-Related Is. 1 
      Asset ownership 0.2212 1 
     Ethnicity 0.1018 0.3058 1 











4. Impact of mining on the social appreciation of mining 
Abstract 
Sustainability practices play an essential role in allowing companies to manage 
reputation and competitiveness and contribute to obtaining SOLs. Most SSM companies in 
developed economies pursue similar objectives. However, weak governance makes them 
difficult to achieve in less developed economies. This chapter employs qualitative and 
quantitative approaches to assess the empirical conditions of Ghana’s SSM and their 
influence on SOLs. From the findings, we predict that societies will reject SOLs under the 
circumstances of the unmitigated adverse effects of mining. As a countermeasure, we 




4.1. Introduction  
Ghana like most Sub-Saharan African countries faces the challenges of raising economic 
growth and reducing poverty (UN, 2016, pp. 1-8; Ndambiri et al., 2012, pp. 1-2). These are 
mostly driven by governance and leadership challenges (Ramburuth, 2016, pp. 1-4), 
particularly in the sustainable management of natural resources. In this state, the ideal case 
for addressing the challenges would involve corporations and businesses providing 
sustainable development, that is, providing goods and services through the responsible 
management of natural resources (UN SDGs, 2016: #2-5). Notwithstanding, this is not the 
case for some small- and medium-sized corporations in Ghana. In most parts of Ghana and 
other developing countries, the corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities of corporates 
are limited to building schools and boreholes (Andrews, 2016).  
However, CSR can be more appropriate in meeting the essential social needs than merely 
building infrastructures when it comes to mining: “Corporate Social Responsibilities – CSR, 
in mining, has generally meant building roads and schools and addressing the needs of 
indigenous populations as best as possible after the fact. To begin with, what if the mine was 
not polluting the water? Investment in new technology, to do things right with as little impact 
as possible, is arguably the most meaningful CSR initiative a company can take on” (Vivien 
Diniz: Kachan & Co. on RIN, 2013). It is inherent that the right technological investment in 
mining could significantly improve the lives of individuals in mining host communities by 
preventing or reducing the adverse effects of mining. The right investments in technology 
could lead to a dynamic pattern of economic systems and managers understand that pre-
emptive management strategies, which at least foster sustainability, are vital for winner-
oriented enterprises (Schmidpeter, 2012).  
The extractive industries and businesses are not exempt from the new wave of social 
development transitions where enterprises must meet the ethical, social, and environmental 
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demands of local stakeholders (Park and Ghauri, 2015). Although the direction of flow of 
events between CSR and financial performance is uncertain, scientific studies support such a 
connection (Wieland, personal communications; Wieland and Heck, 2013). Globally, partly 
for legitimacy and social fitness purposes and resources regularization, mining industries are 
concerned and confronted with the issue of the environmental consequences of their activities 
(Park and Ghauri, 2015; Reed, 2002). Therefore, many concepts relating to the efficient use 
of resources and the management of unwanted outcomes have emerged. Research suggests 
that the idea of sustainability in the area of CSR, SOL, and corporate social irresponsibility 
(CSI) for example, has dominated academic research over the past two decades (Allen et al., 
2017; Majoch et al., 2016; van Duuren et al., 2016; Popa, and Salanță, 2014; Davis and 
Franks, 2014; Franks et al., 2014; Owen and Kemp, 2014; Prno, 2013; Prno and Slocombe, 
2012; Carroll and Shabana, 2010; Jenkins and Yakovleva, 2006), yet the changing social 
demands make the research in the area far from over. 
A careful consideration of the two definitions below reveals the fact that both CSR and 
SOLs share the same goal, although disagreement in the working definitions exists 
(Dahlsrud, 2008): A social license to operate is “… an effort of companies in reaching out to 
stakeholders to articulate how companies respond to societal and community expectations” 
(Owen and Kemp, 2012), while “…CSR best describes the many ways in which companies 
choose to manage their business and conduct their efforts to create a positive and desirable 
impact on society in general” (Popa and Salanță, 2014). The two concepts primarily aim to 
achieve what exactly sustainability is seeking. That is, managing the environment as well as 
its benefits in a way that the negative impacts on society are minimized as organizations 
conduct their business. Many global initiatives also strive toward achieving similar goals. For 
instance, The United Nations Global Compact, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 
and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiatives (EITI) seek to ensure transparent 
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resource accounting. While the Global Mining Initiative (GMI) focuses on industrial 
sustainability, a typical example of the SDGs is the emphasis on achieving universal food 
security, sustainable food production, and natural resources conservation by the year 2030 
(UN SDGs, 2016, #: 2 and 15). Unfortunately, the SSM sector industries from developing 
countries including Ghana miss most of the goals pursued within the SDGs (Buxton, 2012). 
Research demonstrates that in certain conditions, mining operations that do not meet the 
expectations of the local communities and the civil society, can engender anti-business 
development activities such as protest, the intermittent closure of mining operations, and 
sometimes violence (Armah et al., 2016; Rogan et al., 2016; Cuvelia, and Vlassenroot, 2014; 
Davis and Franks, 2014; Prno and Slocombe, 2012; Ross, 2006). The situation is not different 
with the case of Ghana (Armah et al., 2016; Patel et al., 2016; Hilson and Garforth, 2013; 
Bush, 2009; Hilson and Yakvleva, 2007). Thus, it is complicated for SMEs to obtain SOLs in 
the SSM sector and this calls for the examination of the factors that affect the distribution of 
SOLs. Due to the increasing global demand for natural resources in this century (Dubiński, 
2013) and the deficiency of environmental regulatory regimes to meet the social expectations 
of the mining sector, there is a call for mining companies to step beyond their legal titles to 
circumvent the probable expensive social costs (Prno et al., 2012; Bridge, 2004; Hilson and 
Murck, 2000). Pursuing the above goals as well as preventing human rights violation risks is 
necessary for the SSM sector as these problems have the potential of making both medium 
and LSM companies unpopular. More so, the dynamics of mining operations and social 
expectations toward clean mining in Ghana, for example, is changing. Due to this, effective 
coordination of functional economic governance among the major stakeholders to promote 
competitive and responsible oriented businesses in the SSM sector is required.  
Although the resource sector is a key player in the global economy, the application of 
SOLs to mining has not received the necessary research foci, especially vis-à-vis small size 
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(scale) companies. A study by Davis and Frank (2014, p. 10) suggests that small and medium 
scale mining companies are at difficulty when it comes to the remediation of the impact of 
mining rather than the prevention of adverse effects. Whereas large-scale companies 
comparatively find it easier to meet the financial requirements of the negative impact of 
mining. Studies that focus on mining exceedingly devote attention to industrial mining (Prno 
and Slocombe, 2012; Jenkins and Yakovleva, 2006), with a few exceptions that have 
discussed the safety standards and working conditions of Ghanaian underground SSM 
(Bansah et al., 2016). In the latter research, four licensed medium-sized underground mines 
in Tarkwa in the Western region of Ghana were visited, and the working safety of miners and 
environmental effects of underground mining were analyzed. They identified the odd choice 
of working tools, lack of personal protective equipment, poor engineering, and absence of 
operational monitoring as the significant problems associated with the sector operations. 
However, discussions on first-hand conditions of mining and their effect on SOLs are 
lacking. Positive advocacy for large firms to undertake SOLs with local communities in the 
areas of communication, decision-making, conflict resolution, and information on social 
performance disclosure exists (Goldstuck and Hughes, 2010; Business for Social 
Responsibility, 2003; Social License Task Group, 2009). When searching for sustainable 
development, other scholars argue for regulations that would improve governance by 
reporting sustainable standards (Jenkins and Yakovleva, 2006). The aim of this chapter, 
therefore, is to contribute a detailed examination of the realistic conditions of artisan mining 
and its impact on obtaining SOLs using household surveys and in-depth interviews with 
mining institutions and small-scale miners in two districts of Ashanti region. 
The findings demonstrate that the experiential conditions of ASM make it difficult for 
society to offer SOLs and the deficiency of mining policies toward clean mining promotion. 
However, we argue that companies can reduce these impediments by realigning their 
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business models and practices that synchronize the expectations of the society. More so, to 
promote responsible and sustainable ASM, organizational mining governance is 
recommended. The section begins with the application of the theory to explain the 
importance of regulatory management in the establishment of ASM and SOLs, followed by 
the clean mining concept and examination of data, results, and findings.   
 
4.1.1. Application of organizational governance theories in sustainability  
4.1.2. Institutions 
Institutions are seen as an element of the social order of society that, through a set of 
rules and regulations, govern the behavior and expectations of individuals. They are also 
considered to perform vital functions by regulating the responses of economic agents to 
produce socially desirable products and services (Heemskerk and Heemskerk, 2017; Prno and 
Slocombe, 2012; Young et al., 2008). Governance perspectives provide recognition to 
institutions as crucial agents because governance systems require the synergy of several 
institutions (Paavola, 2007; Kooiman, 2003). The institutions being formal (law-based) or 
informal (custom-based) can function either as proximate forces or drivers of fundamental 
forces or both. They can create restricting (regulation-based) or supporting (incentives-
oriented) environments for business operations (Sven-Olorf et al., 2016). In the area of 
resource sustainability, traditional institutions, for example, play a vital role in resource 
conflict management and resource exploitation (Cortex, 2014; 2011; Berman et al., 2012; 
Royal Academy of Sciences, 2009).  
Institutional effectiveness can have a large impact on business performance, for example, 
the reduction of the public-institutional trust problem. Thus, the public can be trusted to 
contribute to the provision of an enabling environment for businesses to operate. However, if 
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governing institutions are perceived merely as bystanders, this creates a challenging context 
for companies to manage (Prno, 2013, p. 584). The type of institutions and governance mode 
matters and may yield competitive and responsible business performance concerning 
sustainability or otherwise. Mining has undergone significant shifts in governance by 
emphatically improving the social and environmental performance sectors (Prno and 
Slocombe, 2012, p. 346). With this, governance tasks are broadening, with civil society and 
market actors taking center stage in contributing to the conditions of creating shared value. 
 
4.1.3. Governance 
Generally, research defines governance as the theoretical conception of the process of 
governing (Prno and Slocombe, 2012; Kooiman, 2003), and it can indirectly dictate the 
operation of the rules of the game. In this regard, it refers to the decision-making on 
environmental and other sustainability processes using government regulations. We learn 
here that the viewpoint on sustainability from fields such as environment, socioeconomics, 
and ethics, builds on this conceptualization. Hence, we imply that with many types and 
mixtures, a governance system can help find solutions to some of the contemporary issues 
concerning sustainability. In some countries, governance dynamics is found to be useful in 
shaping the development of the mining sector for establishing and obtaining SOLs. In Canada 
for instance, it is found to be a helpful instrument in creating SOLs in the areas of mining 
land allocation, permitting formalization, the right of exploration, and mining (Prno, 2013; 
Prno and Slocombe, 2012).  
Furthermore, due to the changing social expectations and growing societal demand for 
responsible and sustainable development, it is complicated for a single governance model to 
provide efficient outcomes. Therefore, alternative modes of governance arrangements may 
lead to a better result for the development of SOLs (Prno and Slocombe, 2012; Schiavi and 
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Soloman, 2007; Lemos and Agrawal, 2006; Dashwood, 2005; Kemp et al., 2005; Eisner, 
2004; Campbell, 2003). Hence, it is appropriate to apply institution and organizational 
governance in conceptualizing how the adverse effects from small-sized mining companies 
can affect the process of obtaining an SOL in a developing country context like Ghana, where 
institutions are found to underperform (Appiah and Wieland, 2016; Prno, 2013). Moreover, 
much of the economic theory assumptions portray the traditional regulatory system as 
offering an impartial and perfect service in sustainable resource management (Royal Swedish 
Academy of Sciences, 2009; Dixit, 2003), but in reality, the advantages are only estimated to 
be useful in a few developed markets (Dixit, 2003). Economic governance as an aspect of 
governance theory primarily seeks to examine the better modes of organizing governance 
order in the management of profitable transactions. 
The preceding discussion suggests that proactive institutions and organizational 
governance are necessary for such settings to coordinate economic transactions to incentivize 
businesses to alter their behavior. Thus, this would initiate incentives for medium-sized 
enterprises (MSEs) to significantly pursue sustainable or clean mining (Lynch-wood and 
Williamson, 2007). It is worth knowing that the coordination of a complex network of 
stakeholders is the role of governance (Kooiman, 2003; Saunier and Meganck, 2009; 
Paavola, 200; Rhodes, 1997). However, the coordination system that recognizes the 
indispensable role of institutions should be guided by the governance of specific economic 
businesses. Accordingly, the analysis of empirical economic realities of SSM companies in a 
governance framework from a developing country is vital. In the Ghanaian ASM context, 
good governance and proactive institutions can be achieved through the formulation of 
workable and functional arrangements between significant stakeholders including the state 
mining regulators, the local community and local traditional leaders (traditional and 
religious), small-scale miners, and the media, with each contributing their natural capital. 
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Although some researchers argue for free prior and informed consent (Owen and Kemp, 
2014), others warn against a cautious effort to replace the legitimate legal permit to operate 
with SOLs (Lincoln et al., 2015). The authors Lincoln et al. (2015) are cautious against 
bestowing significant effort on SOLs as a social veto to environmental issues and argue in 
favor of implementing schemes of approved legal and political arena as remedies. What 
happens when such institutions are weak? Alternative governance arrangements are 
necessary. Other researchers also argue for stakeholder theories rather than observing CSR 
alone as it is limited in scope with regards to ensuring effective order and responsibilities of 
businesses (Park and Ghauri, 2015; Goel and Ramanathan, 2014). However, without clear 
organization and coordination of economic governance structures to manage the complex 
mining sector setting in the presence of weak regulatory regime states responsibly, like in the 
case of Ghana, the stakeholder argument alone would be less efficient. Workable 
arrangements for desirable outcomes that entrust the ownership of clean mining to traditional 
and non-traditional institutions including society is highly commendable as a good 
governance order. The economic governance in this direction would ensure both spontaneous 
order in the market and the global rule of alternative modes of governance (Sven-Olof et al., 
2016; Wieland, 2014).  
The continual management of cooperative relationships on good governance orders and 
workable arrangements establishes the source of economic value creation. Each stakeholder 
has a responsibility to contribute to the nature of universal values such as responsible mining 
management toward clean mining. That is, a stakeholder value that ensures human rights 
protection such as child labor and violence prevention, environmental safety, social stability, 
and economic sustainability (Dubiński, 2013). However, the organization of these values is 
deemed necessary and forms a specific segment of doing business (Freeman et al., 2014), and 
this is the sole responsibility and objective of economic governance. Justifiably, the persistent 
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lack of public trust in SSC to ensure clean mining in developing countries such as Ghana, 
calls for research on the effect of the experimental conditions of companies that obtain an 
SOL. In addition, in the literature, there has been less of a focus on the empirical conditions 
of mining companies and the impact of the social judgment of offering an operating license. 
Hence, the area needs more examination, and this is what this chapter aims to achieve. A 
study involving how to obtain and sustain SOLs in a developing country context is crucial for 
the development of the SSM sector. It would contribute to the development of status 
indicators toward global sustainable development (FAO, 2010) and in addition provide a 
better understanding of some of the context of operations from the SSM perspective and 
formal mining regulatory systems in Ghana.  
In the following section, we introduce the conceptual framework of clean mining with 
the aid of existing literature and its conditions as a guide for a social verdict on SOLs. After 
describing the data and methods, the chapter builds on household and expert observations in 
discussing the practical conditions of mining on host communities and their influence on 
attaining clean mining, a catalyst for obtaining an SOL. It then briefly examines the 
challenges of governance policy instruments and their effect on obtaining SOLs. We believe 
that this section contributes immensely by devising suggestions toward attaining a collective 
appreciation of SSM in less developed economies. 
 
4.1.4. The clean mining conceptual framework 
In everyday terms, clean mining is described as less pollution from mining as reflected 
in the following quotation on how mining can be clean and innovative: “I think we’re at a 
rare point in history where mining companies, policymakers, and elected officials are 
somewhat in sync now. The average voter wants to see clean water and green trees, and your 
average mining company wants to be as efficient and economical as it can be, and that in 
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many cases involves adopting cleaner green technologies. I think it’s an interesting time in 
which policymakers and mining companies have more in common than they think they 
might” (Vivien Diniz: Kachan & Co. on RIN, 2013). Due to the possible effect that social 
responsibilities can have on a their development, companies are usually recommended to 
invest in clean mining not only to be competitive but also to undertake meaningful CSR. An 
important lesson from such position [Kachan & Co. on RIN, 2013] and its usefulness for gold 
mining in developing country contexts is a holistic solution to prevent water wastage. A 
typical area is the adoption of water recycling zero discharge technology, which can be a 
viable solution for some companies and society. For instance, an investment in water 
treatment processes, which ensure that a higher percentage of wastewater used in mining is 
purified and recycled, leaving zero liquid discharge at the end of the treatment cycle, would 
serve such a purpose. Sustainable innovations in mining practices are highly recommended 
and can be useful in developing countries where change is lacking and the negative impacts 
of mining are neglected concurrently. A known case is gross environmental pollution 
including dust fumes in the Ghanaian SSM (Bansah et al., 2016). Mining practices that 
reduce water wastage, for instance, would be much appreciated in developing countries.  
The aspects of clean mining usually referred to as green mining consider only the 
environmental concerns about emissions and these generally demand innovative solutions. 
Moreover, clean drilling discussed in this chapter would include the mitigation of human 
rights violations to the existing sustainability efforts. It adapts the FAO-ISEAL (2010) 
definition of sustainability and moves beyond human rights protection to the alleviation of 
unwanted human rights infringements. The same document summarizes the sustainability 
dimensions to cover good governance, social development, economic resilience, and 
environmental integrity (FAO - ISEAL, 2010), which suggest that good governance matters 
in sustainable mining. The concept of clean mining, as discussed here, advocates for 
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sustainable practices in the field of mining that requires both public and legitimate license 
and at the same time supports intergenerational needs. Clean mining operations would ensure 
meaningful social desirable outcomes over adverse outcomes, a result that leads to less 
human rights violations and mitigates adverse environmental effects. This result must be 
achieved in such a way that the natural environment benefits and the needs of current and 
future generations are met. Put differently by the normative assumption backed by 
stakeholder theories, the codes and the norms of sustainability should be the primal design of 
institutions (Singer, 2013). However, the organization of these values is deemed necessary 
and is a specific segment of doing business (Freeman et al., 2007).  
Prominently, in providing a common output at a sustainable rate, the proposed 
immaculate mining conception would encourage the long-term balance of human rights and 
socioeconomic and environmental issues (Figure 19 below). For instance, practicing social 
responsibility would include all activities that would add more social benefits than costs to 
society. Management decisions that contribute to the provision of essential livelihood 
services such as safe drinking water and health support for communities that badly need these 
services due to mining activities is a good example of practicing clean mining by achieving 
social responsibilities. In this case, SSM could contribute to poverty reduction. More so, in 
the area of environmental safety, clean mining or sustainable mining would suppose that 
corporations are either motivated or convinced on ethical grounds to seek innovative and 
efficient methods of extraction that would reduce the harmful effects emitted on the society. 
For instance, adopting technology such as zero water wastage would lessen the burden on 
community dwellers on water usage and reduce health-related problems. Likewise, exploring 
alternative but safe chemicals such as iodine for gold processing instead of mercury would 
improve the society’s livelihoods. Furthermore, on economic sustainability, faultless mining 
strategies would suppose that mining operations would contribute to a search for an 
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alternative livelihood that could co-exist with mining to reduce the tensions that might be 
caused by labor layoffs from the agricultural sector. If companies achieve that, then the 
continuation of mining activities might not face harsh opposition. 
A balance of such values is necessary to achieve clean mining by revitalizing existing 
organizational policies and the prudent management of existing complex systems (Buxton, 
2012). However, the accepted balance would be provided by efficient institutional and 
regulatory governance systems (Singer, 2013), which economic management seeks to 
examine and promote. 
Observing clean mining would also enable companies to respond to ethical challenges. 
Goel and Ramanathan (2014), argue that firms do not only seek profit when they pursue 
sustainability but also perform an action that fulfills moral norms. This profit, according to 
Wieland and Heck (2013: cp. 1), is not always the difference between revenue and cost but 
rather a social optimum between the positive outcome of the differences between income and 
expense and the achievement of cooperation rents. In the context of this study, the profit is a 
social profit that would be conflict-free, is not involved in child exploitation, contains 
environmental conservation, and has more socioeconomic support, and this would constitute 
clean mining as depicted in Figure 19.  
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Figure 19: Overview of clean mining concept 
Source: Some thoughts adapted from FAO, 2010, p.9. 
 
Figure 19 above depicts the conceptual overview of the concept of clean mining. The 
conception is founded on economic governance that coordinates and enforces responsibilities 
among stakeholders constituting the working arrangements. When businesses meet the clean 
mining conditions, they can be assured of a social offer of a common license that suffixes the 
legitimate state license to mine in a less costly or costless operation than when a collective 
permit is withheld (Prno, 2013). More importantly, if companies use SOLs as a component of 
their due diligence process, then there is a high probability that the shared value among the 
key stakeholders (including the community who is adversely affected in the absence of 
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achieve clean mining, their empirical conditions should support at least three critical aspects 
of responsible management: (1) sustainability that looks at the areas of environment, 
economics, and some perspective of social structures; (2) responsibilities that cover areas of 
social structures (economic and environmental); and (3) ethics that examine the consideration 
of monetary gains over other areas such as human rights and environmental safety in mining 
governance. These conditions, although not sufficient,
14
 are necessary for responsible and 
sustainable mining and for achieving social and competitive outputs and services. Unlike the 
earlier definitions of sustainability in relation to mining, which place greater focus on the 
environment (Valente, 2010; Margolis et al., 2003) and socioeconomic aspects (Jenkins and 
Yakovleva, 2006), this discussion moves further and includes responsible and sustainable 
mining as the base for achieving clean methods of extraction and how it influences SOLs. 
The recent management practices demonstrate that the readjustment of business 
models in the pursuit of sustainability can be more efficacious provided they partly 
comprehend the balance between the dichotomous expectations between the economy and the 
society (Schmidpeter, 2014; Schneider and Schmidpeter, 2012; Laszlo and Zhexembayeva, 
2011; Porter and Kramer, 2011; Senge, 2008). This requires functional economic governance 
that seeks to implement the proper order, workable arrangements, and sustenance of 
cooperative relationships (Wieland, 2014). Studies have demonstrated that even in developed 
markets where the traditional official systems are approximated to be efficient, alternative 
arrangements exist to ensure social outcomes (Dixit, 2003). Accordingly, for the business 
processes and expectations to conform to the changing social expectations of clean mining, 
an alternative arrangement is necessary to overcome persisting governance challenges. The 
realignment of business models toward social output is anticipated to restore the trust of a 
                                                     
14
 This might require other conditions such as good economic governance in organizing and supervising the 
economic activities of all critical stakeholders in the SSM sector. This might include both the legal traditional 




company to higher levels of growth. For instance, as indicated by Paul Polman, the CEO of 
Unilever Group, “…When we experience the impact of recurring storms and severe droughts, 
damaging floods, and obvious water shortages, spiraling food prices and widespread food 
shortages, we are forced to take notice. CEOs and businesses that understand this and 
develop business models that are in sync with the needs of society and the environment will 
not only restore trust in business but also drive their companies to higher levels of growth” 
(in Reeves and Weinreb, 2013).  
Hence, alternative economic governance modes are needed to foster the creation and 
coordination of working arrangements in synchronizing or supplementing the regulations. We 
propose alternative economic governance as a viable means for small- and medium-scale 
mining enterprises to promote clean mining in a developing country like Ghana. The 
responsible management of mining transactions can enhance the maximization of 
shareholders’ value. Interestingly, the maximization of shareholders’ value is also partly tied 
to SOLs; the “permit” is only granted by society when companies behave responsibly for 
ensuring clean mining. Therefore, the management of collaboration between the main 
stakeholders is essential due to the goal of clean mining, which is a shared value to be created 
by all stakeholders. The creation of this cooperation rent would be more feasible if it is based 
on trust relationships among each stakeholder. For instance, the trust in the company’s 
competency in ensuring responsible mining might reciprocate assurances on society to grant 
SOLs to companies. Interdependently, the success of a company’s competency is partly 
shaped by an active civil society demanding accountability on regulations. 
 
4.1.5. Empirical conditions of Ghanaian mining companies  
This research enquires into the impact of mining on host communities to learn the 
nature of mining governance and how management influences the conditions of SSM 
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companies. It argues that good mining governance promotes sustainable mining. The realistic 
conditions of existing mining companies describe how the mining operations affect the host 
communities. How does the mining operation affect social structures such as health, public or 
community security, and food security? What is the effect on the economic structure for 
example, on employment and the environmental architecture? The observational conditions 
should at least support the minimization of the adverse effects on society in the areas of 
socioeconomics and ecology when exceptional economic governance is in place. The study 
further proposes that sustainable and responsible mining should be a subset of clean mining 
from the viewpoint of social capital formation for both legal and communal licenses. For this 
to happen, we need not only good governance (FAO, 2010), but sound economic governance 
to coordinate working arrangements in the sector. Since confrontation between communities 
and companies after issuing formal permits exist (Rees et al., 2012), good economic 
governance is necessary to reduce or prevent this development. 
Moreover, evidence from LSM industries suggests that during mining operations, the 
benefits communities receive from mining and the stakeholder management both influence 
the establishment of SOLs (Prno, 2013). Hence, collaboration for working arrangements is 
necessary among all major stakeholders to supplement the effort of the legal mining 
instruments. We expect this might minimize the probability of the social rejection of mining 
operations after the acquisition of legitimate permits to mine. Mining companies should be 
able to meet the responsibilities of managing most of the unintended adverse outcomes of 
mining on the society. Activities of focus should include conflict prevention and its 
consequential management, contributions to child labor prevention, environmental 
rehabilitation, and supporting local employment.  
More so, the organization of economic activities in the SSM sector should coordinate 
both the proper and social appreciation of mining operations. The first aspect, which is legal 
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acceptance, falls under the legitimate acquisition of a permit to mine, which is backed by the 
law. This aspect of the rights of doing business should ideally spell out the minimum 
requirements and a means of monitoring and evaluating the activities of permit holders. In 
contrast to most developed economies, Ghana’s legal permit is alleged to place significant 
emphasis on monetary benefit. The second aspect is obtaining the collective rights to embark 
on mining operations, which is inevitable. As defined by some authors, this type of power 
cannot be acquired or applied for and issued by the state (Franks, et al., 2016; Kemp et al., 
2016; Moffat and Zhang, 2014; Reeves and Weinreb, 2013; Salzmann et al., 2006). 
Communal licenses instead include the management of public expectations on host 
communities toward their acceptance of mining operations. Although indirectly the SOLs 
primarily seek to achieve clean mining, there is also a social output of encouraging 
undertakings for social, human rights, and environmental safety. These two combined, the 
social and ecological responsibilities, if managed well, can partially have a positive impact on 
the economic burdens. The thesis argues that societies might prioritize social and 
environmental duties over economic obligations in deciding on accepting or rejecting mining 
operations.  
A balance between the legal and communal license with an intersecting focus on 
environmental mitigation that would support the current generation without disadvantaging 
future generations is crucial. This balance might be achieved through good economic 
governance in organizing and coordinating cost-effective transactions of the possible 
arrangements as indicated by Wieland (2014. Ch. 2. p. 17). The mitigation (and 
minimization) of adverse environmental impacts have an inherent feature in effecting the 
other two elements of attaining clean mining. Therefore, ensuring efficient economic 
governance for the responsible management of mining might have a significant influence on 
informing the social perception of accepting mining operations. To obtain and sustain SOLs, 
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the experimental conditions of companies should point toward clean mining and therefore, 
fewer incidences of the unwanted and neglected adverse effects of mining.  
 
4.2. Materials and method 
4.2.1.  Data and sampling strategy 
We employ descriptive statistics in analyzing the practical conditions of small-size 
mining companies and their influence on obtaining SOLs. Institutional and governance 
theories such as economic governance, for example, are employed to identify some of the 
impediments of obtaining SOLs to mine as the current mining governance and activities of 
companies generate unwanted adverse effects in the SSM sector. This chapter employed a 
cross-sectional data of 250 respondents from 10 communities from two districts namely 
Amansie West and Bosomtwe for the mining impact assessment. In addition to this, expert 
interviews and focus group discussions were conducted from various institutions concerned 
with the SSM organizations, making a total sample of 293 (Table 10). The qualitative section 
was sourced to buttress the findings from the households and to ensure the reliability of the 
information (Bitsch, 2005). The data captured the impact of SSM on the host communities 
and their appreciation or otherwise of the mining operation. The data was processed and 
analyzed, both qualitatively and descriptively, for the discussion.   
First, we strategically selected districts from the national Mineral Commission’s list of 
the most affected areas of mining activities in the Ashanti region. Both study areas are 
strategic for cocoa, agriculture, fish production, and host significant water resources 
including the Bosomtwe, Pra, Offin, and Oda lakes (Ghana Statistical Service, 2014a: Ghana 
Statistical Service, 2014b). We further sampled ten communities purposefully from the 
pooled list of towns where the incidence of mining is high in the two districts. The register 
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was made available after two key informants’ discussions with the cocoa board research 
division in the Amansie West district and the mineral’s commission representative in the 
Ashanti region. The households were randomly selected to take part in the survey. The data 
collection period was between July and October 2015; follow up meetings and in-depth 
interviews with some key resource persons were completed between December 2015 and 
January 2016.  
 
Table 10: Data sources and sample details 
Respondents affiliation Description of respondents Number 
Institutions Stool lands, Minerals Commission, Ghana Cocoa 
Board, Ministry of Lands & Natural Resources, and 
Ghana Extractive Industry Transparency Initiatives 
5 
Local Administration Assemblymen: Amansie West District, Bosomtwe 
District Assembly 
2 




On site observations Small-scale mining sites 4 
Mining operators Mangers of small-scale mining  8 
Opinion leaders Chiefs, queen mothers and elders 5 
Exporters/buyers Precious Minerals Marketing Corporation (PMMC) 3 
Focus Group discussions 3 focus group meetings 15 
Individual households 
survey 
Small-scale mining workers, Managers of small-
scale mining, food crop farmers, cash crop farmers, 
other regular pad jobs 
250 
Over all sample  size  293 
Source: Computed from field data 
 
 
4.3. Results and discussions 
The analysis and results of the field survey and interviews on the impact of mining on 
the communities identified three critical areas of value creation that are normatively deduced 
from the applied theories: sustainability, responsibility, and ethics. Findings on these key 
areas report the practical challenges of obtaining an SOL. Following the lessons learned from 
LSM sustainability, inquiries into the negative impact of SSM on host communities is 
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discussed. We argue that the experiential differences between the two effects (positive and 
negative) are expected to play a significant role in support of SOL development and 
sustenance. Based on the current results, the nature and extent of adverse effects in the 
mining communities are more likely to influence the society in denying the SOLs compared 
to the positive impact. The results demonstrated the social, environmental, economic, and 
governance impact of mining on the research communities. We, therefore, concluded that 
using moral persuasion and demands from clients, companies would have more incentive to 
pursue sustainable or clean mining. Hence, this will ensure that outputs produced at the social 
level will yield a significant social benefit other than cost. In effect, it would warrant social 
approval for the sustenance of mining businesses. This is required as current state regulations 
are limited in their ability to correct most of the identified challenges that impede the sector. 
 
4.3.1. Social structures 
For the negative impact of small-scale gold mining on the community’s social 
structures, the focus emphasizes three key areas: health, security, and food security for the 
past twelve months. According to the communities’ account, effects from mining, including 
losses and gains, serve as a critical determining factor for establishing SOLs, which is 
consistent with the findings of Prno (2013: 576 -584). Therefore, the adverse impact on 
health, food security, and human (civil) protection, for example, would serve as an 
impediment while monetary gain through mining employment to the households would serve 




4.3.2.  Impact on health 
The number of people ill at the time of the interviews was computed as the number of 
times an individual was sick per 12 months.  
The analysis demonstrated that SSM has had a devastating impact on the health status of 
the rural mining inhabitants. Although the monetary gains from mining are substantial in 
supporting household incomes, mining was an inflator of health bills. As described by some 
experts, “SSM activity is a threat to the national health security and state finances on health” 
(Interview with the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources Directorate, Accra, 2015). 
Artisanal mining is increasing the demand on the national health care, and new 
responsibilities on local dwellers who incur the adverse effects of mining have arisen. 
Although the government might endorse a license to operate, the effort would be opposed by 
the hosting communities due to the neglected health impact and its associated costs borne 
solely by the victims. For instance, out of the 250 households interviewed, 48% were ill at the 
time of the interview. The common illnesses diagnosed in the mining hosting communities 
include malaria, skin diseases, water-borne diseases, and non-diagnosed illnesses or diseases 
not diagnosed by orthodox medicine (Figure 20). Most of the known infections recorded 
were an outcome of water pollution, which was also confirmed by the expert interviews on 
the negative impacts of SSM on host communities.  
Visiting the mining sites confirmed the revelations from the focus group discussions and 
interviews that the contamination of rivers and open pits from abandoned mining still exist, 
which is dangerous and pose a health threat. The open pit serves as a breeding ground for 
mosquitoes, and this could be the principal cause of many illnesses in the mining 
communities. Likewise, the contaminated water sources in the districts are the primary cause 
of most skin and other water-related diseases that increase the health burden on the society. 
Explicitly, some respondents from the Minerals Commission and the Ministry of Lands, for 
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instance, linked the cause of skin diseases to the contamination of water with mercury from 
mining. Some opinion leaders opined that only a few communities in the Amansie Central 
(very close to Bosomtwe district) received mosquito-spraying services from AngloGold 
Ashanti. However, none of the households interviewed in the Amansie West and Bosomtwe 
districts received any assistance.  
 
 
     Figure 20: Common illness in mining communities  
     Source: Author’s estimations from household data (N = 250) 
 
4.3.3. Impact on food security 
For the food security impact on the hosting communities, three significant issues were 
assessed from the household survey vis-à-vis access to land resources, access to food, and the 
exchange of food or cash crops to give way for mining. Findings from the three were then 
related to the experts’ responses for an accurate picture of the empirical conditions in SSM. 
Most of the households, less than 40% at the time of the interview, had traded cash crops 
such as cocoa, oil palm plantations, or food crops for mining. Approximately 65% had access 
to land, and about 74% had access to enough food (Figure 21). Access to enough food, 
according to the respondents, was possible as they buy food from nearby cities based on 





     Figure 21: Indicators for food security  
    Source: Estimated from the household survey data (N=250) 
 
  
Most respondents, approximately 90%, indicated that it was very challenging to access 
resources; very few, less than 2%, reported the opposing view. The results on the challenges 
of access to most of the essential resources for food production demonstrated that land (41%), 
financial credit for farming (31%), farm labor (17%), and extension services (10%) were 
arduous to access (Table 11). From the community accounts and focus group discussions, we 
found that mining discourages the use of both human and natural resources for farming. 
Hence, accepting ASM is against the wishes of the society because mining can detract the 
most vital productive resources such as farm labor and financial credit, among others, away 
from farming, which was the preferred employment in the communities.  
An additional reason might be the increase in mining activities and the ability of mining 
jobs to offer faster access to cash than agriculture. Food security is threatened by the lack of 
access to resources for food production. This confirms the position of the focus group 
participants and the experts interviewed that uncontrolled or poorly managed SSM threatens 




Table 11: Resources that are difficult to access  
Resources access challenges Frequency Percent 
Land 101 40.56 
Farm laborers 42 16.87 
Financial credit 79 31.73 
Extension services 24 9.64 





However, some private individuals such as landowners and farmers who were frustrated 
by the unattractiveness of farming sold their cash crops to pave the way for mining. Other 
reasons for sacrificing farming for mining include the mobilization of capital for funerals, to 
start new businesses, and finance school fees. Others who refuse to sell their farms hinted that 
they did so only to prevent food-scarcity for future generations. These findings are also 
consistent with the view from the focus group participants and expert interviews that absolute 
poverty and lack of access to financial credit for farming forced most people to sell their 
farms to miners.  
 
4.3.4. Community (civil) security: violence 
We established that violent disputes are inevitable and increase in mining communities 
as soon as gold discoveries are made and SSM begins. This finding is in line with the results 
from other authors (Armah et al., 2016; Davis and Franks, 2014; Ross, 2006) that the rate of 
natural resource discovery and exploitation influence conflict in these communities. This 
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result could be because of the lack of good mining governance to coordinate working 
arrangements for services such as land use conversion and compensation, for example. 
Another reason for the violence is the perception of the anticipated but unwanted adverse 
effects of mining on the community. These disputes undermine the security of the companies 
and the communities. Nearly all the community respondents (90%) indicated that they had 
witnessed mining-related violence in host communities, which deters them from coping with 
or accepting the mining activities. Instances of disputes that are perceived as the major 
contributing factors include daily attacks and counterattacks by miners among the mining 
groups, especially within the illegal mining circles, assaults among the state security and 
mining workers, land conflict due to concessional mining awards, and cheating and non-
payment of compensation to affected households are perceived. Various levels of threats and 
violent attacks exist in SSM hosting communities (for details see forthcoming “Determinants 
of conflicts in ASM communities – evidence from the Ashanti region” by the author.) These 
were peculiar to the governance challenges in the coordination and management of mining 
activities to reduce corruption, and the lack of monitoring of mining standards, for example. 
These developments increase the likelihood of violence and cause objections to SOLs in 
mining. 
 
4.4. Environmental effects 
This study established that most water bodies and river sources are significantly affected 
by the activities of SSM in the districts. This result is consistent with the findings that 
artisanal mining has significant adverse effects on the environment and usually leads to 
environmental degradation (Armah et al., 2014; Carson et al. 2005). On-site field 
observations confirm another essential revelation from the interviews and focus group 
discussions that minor and major rivers including the Pra, Offin, and Oda in the two districts 
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are polluted with liquid and solid substances. In addition to this, the natural courses of most 
rivers are diverted, causing a flood, and consequently suffer extinction (Figure 22). The Oda 
River, for instance, runs through the two districts to join other major rivers, and their 
tributaries exit into the largest natural lake Bosomtwe, in the Bosomtwe district; this 
demonstrates how crucial water sources are to the areas. As sustainability is found to be one 
of the dominant concerns for communities in deciding whether to issue SOLs (Prno, 
2012:586), any evidence suggesting the neglect of environmental sustainability as illustrated 
in Figure 22 implies an impediment to obtaining an SOL.  
Noticeably, some expressions from the interviews signify a rejection of SSM, and hence 
a refusal to encourage the offering of SOLs to companies under such settings. The following 
are examples of expressions of shock, disappointment, and sadness indicating the lack of 
community-company trust in ensuring clean mining (sections 4.5.1 through 4.5.2). 
 
 
Figure 22: Pollution of major rivers (Left) Amansie West district, (Right) Bosomtwe  




4.4.1. Dismay at the social and food security and health situation 
“Illegal mining is a national security threat!”  
“It increases health expenditure, more patients visit hospitals, there is more demand for 
healthcare facilities, and more healthcare practitioners.”  
“Area of agriculture: SSM threatens food security, there is less food production and a 
high demand for food consumption. Government expenditure on the importation of food 
increases.”  




4.4.2.  Dismay at the degradation of land and destruction of water bodies 
“Land degradation is common, especially the alluvial mining in the Ashanti region.  
“Devastation is huge; the environmental destruction is very pathetic! You have to go 
there and be the right judge.”  
“Rivers and streams sedimentation and pollution of water bodies; Rivers like Pra, Offin, 
and Oda.” 
(Minerals Commission, Accra, 2015). 
  
“Miners have destroyed all the rivers! The mighty Oda River is gone. You saw it, or 
not?” 




Contrary to expectations, the study cannot deny that the environmental footprints of 
SSM are the same for license holders (legal) and non-license holders (illegal). It is loosely 
perceived that only illegal mining degrades the environment. This was revealed during onsite 
visits, household survey, and interviews with mining operators and a local NGO operating in 
the region. Evidence of abandoned mining pits, land degradation, and non-closure of non-
functional mining sites exist. This means that the SSM activities, irrespective of their 
legitimacy, as currently seen in the region, are not appreciated by the society since the 
positive impacts are overlooked, as suggested by the findings.  
The research demonstrated that the supply chain for SSM is short of buyers and this 
enforces a monopoly, which is not suitable for the market development of the sector. This 
was revealed during field observations, where only a few gold buyers (gold mined from 
SSM) operate in the market, especially in the rural areas. This discourages competition 
toward clean mining as the buyers do not care about clean mining practices and face no 
competition. In addition, existing gold buying companies such as the Precious Minerals 
Marketing Company (PMMC) and the individual authorized buyers linked to the SSM sector 
are doing very little to ensure clean mining. This might be due to the lack of competition 
among gold registered buyers. For instance, a response to a question about the buying 
company’s knowledge of the social responsibilities of clean mining yielded the following 
answer: “We have little or no knowledge in this respect ... we only buy and export gold… 
buyers don’t care about neither the environment nor what goes into the mining, only the gold 
matters” [a respondent from PMMC, Accra, and a local gold buyer, Amansie West district, 
2016]. 
The adverse effects such as the destruction of the environmental support systems have 
intergenerational consequences. It can be deduced that the society would neither approve 
mining operation nor be willing to change their decision if the current conditions on the 
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impact of SSM persist. That is, as long as the unethical and irresponsible behavior of 
suppliers within the supply chain remains, the society will refuse to issue mining SOLs. 
Consequently, as deduced from the expressions, these findings indicate the indirect 
impediments to mining operations because of existing negative consequences of mining. In 
other words, these signs portray the unwillingness of the society to offer SOLs to small sized 
mining companies. However, ASM companies can prevent or improve the situation and win 
the trust of society by changing their operating models to meet the social and economic 
expectations in this respect. 
 
4.5. Economic impact 
To assess the conditions of companies contributing to economic development, we asked 
questions about the employment history of the capable labor force in the communities. Figure 
23 illustrates that out of the valid respondents who were employed at the time of interviews 
(132 out of 250), the agricultural sector offers the highest employment levels, followed by 
mining, self-employment, and paid jobs (in the right half of Figure 23). Whereas stone 
washing, digging “miners,” water fetching, excavator drivers, and sand transporting, 
illustrates the task distribution within mining employment from left to right respectively in 
Figure 23. From the interviews, we found that mining supported household incomes and 
improved their financial development even though it was not able to offer the promised or the 
anticipated level of employment. Employment in the small-sized mining companies provided 
alternative and reliable sources for cash availability and collateral in securing financial credit 
to the communities. This finding is consistent with results by other authors (Kayla et al. 2016; 
Hilson and Potter, 2003; Hilson and Garforth, 2012) that the mining sector serves as an 
alternative source of rural household income. Despite the promising financial support, the 
thesis also found that mining is not able to employ the entire agricultural labor force as 
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wrongly perceived in Ghanaian society and this has negative consequences for the social 
acceptance of mining. 
 
 
Figure 23: Impact on employment  
Source    Estimated from the household survey data (N = 132/250) 
  
 
Employment and income gains from mining are only short-term benefits to the 
present generations, and this is not sustainable. Currently, there is no substantial alternative 
use of the profits from mining to bequest future generations, as narrated by some opinion 
leaders. Meanwhile, the significant impacts of SSM on society have intergenerational effects 
regarding the negative implications. The current evidence here suggests that the positive 
outcomes benefit mostly the current generation while negative mining impacts affect 
generations to come. Consequently, it is expected that a forward-looking society will 
withhold SOLs from companies. In addition to the reliable source of income from mining, 
households who engage in mining and related activities earn a higher salary than all the 
alternative employment activities. Farming contributed less (about 13 %) to the total 
household income, while approximately 18% came from paid job workers, 23% from self-
employment, and 46% from mining and related jobs in increasing order of magnitude (Table 
12). These results suggest that mining is becoming an essential factor in rural household 
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income and livelihoods, and therefore its exploitation needs to be carefully looked in relation 
to clean mining. 
 
Table 12: Distribution of household income by employment type 
Job type Mean Maximum Minimum % of income contribution 
Farming 762.5 14500 100         12.6 
Mining and related 
jobs 2799.8 14500 100         46.4 
Self-employed 1392.0 13100 100         23.1 
Paid jobs 1083.0 4050 125         17.9 
 Source: From the field data. Income in Ghana cedis 
 
 
4.6. Mining policy and clean mining  
The existing mining policy in Ghana was analyzed, with a significant focusing on the 
aspects capable of promoting clean mining. The analysis of mining policy and governance 
provides information on the context in which mining operation occurs. The circumstances of 
the mining businesses were found to influence the establishment of SOLs (Prno, 2013, pp. 
586 - 587), and this context is significantly determined or shaped by the governance model. 
The assessment of the 112 sections of mining policy (Minerals Commission of Ghana, 2006), 
demonstrate that few sections are dedicated to clean mining. Hence, the thesis focused 
attention on identifying the areas that have the most conflicting agendas that need to be 
considered for business development in the ASM sector. Consistent with the findings by 
Andrews (2016), most of the sections of the Mining Act 703 (2006) are devoted to obtaining 
a permit and very little is codified on clean mining that supports the social approval of 
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mining operations. For instance, on the license of water rights, it can be found that holders of 
mining rights can “… obtain the right to divert, impound, and use water from a river, stream, 
underground reservoir, or watercourse within the land of the subject of the mineral right” 
(ACT 703. Sec. 17.), but it lacks corrections for the ramification and innovation after the use 
of such vital resources.  
More so, the Act makes only little reference to good mining practices and fails to spell 
out on what constitutes “good mining practices.” On SSM, section 93 of the same act, 
mentions an effective and efficient observance of good mining practices, health and safety 
rules, and pays due regard to the protection of the environment during mining. Although this 
is meant to support a shared appreciation of mining, it lacks motivation and direction. The 
additional danger stems from the fact that small-scale miners can use mercury and cyanide to 
facilitate their production process but the act barely controls the application of these 
deleterious substances in the areas of clean mining. The monitoring of mining standards is 
lacking, and this is consequential for companies in obtaining an SOL. The non-monitoring of 
mining standards and operations of companies provides room for irresponsible practices that 
force host societies to reject mining operations. 
Moreover, we discovered further that monetary interest purely motivates the current 
mining policy and governance over the social structure and environmental importance, that 
is, the government is prioritizing state revenue and discouraging sustainability that leads to 
clean mining. In this sense, the existing conditions of mining operations and the mining 
policy are discouraging the society from trusting the companies to ensure clean mining 
practices. The trust issues, which serve as a primary challenge for the mining companies, 
need to be corrected to achieve sustainable ASM industries. From the policy discourse, we 
infer further that an improvement in the economic orientation of mining governance would 
have a tremendous mutual effect on three primary stakeholders: government, society, and the 
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companies. For instance, reductions in state health budgets, food security budgets, political 
security, minimized the social costs of mining to the community and overcoming the 
impediments of obtaining mining approval for companies. As an immediate response, the 
government of Ghana in July 2017 has embarked on an aggressive operation dubbed 
“operation VANGUARD” or the use of armed security to halt all SSM activities nationwide. 
The procedure has resulted in saving some mining communities from river and water 
pollution, while others complain that they have been cut off from a significant source of 
income, and some SSM companies are crying foul and preparing to meet the state security 
squarely by any means including legal action and violence. During the field interviews in 
2015, we predicted that SSM might come to a halt if the then mining decisions and strategies 
continue. This policy response would not be sustainable in the long term (for a detailed 
analysis see section 6.3.1) even though the media reports
15
 demonstrated the realization of 
this goal. Some media reports indicated that some communities already witnessed clean 
rivers free from solid debris, which for them was a positive sign of the VANGUARD 
operation.  
 
4.7.  Implications of the findings 
This thesis affects the three critical actors in the SSM sector namely business 
organizations, policy actors, and the society in many ways. First, it provides information on 
how companies can win social trust for obtaining mining approval, which improves their 
reputation and competitiveness locally and globally. Company's reputation building and 
competitiveness provide evidence for a business case for pursuing SOLs (Demuijnck and 
Fasterling, 2016, p. 675). Second, it contributes to the development of tools for monitoring 
                                                     
15




sustainability (FAO-SEAL, 2010; WCGE, 2016), which improves the government's financial 
structure by reducing state budgets for health, food, and political security. Finally, it has 
implications for social costs by minimizing the costs of mining to the society through 
achieving clean mining objectives. Thus, households can improve their income by investing 
rather than incurring high health costs due to an unsafe environment. 
 
4.8.  Conclusion  
The study has explored the practical conditions of Ghanaian SSM and the impacts of the 
social appreciation of ASM. The findings demonstrate that the working conditions of mining 
create effects ranging from positive economic benefits such as employment and considerable 
contributions to household incomes to some adverse effects including environmental 
pollution, violent conflict, poor health, and food security threats. Coupled with weak 
governance and institutional capacity toward clean mining, these serve as an impediment for 
society to perceive mining as an alternative income activity that is environmentally friendly. 
We found that pursuing good economic governance that ensures clean mining by way of 
creation and coordination of working arrangements is envisaged as a way to promote 
responsible behavior on the part of mining corporations. Thus, the empirical impact from 
their activities would lead to a social outcome, which produces less adverse effects including 
effects on the environment, conflict, and child labor and can help to regain the trust of the 
society. The discussions suggested four key factors capable of impeding the effort of 
obtaining an SOL in the SSM sector. These include the neglect of environmental 
sustainability, lack of responsible management of human right challenges, weak mining 
governance and its effect, and the unmitigated adverse effects from mining. These findings, 
in general, are in line with Lynch’s social license-five factor model (2007), which 
demonstrates that a combination of environmental impact and social pressure, among others, 
 
 162 
determines whether maximum social license pressure will occur in demanding firms to go 
beyond regulations. For the case of Ghana, as the findings suggest, the environmental impact 
and other empirical conditions from gold mining companies, and intense community pressure 
together are very substantial and capable of affecting the image of SSM negatively. That 
phenomenon is likely as the demand for maximum social license pressure toward clean 
mining is underway. 
Consequently, the state in 2017 put a moratorium on all activities of SSM in Ghana 
intending to conserve and protect the environment from complete extinction. This move was 
known as operation “VANGUARD,” and was not welcomed by the business community. 
However, the society, some sections of the scientific community of Ghana, the media, and 
other international anti-dirty gold mining movements see this as a viable way to restore trust 
in mining when the companies have acted irresponsibly. A similar repeated movement 
against dirty gold mining, as its extraction requires mercury or cyanide, which is deleterious 
to the environment, was implemented internationally by groups such as Oxfam-America in 
February 2004 in the US.  
As public trust in the mining economy, especially the SSM is declining, it is imperative 
for small-sized enterprises to embark on clean gold mining. Instead of rhetoric, companies 
must demonstrate this in reality. The findings have suggested that the current operational 
conditions of small-scale gold mining in the Amansie West and Bosomtwe districts of 
Ashanti region suppress community effort to offer SOLs to companies. We attribute this 
effect partly to the malfunctioned economic governance that governs the clean mining efforts 
of the SSM sector. There is much to be learned about managing this sector, especially about 
the role of institutional and organizational governance. More effort is needed from managers 
of SSM companies to accomplish this goal to meet the regulatory and social expectations. 
Clean mining activities must always go beyond the rules, not as a replacement, preferably as 
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a compliment. With this, we can be sure that the society accepts mining operations alongside 
state permission, as participation in conditions for mutual advantage.  
More importantly, not all hope is lost! Companies can avert the anticipated rejection of 
SOLs by readjusting their business models and practices to meet the expectations of society. 
Obtaining an SOL is possible only when companies improve on their current mining 
operational practices. Hence, communities might not withhold an SOL from the companies, 
as the current evidence seems to suggest. Managers can achieve this by bestowing attention 
on the pursuit of clean mining that can balance the socioeconomics, environmental, and 
human rights improvements to promote the acceptance of ASM, a first step in obtaining an 
SOL for competitive business operations. That is, responsible mining management that 
generates desirable experiential outcomes for society. More so, to stimulate the interest of 
SSM enterprises to embark on clean mining practices, functional economic governance 
including effective regulation and useful institutional monitoring is necessary to coordinate 
and realign the diverse interests of key stakeholders toward competitive and social outcomes. 
The rules should channel more significant attention to the protection of human rights in the 
supply chain, environmental standards monitoring, and society-centered job creation rather 
than a mere offering of permits. Enforcement of good governance can be improved through 
citizen ownership of policies on good mining. More especially involving communities in 
ethical mining principles including monitoring would go a long way to enhance company-
community relationships for efficient outcomes. Good governance would reinforce the 
traditional institutional functions of altering the behaviors of small and medium mining 
enterprises toward social desirable output and service provision in the industry in the study 
districts and among other similar areas in Ghana. Achieving these goals requires an 
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5. Discussions and conclusions 
 
Using evidence from the Amansie West and Bosomtwe Districts of Ghana’s Ashanti 
Region, this thesis offers insights into the role of institutions in promoting SSM businesses in 
the form of a conflict prevention and resolution study. We pondered the following three 
principal research questions: 
•    What are the empirical realities of child labor in SSM?  
•    What causes violence in communities involved with SSM?  
•    What role do the empirical conditions of mining companies and associated institutions 
play in the process of obtaining SOLs?  
As discussed, an improved understanding of the empirical realities concerning human 
rights and sustainability (social and environmental) relating to SSM can help in formulating 
effective mitigation and policies for stimulating economic development in the SSM sector. 
We have discussed how the close association of SSM with human rights and 
environmental sustainability challenges makes the sector unattractive. Thus, child labor is 
motivated by the greed of managers and by the abject poverty of rural households, which 
further encounter violence in the context of land rights conflict, economic inequality, and 
through other adverse effects of mining. Appropriate mitigation is necessary to prevent 
severe damage to the long-term interests of mining businesses, rural standards of living, and 
social cohesion. Various unresolved problems plague the mining sector directly by turning 
public opinion against mining enterprises, leading to the possible public rejection of SOLs for 
mining in Ghana. From the perspective of government, SSM can place indirect demands on 
budgets for health, security, and food when poorly managed and the reverse is true. The net 
impact of SSM on rural standards of living in the areas studied has been negative under the 
current management practices and governance structures. Hence, the monetary and social 
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benefits that accrue from mining are inadequate compensation for the losses (social costs) 
associated with the unmitigated adverse effects. 
In summary, Ghana’s small-scale gold mining has a significant positive effect on family 
income but adverse effects on other areas. These areas include social cohesion, food security, 
child labor, health, environment, and the growth of companies. The following discussion 
summarizes the key findings and the limitations of the research and offers conclusions and 
policy recommendations.  
 
5.1. Summary of key findings 
The findings presented here demonstrate that mining has the potential to stimulate 
economic development and to bring about environmental and social change in the areas of 
health, pollution, employment, land use, social cohesion, and the economy. There are both 
business risks for corporations, and social risks for communities in the exploitation of 
minerals, specifically with the gold mining analyzed in this research that demand attention. 
The significant empirical findings were presented sequentially in the preceding chapters, 
and they are well summarized by their titles. Chapter 2 addressed analysis of child labor 
issues in the Ghanaian SSM. Chapter 3 explored the question, analyzing the determinants of 
conflict in SSM in Ghana, and Chapter 4 analyzed the impacts of mining on the social 
appreciation of mining. We suggested mitigation strategies for the issues raised in each 
chapter. Consistent with the findings by Hailu et al. (2012), ASM was found to be associated 
with child labor, violence, and environmental degradation. This association is perhaps 
explicable using the specific economics of the exploitation of widely dispersed mineral 
deposits. Scattered small mines are more frequently in competition with farms for land and 
water resources than the large-scale mines that cluster around concentrated deposits.  
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The discussion will now synthesize the empirical findings and their relationship to the 
primary research questions. 
 
5.2. Challenges of eradicating child labor in the SSM 
The thesis contributes to the understanding of insights into child labor in mining. This 
thesis has offered an analysis of the current trends and challenges facing SSM, based on the 
experiences of a cross-section of mining operators in the Ashanti Region of Ghana. The aim 
was to answer the following questions.  
1. What are the empirical realities of child labor concerning the realization of the SDGs 
agenda 2025? In other words, what are the key impediments to eradicating child labor in 
the SSM sector? The significant findings are indicative of the achievement of the United 
Nation’s sustainable development goals agenda 2025, specifically number 8.8. The 
realization of this goal requires a more considerable focus on the SSM sector in 
developing countries to realize progress toward the eradication of child labor.  
 
a. Effective institutions are crucial 
The case study demonstrated that child labor in the mining sector remains a problem in 
the Amansie West and Bosomtwe Districts owing to the weak functioning of institutions. 
Good governance is a significant factor in forming global partnerships for ending child labor 
and monitoring and ensuring the adequate protection of land and other resources (Hinton, 
2005). Therefore, communities that have forged working arrangements among landowners, 
miners, and traditional leaders have been able to control child labor. In some instances, 
children under 18 years of age were allowed to work at mining sites but only on weekends 
and holidays so that the work would not interfere with their education. From the perspective 




b. It is crucial to consider local ideas and knowledge 
Local input is necessary to control child labor. As we used cross-sectional data from this 
case study to arrive at the findings, we do not generalize the results. However, the findings 
support the notion that local knowledge is consistent with at least some research suggesting 
that under safe working conditions children can benefit from work. We established that with 
adequate self-confidence and responsibility, for example, children above 15 years of age 
could be encouraged by undertaking non-hazardous work. This finding is consistent with the 
literature on human rights and child rights suggesting that children in developing countries 
generally work to support their development (Anker, 2000). Therefore, leverage through 
good governance and respect for local ideas and knowledge are crucial for effective 
mitigation policies. 
 
c. Political and elite capture is a key challenge 
The lack of effective governance has negatively affected attempts to curb child labor in 
Ghana’s ASM sector. The results of this study demonstrated that adequate monitoring is 
expected to have a positive effect, but it requires fairness in the award of concessions. As 
permits are granted irregularly through intermediaries such as political party members, 
“middlemen,” traditional leaders, and state officials, the exploitation of children under the 
age of 17 was encouraged. The widespread corruption of politicians and other elites in the 
sector hampers efforts to alleviate poverty and child labor. 
 
d. The mode of governance matters 
The lack of workable governance arrangements is a key challenge. Interestingly, child 
labor was less common among mining operators who received their concessions from the 
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heads of individual households due to private agreements between landowners and miners. 
This outcome suggests that the mode of governance is a significant factor in controlling child 
labor and that a blend of state and private institutions is crucial. 
 
e. A free market and technical competence are necessary 
The unavailability of adequate buyers in rural mining communities and the lack of 
technical expertise necessary to create safe working conditions combine to pose a significant 
impediment to child safety and the eradication of child labor. The findings demonstrated that 
the lack of competition among gold buyers was a considerable problem. Most of the gold 
produced by SSM operations was sold to private buyers who were foreigners and perhaps for 
that reason they were little concerned with the working conditions and health of workers and 
local communities.  
Another crucial factor is technical expertise. Some license holders were found to have 
received some form of professional training relating to environmental and human safety, 
particularly for children, unlike the unlicensed operators. However, training was woefully 
inadequate to safeguard the safe working environment for economically active children. This 
training should be augmented and advocated for on a wide array of platforms owing to the 
widespread nature of SSM. 
 
f. Appropriate alternative social programs, such as free secondary school, are crucial 
There is a lack of complementary social programs for the affected communities. Mine 
operators were found to employ children on their concessions for four main reasons: because 
parents wanted their children to work to cover school fees, to reduce operational mining costs 
(as children are paid less than adults are), to provide a livelihood to homeless children, and 
the desire of children to work at mining sites. Thus, poverty and lack of an alternative source 
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of income can induce parents to put their children to work in the ASM sector despite the 
drawbacks. This finding is consistent with Hilson et al. (2009) who demonstrated that 
artisanal mining is poverty-driven. It is worth noting that the new policy intervention of free 
senior high school introduced on September 15, 2017, represents a step in the right direction 
given that most of the children who work in the mines do so to finance their education. If 
implemented efficiently, the free senior high school program represents a commendable 
effort to reduce child labor by relieving the financial burden of education on the poorest 
households.  
 
5.3.  Causes of conflict associated with SSM  
In Chapter 3, we demonstrated that although the violence in Ghana has not reached the 
“violent conflict-massacre” level as measured by the Heidelberg barometer, ASM activity in 
Ghana was demonstrated to be associated with violent conflict, a finding consistent with the 
research of other post-conflict countries (European Commission, 2014). SSM related conflict 
in Ghana’s mining communities has tended to involve threats, physical assault, robbery, and 
attacks by security guards. The contributing factors have included the weak management of 
natural resources (e.g., land ownership rights and gold mining), extraction (employment), 
distribution of resource rents, and various other harmful effects of mining. In general, weak 
governance has been the critical determiner of conflict in mining communities.  
 
a. Socio-economic factors matter in mining conflict (horizontal inequalities) 
The results revealed that the field of employment for the heads of households, ethnic 
affiliation, and mining on household land were the significant determinants of whether a 
family would encounter conflict in general, whereas poor management of land ownership 
rights was the critical determinant of the frequency of the specific types of conflict. These 
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findings are consistent with the work of Maystadt et al. (2012) demonstrating that mining 
activities increase the occurrence of conflict. We found this to be more significant, 
particularly when mining is mismanaged. 
 
b. Effective resource management is crucial 
 Also consistent with the findings of previous research, this study identified 
landownership rights as the primary source of mining-related conflict in Ghana (Mcquilken 
and Hilson, 2016) and elsewhere (USAID, 2005). A vigorous effort is necessary to improve 
the management of resources, in particular, by enforcing the ownership of land property 
rights to reduce conflict.  
 
c. Unresolved land issues and the negative effects of mining 
Additionally, the frequency of conflict was found to correlate with unresolved 
landownership rights problems, the adverse impacts from mining, and large family size. 
Although most research into the disputes associated with mining have demonstrated that 
mining itself causes conflict (Collier et al., 2004) and indeed, some of the findings presented 
here also suggest that mining predicts the incidence of conflict in general, while further 
results indicated that the problem is more managing mining institutions than mining itself 
(USAID, 2005). Thus, mining can reduce the frequency of conflict when governance or 
management provides the channels for cooperation and confidence building and involves 
rural households.  
In general, the findings suggest that the causes of the conflict go beyond mining itself, 
and the contributing factors include the lack of capacity to manage the adverse effects of 
mining and improper environmental monitoring standards on the part of governments. The 
results moreover indicate that conflict prevention methods and resolution efforts by 
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traditional local leaders have been the first line of defense, followed by mediation involving 
ASM corporations and the state, although conciliation has not heretofore proved to be useful 
for mining communities. Organizational governance is then a crucial part of the kind of 
resource management that can reduce conflict in the ASM sector. 
 
5.4. Challenges faced by SSM companies  
As a contribution to the development of ASM-sector businesses, Chapter 5 focused on the 
“impediments to obtaining SOLs in SSM,” and demonstrated that at times, SSM operations 
face stiff opposition from the surrounding community when seeking approval for mines. This 
finding is consistent with Prno’s (2013) argument that the environment in which mining takes 
place determines whether the society will reward a company with an SOL or not. It also 
demonstrates that the adverse effects of mining impose significant costs on companies when 
they face strong social opposition (Davis and Franks, 2014), as is currently the case in Ghana. 
The costly rejection of mining is explicable through the weak governance on the part of 
regulators and the unintended adverse effects of mining on the social, environmental, and 
economic status of households. Thus, as has been seen, mining has provided a significant 
income to families and inversely caused the considerable destruction of land and water 
resources through the neglect of sustainable practices. We have identified earlier that the 
absence of sustainable practices was a cause of violence and had significant adverse effects 
on human health. Consequently, food insecurity, civil unrests, and adverse health outcomes 
are on the rise in Ghana’s mining regions.  
Current mining policy is weak and lacks up-to-date guidance for environmental and 
human rights sustainability. Some scholars have attributed the governance challenges within 
the SSM sector to the complexity of the system and its lack of representativeness (Ayee et al., 
2011), but the findings presented here point to the absence of guidance for industrial policies 
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detailing sustainability practices and monitoring as the primary source of the problem. At the 
same time, active and adaptive governance that incentivizes the behavior of artisanal mining 
companies and promotes clean mining practices appears to foster an appreciation for mining 
within a society. Based on these considerations, sustainability, responsibility, and ethical 
behavior are the three critical components of a mining sector that is profitable and promotes 
the interests of the mining communities.  
 
 
6. Practical implications 
One of the expected outcomes after the implementation of the ERP in 1983, but before 
the mineral policy reforms, was for the SSM sector to improve the standard of living for the 
poor, to develop local businesses, and to stimulate the Ghanaian economy. Unfortunately, the 
sector has yet to succeed in translating the country’s mineral wealth into poverty reduction, 
even though the mining industry has experienced significant and widespread growth in the 
wake of the ERP (Ayee, 2001). To realize such benefits, stakeholders must move beyond 
shortsighted self-interest and insist upon responsible mining and the prudent management of 
resources.  
Through this research of the small-scale gold
16
 mining sector, we determined that good 
governance is a crucial part of economic development and engaged in the debate over the 
performance and governance of resources and conflict over them in a non-civil-war setting. 
The aim was to identify policy and management strategies that have the potential to resolve 
the problematic issues described in the previous chapters. Grounded in and guided by the 
                                                     
16
 Ghana’s astonishing mineral endowment includes diamonds, manganese, salt, and bauxite—resources that led 
to the inclusion of the country in the “Gold Coast” during the pre-independence era. Gold, as noted in the 
introduction, is the predominant mineral, having accounted for 90% of total mineral revenues annually over the 
past three decades (Minerals Commission of Ghana, 2015). 
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study’s overall conceptual framework, the following discussion of the main findings explores 
the major contested issues in SSM policy and their relationship to governance structures. 
 
6.1. Beyond self-interest: Toward responsible management of mining resources 
The potential of natural raw materials to reduce inequality and their relationship to 
governance and conflict are the main topics discussed in the literature on developmental 
economics and resource management that is relevant to the present study. This previous 
research has demonstrated that institutions involved in natural resource management are as 
important as the resources themselves in developing national economies (Chang, 2011; 
Kirsten, Dorward, Poulton, and Vink, 2009). Others have argued that institutions are the 
ultimate determinants of economic performance, for better and worse (El Anshasy and 
Katsaiti, 2013) or have seen causal relations between the two (Chang, 2011). Similarly, it is 
noteworthy that resource performance may have a causal relationship with the governance 
structure. On a global scale, environmental governance has proved to be a vital part of the 
exploitation of natural resources (Duffy, 2005), although considerable resistance is predicted 
in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) owing to the internal dynamics of African societies (Bayart, 
1993). The natural resource and developmental economics literature has devoted a great deal 
of attention to state institutions as a source of conflict over resources, but less is known about 
the combined effects of state and non-state institutions, particularly corporations, on resource 
exploitation. Most of the literature on governance and the extraction of natural resources is 
concerned with establishing the relationships between resources and conflict, mainly in the 
context of LSM in post-conflict (i.e., civil war) countries. On the contrary, there has been 
relatively little work, by contrast, on the promotion of SSM sector businesses, which is a gap 
that this thesis was designed to fill.  
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Recent quantitative analysis has revealed that governance structures are fundamental in 
the SSM context. Crucial factors include the nature and composition of state and non-
governmental institutions, including corporations and citizens (i.e., those who will be affected 
by the policies) and the prudent management of the adverse effects of SSM. The analysis in 
this thesis complements the explanations in the literature for the economic performance of 
natural resources with governance structures using evidence of SSM in a non-civil war 
setting. The following discussion highlights the practical implications of this thesis.  
Chapters 2 through 4 identified child labor and violent conflict (i.e., human rights 
challenges) and sustainability (economic and environmental problems) as the most contested 
and pressing issues in Ghana’s SSM sector. These findings are consistent with research that 
has demonstrated that sustainability mainly relating to the environment is a widely debated 
topic in general but is less discussed in the specific context of mining (Murguía and Böhling, 
2013). The analysis from the first case study on child labor, for example, demonstrated that 
this issue is a crucial one in Ghana. The problem is not peculiar to non-licensed miners only 
as alluded to by the policy activists discussed in Chapters 2 through 4. The question of 
environmental destruction, on the other hand, follows similar patterns for both licensed and 
non-licensed miners and it contradicts the perceptions of policy actors. These results are 
consistent with the findings that countries with a large SSM sector are also the largest 
employers of child labor, with some 72.1 million working in mines according to a recent 
estimate,
17
 and that SSM in Sub-Saharan Africa has been characterized by the endemic use of 
unfree labor, mainly child labor, and child abuse (Lebaron and Ayers, 2013). On the other 
hand, the problem is widespread among non-licensed small-scale miners in the Ghanaian 
districts studied here.  
                                                     
17
 The current ILO report ranks the Sub-Sahara Africa sector first and holds it responsible for about half of the 





The specific motivations for mining managers to violate child labor laws included 
governance failure (e.g., lack of social support, conflict between the state and the traditional 
leaders’ administration of mining concessions, and inadequate enforcement of mining 
standards), greed (i.e., exploitation of cheap labor), and horizontal inequality (i.e., abject 
poverty, as discussed in Chapter 2). These findings are consistent with those of Lynas et al. 
(2014) in selected SSA countries where poverty coupled with high unemployment compelled 
poor households, mainly women and children, to engage in SSM. The persistent failure of 
traditional governance to enforce mining standards points to the necessity of alternative 
arrangements that incorporate non-traditional institutions. Hence, the way forward is building 
a comprehensive governance approach encompassing the state, corporations, and “third” 
institutions (i.e., the local citizens together with their traditional leaders) in developing 
appropriate mitigating policies. 
The literature demonstrates that the performance of resources in alleviating poverty is 
likely to be tied to institutional governance structures (Rodrik, 1999) at both the state and 
non-state levels. The fundamental nature of these structures is peculiar to extractive resource 
exploitation, such as small-scale gold mining, that has broader effects, both direct and 
indirect, on standards of living. Thus, some households depend directly on mining and its 
chain of activities, while others rely indirectly on support services involved in water, forest, 
land, and similar natural resources. Chapter 3 revealed several interesting findings that in 
general support the argument that the performance of the resource sector is dependent on 
effective institutions, meaning that Ghana is not immune to the “resources curse syndrome” 
because governance failure is the leading cause of mining-related violence in small-scale 
gold mining communities. This finding contradicts the argument that neither governance nor 
the resource itself explicitly predicts conflict (Voors et al., 2017) and supports instead the 
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notion that the exploitation of extractive resources is indeed linked with conflict, which in 
turn further marginalizes the roles of women in governance (Ross, 2008).  
The failure of governance is a consequence of the inability of state regulatory institutions 
to provide the necessary services to prevent violence or to identify alternative management in 
the form of workable arrangements with non-state institutions, such as corporations and local 
citizens who rely both directly and indirectly on the resource and non-owners who are 
affected by the economic outcome. In addition, the corporations or corporate bodies must 
also be seen as part of the solution, rather than merely the source of the problem, in the 
management of SSM enterprises.  
This finding is in part consistent with research demonstrating that the provision of public 
goods, such as education (which is also a means to reduce inequality among groups) can help 
minimize conflict (Cortés and Montolio, 2013). The implication is that by adjusting the mode 
of governance concerning structure and efficiency, problems such as conflict, which impede 
the performance of resources, can be either enhanced or exacerbated. This finding is also in 
line with a recent study by Paudel et al. (2017) that demonstrated that well-educated 
individuals could quickly turn to alternative income-generating activities and so are not 
compelled to work in the SSM sector and avoid exposure to mining-related conflicts. The 
results of the present study are likewise consistent with Cramer (2003) who demonstrated that 
economic inequality is an essential variable for explaining the dispute. The findings of the 
present study thus complement the horizontal and grievance hypotheses, which hold that 
group inequality can be overcome by, for example, funding education, which could, in turn, 
reduce conflict linked to grievances and group inequalities, although in a later study, Cramer 
(2013) did not find a direct link. The analysis presented in Chapter 4 demonstrated that the 
lack of environmentally sustainable “clean mining” was the primary cause of the current 
SSM ban in Ghana. The ban was motivated by gross evidence of environmental destruction, 
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particularly the adverse effects on rivers and other water bodies and lands, including national 
protected forests. The analysis is also consistent with the finding of previous studies that 
proved that the unresolved adverse effects of mining could lead to public rejection, which is 
naturally detrimental to companies, and that medium and small mining companies are poor 
mitigators of environmental consequences owing to the individual unit cost of operations 
compared with large-scale operations (Davis and Franks, 2014a).  
In Chapter 4, we discussed the weakness in both governance and the current SSM policy 
when it comes to preventing the development of conditions for future violence. This finding 
is consistent with the argument that extractive minerals are inherently prone to becoming a 
source of conflict (Ross, 2013). The current policy intervention, known as “Operation 
VANGUARD,” was designed to prevent the further destruction of natural resources in Ghana 
and it is mono-directional, considering its focus on one hostile option. Owing to the 
enormous costs involved, such an approach seems sustainable in the short term but not in the 
long term. This operation, which the new government implemented as part of a good 
governance effort, includes a ban on all SSM activities and went into effect in July 2017. Not 
surprisingly, this policy has encountered resistance from the SSM sector.
18
 Anshasy et al. 
(2013) argued that mismanagement of natural resources could lead to economic stagnation in 
resource-abundant countries. If governance challenges hamper companies, the productivity 
and financial performance of natural resources stand to suffer. 
Good economic governance of natural resources holds prospects for improvements in the 
standards of living and overall economic development and for avoiding the “resource curse 
syndrome.” Mining and forest management in Canada, for instance, are considered in the 
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 This is based on media eyewitness reports and archives from the Ghanaian web. Some groups organize and 
arm themselves against the state armed task force; others plan public riots. One example is the report of a public 
demonstration prevented by the Ashanti regional Security Council in Kumasi; another is a report of armed 






literature as an exemplary strategy of good resource governance and economic development 
(Prno, 2013; Prno and Scott Slocombe, 2012). Angola, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, on the other hand, are cited as examples of resource-related conflict 
(OECD, 2013). As part of an effort to minimize the adverse outcomes of mining and to 
promote ASM-related businesses, we found it essential to assess the current governance 
challenges facing the sector. This thesis contributed to this assessment by exploring the role 
of institutions in preventing and resolving conflict related to mining and in enforcing mining 
standards. It also assessed the adverse effects of ASM and the challenges that companies face 
as a method of guiding policy design and mitigations that would encourage the development 
of the sector. In this respect, this thesis challenges the current consensus perspective, 
according to which the government constitutes the sole solution to the persistent challenges 
facing the SSM sector, and advocates for the inclusion of corporate bodies and local 
communities in policy discourse. 
 
6.2. Limitations of the study and suggestions for future research 
The empirical results presented in Chapters 2 through 4 made use of a variety of 
qualitative and quantitative analytical techniques, including econometric estimations. This 
section offers a discussion of the limitations and challenges of the approach taken here (in 
each case) and some suggestions for future replication and improvement.  
To ensure the internal validity and general reliability of the responses and collected 
information (Bitsch, 2000, p. 2005), various data-gathering techniques were employed, 
including key informants, in-depth and semi-structured interviews, field trips and 
observations, focus group discussions, and accessing secondary country data. These 
approaches represent an essential analytical contribution to the analysis of the relationship 
between governance structures and the performance of resources (i.e., the role of institutions 
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in promoting SSM that does not infringe on human rights or exacerbates the sustainability 
challenges along the supply chain). Despite the range of techniques used in the study, the data 
collection design and the analytical approaches used here do have some limitations. 
Specifically, the primary data for the analysis was obtained using structured instruments 
comprising a mixture of qualitative in-depth and quasi-structured interviews and a 
quantitative household and community survey. The selection of respondents was guided by a 
mixed-methods sampling technique that included random purposeful, snowballing, judgment, 
simple random (for the household survey), and research resources convenience sampling as 
the means to identify policy experts and other interviewees (cf. Onwuegbuzie et al., 2007; 
Collins et al., 2006). Aside from the advantages of the purposive sampling method employed 
here, the results could have been affected by selection bias. Although measures were taken to 
minimize this risk, the process in question was only used to select the essential policy experts 
and informants. Furthermore, we applied a triangulation technique to ensure the validity of 
the sampling procedure (Carter et al., 2014) and the internal validity (Bitsch, 2000) of 
quantitative information through the inclusion of a wide range of experts from various fields 
of expertise in the SSM sector. These include representatives from the private sector, NGOs, 
government, and academia as well as farmers and other members of the affected 
communities.  
This research is further limited to observations from households in small-scale gold 
mining communities in the Amansie and Bosomtwe Districts; the recommendations are 
therefore not necessarily relevant to all mining communities in Ghana. This lack of 
representativeness is due to the fundamental structure of mining companies (legal or illegal), 
the distribution of adequate occupations, and the types of assets and resources available in 
mining communities. Nevertheless, the methodologies and recommendations in this study 
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may prove useful for the analysis of the impact of gold and other extractive minerals in other 
parts of Ghana and neighboring African countries.  
We believe that the results would have been more robust and stimulating had regional 
comparative studies been included. However, doing so would have strained the resources 
available for this study. It is acknowledged that the estimations and hence conclusions would 
be more enhanced if information from the police record on violence were available and 
included in the models to supplement and deepen the depth of the empirical estimations. 
Furthermore, the current study made a minimal contribution to the theoretical development 
and instead focused significantly on empirical analysis. For instance, the clean mining 
concept as employed here is only an abstract state, which requires further theoretical 
development in its suitability for mitigating the identified problems. Although it seems 
plausible in solving the identified challenges, however, its theoretical verifiability is beyond 
the scope of the current study, and therefore further research is necessary for pursuing this 
objective, which we recommend for future research. 
 
6.3. Key recommendations  
To answer the research questions, this thesis evaluated the human rights and sustainability 
challenges (environmental and economic) facing the SSM sector. The findings of the 
empirical case studies presented in Chapters 2 to 4 offer a range of insights into and remedial 
measures for the identified challenges. The following discussion explores the broad 





6.3.1. For policy makers 
Good governance (operational) is required: 
a. Child labor 
i. Challenging the status quo 
The current policy regime for combatting child labor is inadequate. The policies must 
change to differentiate work that enhances a child’s development under safe conditions from 
work that exploits children and threatens their safety.  
 
ii. Collaboration with local people is important 
A comprehensive partnership involving “workable arrangements” among the various 
institutions, miners (and mining companies), and local citizens (e.g., owners of resources, 
traditional local leaders, NGOs, and religious groups) in the form of ad hoc committees that 
are adapted to the conditions in individual communities is necessary for controlling child 
labor. Such collaboration has proved feasible in a few neighborhoods in which, as discussed 
above, children were allowed to work only on weekends and during their holidays so that 
their weekdays could be devoted to their education and development outside the workplace. 
Such shared value creation is commendable and capable of replication in other communities 
facing similar problems, providing that safe working environments can be ensured.  
 
 
iii. Effective enforcement of mining standards is a key 
The adequate and appropriate awarding of mining rights should be implemented and 
adequately monitored. Doing so would reduce child labor, as the findings demonstrated a 




iv. Provide an enabling environment for all 
The governance structure should provide the same operating environment for all investors 
in the SSM sector as a means to incentivize a reduction in the exploitation of children. As the 
findings demonstrate, the political elite created unfair and uncompetitive markets for 
managers, particularly in the area of concessions and licensing. Bribery and corruption 
inflated the operating costs for mining managers and therefore influenced the likelihood of 
child employment. Moreover, providing alternative income-generating activities for 
unemployed members of households will decrease the willingness of parents to persuade 
their children to work in harsh conditions at mining sites.  
 
b. Conflict associated with mining 
i. Key roles of building and multi-purpose policy 
Currently (2017) in Ghana, the government that recently came to power, led by President 
Nana Addo Dankwah Akufo-Addo and the New Patriotic Party, is championing an absolute 
nationwide ban
19
 on SSM. The reasons put forward to support the ban included the 
deterioration of water and land resources, in particular, the shortage of safe drinking water, 
because of SSM activities in the country. Beginning in 2017, the ban has been enforced 
through the deployment of armed national security forces to all the targeted regions. There is 
support for the ban by the public, environmental activists and movements, and the media as 
part of a determined effort to safeguard the country’s major water bodies from further 
pollution so that they may serve domestic and industrial purposes. At the same time, this 
policy by itself seems unsustainable economically, owing both to the enormous transaction 
costs involved and to the determined effort by some miners to continue their work and to take 
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 to counter the VANGUARD forces. Under these circumstances, the absolute ban 
on SSM stands to plunge mining communities further into abject poverty (Bush, 2009). 
Resources would be better used if they were channeled into the realization of social and 
ecological goals that involve minimal economic trade-offs.  
 
ii. Good governance remains crucial 
Proper management is necessary to ensure the adequate monitoring of SSM operations 
and to implement income-earning programs to complement the VANGUARD effort. Without 
such complementary integrative livelihood programs, the likelihood of failure is high. To 
provide an example, the monitoring team should include the local community to ensure 
coverage that is more comprehensive and increased cost-effectiveness. Based on the research 
presented here, community involvement in the mining processes, in particular in the search 
for innovative solutions to the environmental challenges and a clear policy direction for 
critical mining concerns (e.g., responsible and creative mining), is a prerequisite for reducing 
conflict in the SSM sector. 
 
 
c. Social acceptance of mining demands responsible and sustainable mining 
practices 
To implement clear and comprehensive policies that promote clean mining, we 
recommend that the state should create an enabling environment by supporting innovative 
research and the adoption of environmentally safe and economically feasible practices. Such 
an effort in combination with other policies could curb the tendency of companies to act 
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irresponsibly, thereby decreasing the negative environmental effects and increasing the public 
acceptance of SSM activities. 
 
6.3.2. The mining business: The community or practitioners? 
a. Mining conflict and child labor: Support initiatives in conflict prevention 
programs 
SSM companies can enhance community conflict prevention and resolution programs 
through their trade associations. They can improve communication between companies and 
communities through dialogues and programs. These would serve to identify the sources of 
impending conflict that call for immediate action, thus minimizing violence in mining 
communities. Forging agreements to control child labor that are based on shared principles 
could improve relations, paving the way for trust and peacebuilding. 
 
 
b. Public support for mining 
i. Invest in innovative mining to promote public appreciation of SSM 
The adverse effects of mining on the environment directly influence human health, food 
security, and social cohesion, making them a concern for all stakeholders (i.e., mining 
industries, households, and government), and these are the significant contributing factors to 
the current SSM ban. Therefore, it is necessary to link improved integrated programs such as 
water recycling or water saving innovation, site reclamation, and land enrichment programs 
to mining. This link should be the focus of SSM companies in partnership with the 
government. Collaboration in problem-solving can improve public opinion regarding mining. 
For instance, to build a reputation and stay in business, companies must seek innovative 
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mining practices, such as drilling their well water, which would reduce the adverse effects 
and undue pressure on water, land, and forest resources.  
 
ii. Involve local communities and improve social responsibility 
Accordingly, companies are encouraged to communicate with local communities to find 
possible ways of reclaiming used land, improve communication, and provide for local social 
necessities. Taking these steps would build trust and contribute to community development 
through problem-solving. The findings presented here are consistent with the earlier literature 
demonstrating that supporting good management practices for natural resources is a path to 




6.3.3. Recommendations for researchers 
Collaborative research is needed 
In light of the above discussion, we recommend that future research be collaborative and 
explore conflict mitigation and sustainable mining innovations to both reduce environmental 
pollution and improve resource extraction. Further research is required to identify ways to 
support effective livelihood programs for mining communities and to explore how 
institutions can create an enabling environment for the benefit of all. Although SSM 
organizations are building stable membership levels, it remains essential for researchers to 
investigate how small-scale gold miners can pool their resources to invest in innovations that 





a. Research into child labor mitigation 
Research should focus on distinguishing between beneficial child employment from child 
exploitation as a first step in designing the appropriate policy responses. A fair-minded 
assessment of the role of children in mining holds the key to competitive and responsible 
mining that the public could support.  
 
b. Research into preventing conflict associated with mining  
A study focused on conflict would be very useful given the findings presented here on the 
determinants and frequency of conflict in mining communities. These findings demonstrated 
that under the right circumstances, mining could reduce the incidence of particular types of 
conflict, thus making a case for exploring the fundamental factors behind conflict as part of 
an effort to avoid the “resources curse syndrome.”  
 
 
c. Social acceptance of mining: Innovative mining solutions 
Collaborative research that considers the communities, government agencies, and the 
companies involved in mining can provide innovative solutions to long-standing problems in 
the sector. This research could help confront and counter the socio-economic and governance 
challenges associated with the extraction of resources by small- and mid-sized companies. 
The focus should be on innovative, clean mining as a means to reduce the negative impacts of 
mining on societies. Previous studies have suggested that new mining technologies have the 
potential to improve standards of living and social and environmental outcomes such as 
public health and safety, land use, air, water, and soil contamination, social violence, and 






Appendix 1A: Questionnaire for key institutions, NGOs, and civil society actors 
This study is for academic purpose only, and we treat any information given confidential. 
You are free to participate, not to participate or end discussions in this survey. Thank you for 
your permission. 
KI: Key informants structured interview @ Institutional/company/District level 
 
Institutions/z name, please select Code 1 [             ]   District code [          ]  
Location id                                                                  [             ]    KID             [           ] 
 
Code suggested/expected, 1= Environmental Protection Agency, 2= Lands /Minerals 
Commission, 3= Traditional Institutions/National House of Chiefs, 4= WANEP, 5= Ghana 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiatives-GHEITI, 6= Ghana Chamber of Mines, 7= 
Precious Minerals Marketing Company, 8= Other, specify 
           
 
1. Please, what is the main protocol for mining land acquisition/registration process in 
Ghana? 
 
2. Please name four districts in Ashanti region where small-scale mining is predominant 
since the last 12 months. 1. ………………………... 2. …………………. 3. 
……………. 4. ……………………. 
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3. Select land-planning classification that exists in the Ashanti region. Code: 1= 
Demarcated for forest reserve, 2= Estate development, 3= Nature preservation, 4= 
Farming, 5= Other, specify, 6= None [                                      ] 
4. Whose concern does one obtain before the commencement of mining in the 
community? [      ] Code: 1= The landowner, 2= Chief/queen, 3= Assembly, 4= Do not 
know, 5= Other 
5. Do you see the increasing small-scale mining as a conflict-risked element in this 
district? 1= Yes, 0= No [          ]    
6. Are there any reported cases? 1= Yes, 0= No [          ]  Please give examples 
Conflicts type 
Give estimated 
cases recorded in 
number since the 
last 24 months. 
code 
1=1 to 3 
2=4 to 6 
3= 7 and above 
 
 
What was the main 








What is the 
frequency of 
conflict occurrence 
in the community 
per year (month) in 
a ratio of 1 out of 5? 
1=1, 2=2, 3=3, 4=1 
5=5 
People fought 
violently    
Bloody, and casualties    




IMC: Violent conflict cases reported, select all (Answer by all) 
IMCR: Any mitigating measures/resolution approaches taken for reported conflicts in the  




the community    
Stool/Chieftaincy 
faction    
illegal land guards 
threat    




               
1. What is the success rate in % in all, the cases intervened? [        ]  
Code: 1= 5%, 2= 10%, 3= 30%, 4= 50%, 5= Over 60% 
 
2. What major gains do your z intend to achieve by help solving these issues?  
Code: 1= Environmental protection or improvement, safety, 2= Community peace, 





Please select 1 if 
you offered the 
listed service or 0 if 
not 
1=Yes, 0=No 
The frequency of 
provision in a month 
1=1, 2=2, 3=3, 4=1 
5=5 




Peace campaign or 
education    
Youth programs    
Community 
sensitization    
School campaign    
Religious crusade    
Media campaign    
Other (specify)    
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Monitoring standards: Child employment, environment and land rights 
3. What is the estimated incidence of child labor in the small-scale mining sector in 
percentage? 
4. What are the major causes?  
5. Does the small-scale mining pose environmental problems in those districts? 1= Yes, 
0= No      [           ] 
6. What are the major areas of environmental concerns and why is it a problem?   








offer any of the 
below services? 
1=Yes, 0=No 






What is the 
frequency of 
provision per 
year, ratio out of 
5? 




/transfer     
Enforcement of 
land rights     
Child labor     
Environmental 






by the miners to 
affected households     
Compensation 
payments by a 
chief / queen     
Health conditions 
in the community     
Issues concerning 
mining licensing     
 
7. What is the significant functional responsibility or contribution of this institution 
towards mining conflict resolution in this regard?              
            [                                                                               ]    
8. What do you think is the best thing to do as a company/institution to reduce/prevent 
child labor in the artisanal mining? 
9. What do you expect minerals buying companies to do to curb the child labor in the 
artisanal mining? 
10. Does your institution collaborate or work together with others on conflict resolution 
programs in the last 12 months? 1=Yes, 0=No 
11. Mention 1 case worked on together with other institutions [    ]  
 Code: 1= Peace campaign.  2= Youth outreach program.  3= Community sensitization.  
4= School visits. 5= Religious crusade. 6= Media campaign. 7= Other.
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Appendix 1B: Questionnaire for small-scale miners 
 
This study is for academic purpose only, and we treat any information given confidential. 
You are free to participate, not to participate or end discussions in this survey. Thank you for 
your permission. 
 
KI: Key informants, Small-scale miners SSMid: [    ] District id [        ]     Gender [        ]   
 Village id [      ]   Ethnicity [        ]   1= Nanumba. 2= Dagomba. 3= Mamprusi. 4= Wala. 5= 
Builsa. 6= Frafra. 7= Talensi. 8= Kusase. 9= Gonja. 10= Chokosi. 11= Busanga. 12= Gurma. 
13= Komkomba. 14= Akan. 15= Ewe. 16= Ga. 14= Other. 
Religion [   ]  1= Christian. 2= Traditionalist. 3= Muslim. 3= Animist. 4= Non-religious. 5= 
other 
 
1. Do you get help from pupils at your mining site? 1= Yes, 0= No   [             ]  
2. What major work do they do? Work as Code: 1= Miner, 2= Stone washer, 3= 
Water fetching or drainer, 4= Carrying or transporting sand, 5= Other [          ] 
3. If yes, do you employ ages between 17 years and below? 1= Yes, 0= No  [         ] 
4. What is the main reason for employing children at the mining site? Code: 1= To 
reduce cost, 2= Easy to control, 3 = Their parents brought them, 4= Homeless, 5= 
Don’t want to answer, 6= Other specify [     ] 
5. Do you have any knowledge or idea that children should not engage in this type of 
hard work? 1= Yes, 0= No   [             ] 
6. What type of knowledge if yes? Code: 1= National law, 2= Community law, 3= 
Other   [           ]                                         
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7. Who do you sell your minerals to? 1=Major company run by foreigner, 2= Major 
company run by Ghanaian, 3= Private individual foreigners, 3= Private 
individuals, Ghanaians, 4= Other, specify [           ]                                                                                                     
8. Where is the main office location of outlet buyer? Code: 1=In this community, 2= 
Nearby big community, 3= District capital, 4= City, 5= Other, specify [     ] 
9. Which of the following do your network of buyers’ care about as responsible 
buyers of extractive minerals? Multiple select: 1= Child labor, 2= Environment, 3= 
Community health, 4= Miners/workers’ health, 5= Community voluntary 
development services, 6= Do not know, 7= Other [  ]                                                
10. Mention one activity support by your network of buyers in the community that you 
are aware of [                                                                 ]                                       
11. Did you receive any training concerning mining standards, best practices, and 
Environmental Conservation? 1= Yes, 0= No [          ] 
12. Are you working with own mining licence? Code: 1= Own licence, 2=Working 
with someone’s certificate, 3= Do not have license [   ]. Skip 13 if don’t have 
license 
13. Which institution issued you the mining permit? Code: 1=Minerals Commission, 
2= Ghana Chamber of mines, 3= Political affiliation, 4= Traditional leaders [     ] 
14. Who granted this land for mining? [      ] Codes 1= Household head, 2= State 
official, 3= Traditional leader, 4= NGO, 5= Private investor or estate developer, 6= 
Intermediary ‘Middle woman or man”, 7= Party official. 
15. What are the major challenges you face that you think contribute to this problem? 
16. What can be done to improve situation or solve the problem?
 
 202 
Appendix 1C: Questionnaire for focus group discussions 
This study is for academic purpose only, and we treat any information given confidential. 
You are free to participate, not to participate, or end discussions in this survey. Thank you 
for your permission. 
 
FGD. District id [           ] Village id [             ] Focus group fqid [              ]  
 [Mark groups that were represented: 1= Affected (farmer) groups, 2= Small-scale Miners, 
3= Local/active NGO. 4= Assembly man/woman, 5= Chief/queen, 6= Other (          )].  
       
FPIC:  Free, prior, and informed consent from the affected groups. 
 
1. Are small-scale mining activities going on in this district since the last past 12 
months?  1= Yes, 0= No [     ]                      
2. Do you have any knowledge or consent of affected household respected before 
mining? 1= Yes, 0= No   [           ] 
3. Whose concern was obtained before the mining begun in the community? 1= The 
landowner, 2= Chief/queen, 3= Assembly, 4= I do not know 
 
EME 1: Effects of mining activities on girl’s development in the community. 
4. Has mining activities (galamsey) increased girl child prostitution and sex abuse in this 
community? 1= Yes, 0= No [           ] 
5. Are there victims in this community? 1= Yes, 0= No [           ] 
6. Please estimate, how many girls have been victims of teenage pregnancy since the last 
12 months in this community. [           ] Code 1: 1= Below 10, 2= Above 10, 3= Do 
not know, 4= Other (specify) 
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7. Estimate how many pregnant girls have been drop out of school in this community [    
] See Code 1: 1= Below 10, 2= Above 10, 3= Do not know, 4= Other (specify) 
 
EME 2: Effects of mining activities on education, community perspective 
1. Does mining activities itself (galamsey) disrupt school activities; learning and 
teaching in this community? 1= Yes, 0= No [              ] 
2. How does a small-scale mining activity affect school activities? [     ]      
Code: 1= Child absenteeism, 2= Taken over of classrooms for drugs smoking and littering 
school environment, 3= Attacks on teachers for preventing pupils from working at mines, 5= 
Constant noise from mining activities during teaching and learning, 6= Other.                                                                                   
3. How often does a small-scale mining activity affect school activities per week? Code 
2: 1= Not frequent (less than 2 times), 2= Frequent (3 times), 3= More frequent (At 
least 4 times) [           ] 
4. Do any of the activities such as selling water, telephone credit, food, assisting at 
mining site, babysitting, etc. at the mining site prevent children in this community 
from going to school? 1= Yes, 0= No [              ] 
5. Please estimate the number of school dropout regarding gender for mining jobs in 












MC: Conflict, community experience 
   






the last 24 
months 
Code: 1=1-2, 
2=3-4, 3=5-6,  
4=7-8,  5=over 
8 
What was the 












in the month 
Code: 










violently     
Bloody, and 
casualties     
Verbal 
assault/threat     
Curfew in the 
community     
Chieftaincy faction     
The mass threat 
from illegal land 
guards     
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Conflict reported in the last 12 months. 
 
6. Are any of the listed violent conflicts capable of causing future civil war in the 
community? [  ] 1= Yes, 0= Nos 
 
  CM: Community measures for mitigating mining conflicts 
Conflicts resolution 
approaches used in the 
last 12 months 
Did the community 
use this approach in 
solving the conflict? 
1=Yes, 0=No 
The frequency of 
provision per year 
1=1, 2=2, 3=3, 4=4, 
5=5 
Was the approach 
efficient? 
1=Yes, 0=No 
Peace campaign or 
education    
Youth programs    
Community 
sensitisation    
School campaign    
Religious crusade    
Media campaign    
Other (specify)       
 
7. What is the success rate in % in all the cases intervened? 1= 10%, 2= 20%, 3= 30%, 
4= 50%, 5= Above 60%     [         ] 
 
 
Other (specify)     
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EI: Environmental impact of mining in communities under violent disputes 
Adverse effects of mining activities on the environment; Water bodies, the natural 
forest, and land; cash crops.  
 


































Are you aware of any evidence of 
unregulated post-mining activity 
leading to gross land degradation?     
An open trenched or uncovered 
excavated Land     
Cash crop destruction; cocoa or orange 
farm     
Destruction of main water sources     




8. How many people or children have drowned (casualties) due to improper 
management of post-mining land restoration such as open trench? [  ] Code: 1=1-4, 
2=5,  3=6-7,  4= Over 8, 5= None 
9. What do you think can be done to restore the degraded environment?  [        ] multiple 
selection. Code: 1= Effective monitoring of mining standards and by state, 2= 
Community monitoring and sanctions, 3= Employ community in land restoration 
programs, 4= Other 
 
OBEI: Researcher observations and general remarks from the discussion.
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Appendix 1D: Household questionnaire for small-scale mining survey 
 
This study is for academic purpose only, and we treat any information given confidential. 
You are free to participate, not to participate or end discussions in this survey. Thank you for 
your permission. 
 
District [                                                                                  ] 
 
Questionnaire number /__ /__/__/ __/  
District code [         ]     Village [………………………….] 
 
House number / Popular Street ………………………………………………………… 
 
Household code: _H_/ __/__/__/__/        Date of contact date. month. Year.:  
Ethnicity of HHH [     ] 
 
Code: 1= Nanumba, 2= Dagomba, 3= Mamprusi, 4= Wala, 5= Builsa, 6= Frafra, 7= Talensi,  
8= Kusase, 9= Gonja, 10= Chokosi, 11= Busanga, 12= Gurma,13= Komkomba, 14= Akan, 
15= Ewe, 16= Ga, 14= Other. 
 
Religious background   HHH [              ] 
Code: 1= Christian, 2= Traditionalist, 3= Muslim, 4= Animism, 5= Other. 
 
 








Code 1: Main activities: 1= Farming, 2 = Rearing of animals, 3 = Mining/digger, 4= 
Retailing-extractive minerals, 5 = Mining equipment supplier, 6 = Mining field engineer, 7 = 
Security at mines, 8 = General security, 9 = Mining site petty trading; water, snacks, etc., 10 
= Health worker, 11 = Sales/shop attendant, 12 = Teaching, 13 = Politician, 14 = Media 
worker, 15 = Clerk, 16 = Fishing/hunting, 17 = Driver/motor taxi, 18 = Handicraft, 19 = 
Translator, 20 = Casual labour, 21= Pupil/student, 22 = Unemployed, 23= Other. 
HHM ID 01 02 03 
Name and family name    
Gender.  Code: 1= Male, 0= Female    
Age in years. 1 if less than 1 year    
Job/ main activity of member at least 8 years old since last 12 months. Code 
1    
Marital status. Code: 1=Married, 2=Single, 3= Co-habitation, 4= Divorced, 
5= Minor    
Child 14 years and less, and working at mining site. Code: 1= Yes, 0= No 
Fill EMC if yes    
Family bond or relation. Code 2    
Is anyone currently ill? Code. 1= Yes, 0= No. Fill HS if yes    
Last level of education. Code: 1= Primary, 2= JHS, 3= SSS, 4= Higher 
education, 5= Tertiary (Master/PhD)    
How long has the family lived here? Code:1= less than 5,   2= 5-10, 3=11-





Code 3. Relationship: 1= Household head /Spouse of the, 2= Son/daughter, 3= 
Nephew/niece, 4= Father/mother in law, 5= Siblings, 6= Grandson/granddaughter, 7= Other 
(specify).  
 
1. Do you come from this village? 1=Yes, 0=No    
2. Has mining occurred on your land? 1=Yes, 0= No  
3. What percentage of the total land area is used for mining? 1= 30, 2= 40, 3= 50, 4= 60, 
5= 90 
 
















Refer from the HD1 01 02 03 
Sickness cases in the last 12 months. Code: 1=1, 2=2, 3=3, 4=over 4    
What was the type of sickness? 
Code 1: 1= Malaria, 2= Cough, 3= Water born disease, 4= Diarrhea, 5= 
Skin diseases, 6= Other, specify    





EMC: Specific mining task for someone working at a small-scale mining site. 
 
Direct involvement of major mining activity as: Code 1, 1= Miner, 2= Stone washer, 3= 












LS1: Services received from institutions: Land property rights.  
 
4. Has any member of this household ever involved in, or received any information on land 
use issues? E.g., land sales, land transfer, farming land property rights disputes, etc., 






HHM ID 01 02 03 
Major activity. Select from Code:1    
What is the reason for helping/working at the mine site? Code: 
1= Self, 2=Family, 3= The person I stay with, 4= Help my brother, 5= Help 
my sister    
How many hours of work per day? Code: 1= 4, 2= 5, 3=6, 4= 8    
Estimate the amount received in Ghc for working per day    
Total number of days does of skipping school for mining per week?  





LS2: Monitoring Services from institutions 
 
Code 1: 1= Environmental Protection Agency, 2= Lands Commission/Minerals Commission, 
3= Ghana Chamber of Mines, 4= Geological service, 5= Chief/queen, 6= Council / Religious, 








Which z or Institution 




How often per 
year, is the 
service provided. 
See code below. 
 
Code 2 





 1=Yes, 0=No 
 
Monitoring of mining 
standards     
Enforcement of land 
rights 
     
Monitoring of child 
employment     
Monitoring of post-
mining land restoration     
Royalty payments by the 
miners to affected HH     
Compensation payments 
by chief/queen     






Code 2: 1= 1, 2= 3,3= 4+, 4= don’t know.  
Code 4: 1= Efficient, 2= Not efficient, 3= Cannot determine 
 
 
LO: Services on Land use, ownership, transfer, … 
 
5. Does any member of your household currently work on a piece of land or own this house 
(apartment land) in this neighborhood? 1= Yes, 0= No  
  
6. If yes, select type of ownership arrangements [                                                           ] 
 
Code: 1=Lease, 2= Rent, 3=Inheritance, 4=Customary stool land, 5= family land, 6= Gift, 
7=Outright purchase or alienation holdings, 8=Share farming (where property is divided per 
pre-determined arrangements), 9= other, specify 
 
7. What was the medium of acquisition or purchase? [           ]    
Code: 1=Customary household landholder, 2= Lands Commission/Minerals Commission, 
3=Customary stool or chief/queen, 4=Secondary or derived holder, 5=Community land 
bank/common pool, 6=other 
 
8. Whom did you consult? [       ]  
 
Code: 1= Household head, 2= State official, 3=Traditional leader, 4= NGO, 5= Private 





LD1: Individual land disputes 
 
9. Have you ever received any complaints about your landownership/usage in the last 12 
months? 1= Yes, 0= No  
 
10. If yes from which quarters or individual did you receive complains? [               ] 
Code: 1= State institutions. Code: 2= Traditional authority, 3= Private individual / NGO, 4= 
Religious authority, 5= Small-scale miner, 6= Other, specify 
 
11. Type of disputes please selects all that apply. [                                                        ] 
 
Code:1= Violent, 2= Verbal threat, 3= Amicable, 4= Law suit, 5= Traditional authority 
summons, 6= Other (specify)    
 
12. Is the issue resolved? 1=Yes, 0=No.     Skip the next question if No  
 
13. If yes which of the following bodies were involved? Select all that apply. [                     ] 
 
Code: 1= Environmental Protection Agency, 2= Lands Commission/Minerals Commission, 
3= Ghana Police Service, 4= Traditional Institutions/National House of Chiefs, 5= 
District/Local Assembly, 6= National Peace Council, 7= Ghana Chamber of Mines, 8= 
Ghana Extractive Industries Transparency Initiatives-GHEITI, 9= the West Africa Network 







14. You stated that (If No) the land dispute you are involved is not resolved, how are you 
managing the problem to protect your property in future? Multiple selections are 
possible 
[                                                                                                                  ] 
Code 1: 1= Still rely on the law enforcement to resolve it, 2= Still rely on Chiefs/queens/ 
traditional institutions to address it, 3= Will hire private security ‘’land guards’ to protect my 
asset, 4= NGO, specify, 5= Peace council / religious z to protect it, 6= Own protection, e.g. 
arm myself to protect my property, 7= Other (specify). 
 
15. What is the reason for that decision? [         ] 
Code: 1= State cannot ensure effective property rights, 2= Lack of transparency in land sales 
adjudication, 3= That is the only way available to me, 4= NGO, specify. 
 
RCL: Reported cases of mining land disputes in the neighborhood 
16. Have you ever been involved in cases of mining-related (land) disputes in this 
neighborhood for the past 24 months? 1=Yes, 0=No 
 
Code 2:1= Eye witness, 2=Mass media, 3=Police report, 4=Family records, 5= Traditional 
Council/community record, 6= District Assembly, 7= Local Assembly (man/woman), 8= 
NGO, 9= Religious z, 10= other (specify).  
 
Code 3: 1= 1, 2=2 to 3, 3= 4+, 5 = none, 6=other (specify).  
Code 4: 1= between 5-10 houses, 2= Over 10 houses, 3= between 5-10 hectares of farm 





Violent type in the 



































































violently        
2=Bloody, and 
some life lost        
3=Verbal assault   skip Skip skip   
4=Restriction of 
human movement 
due to social 
disorder, e.g. 
curfew      Skip skip 
5=Stool/Chieftaincy 
faction        
6=Land guard 
threat        





Code 5: 1=only nationals, 2=Nationals and foreigners, 3=only foreigners; specify 
 
 If yes, what was the nature of the conflict? Select all that apply using the above codes 
 
17. In your opinion, are any of the above conflicts capable of leading to future civil or tribal 
war in this neighbourhood? 1=Yes, 0=No 
 
18. In your view, would you attribute the above conflicts to a political or a state failure?  
1=Yes, 0=No  
19. Mention major causes of violent conflicts in this neighbourhood. 



















CR:  Which of the recorded violent incident (s) is resolved? 
 
 
Code 1:1= Over 12 months, 2= 12 months, 3= less than 12 months, 4=other (specify). 
Code 2:1= Environmental Protection Agency, 2=Lands Commission/Minerals Commission, 
3=Law enforcement; Police, 4=Traditional institutions, 5= District Assembly /Local 
Assembly, 6= Religious z/ Local Assembly, 6= Religious z/peace GHEITI, 9= the West 
Africa Network for Peacebuilding WANEP, 10=other, specify.  
Code 3:  1= 1, 2=2, 3=3, 4= 4 and above. 



























Select from Code 
2 
 






Select from Code 
3 
People fought violently       
Bloody, with some 
casualties 
    
Verbal assault     
Police curfew     
Stool/Chieftaincy faction     
Land guard threat     





CRA: Conflict resolution approaches or programs this neighbourhood witnessed or 
participated since the last 12 months. 
 
 
Code 2: 1= Environmental Protection Agency, 2= Lands Commission/Minerals Commission,  











Which institution (s) 
was involved in the 
program? 
 
Select from Code 2 
 




Select from Code 3 
Campaign on small-scale mining-
related conflicts    
Election-related conflict 
prevention     
Youth programs     
Community sensitization    
School lecture or symposium    
Community annual meeting    
Religious crusade 
(Church/mosque)    





  6= Religious z/peace council   7= Ghana Chamber of Mines, 8= Ghana Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiatives (GHEITI), 9= The West Africa Network for Peace building 
(WANEP), 10= Other, specify.  
 
Code 3: 1= Once per month, 2= 2 times per year, 3= Only when there is a problem,  
4= It was only once, 5= Other (specify). Code 4: Time 1= 1 day, 2=2 weeks, 3= 1 month, 4= 
2 months, 5= Other (specify). 
 
 
FS0: Food security; means of food production 
 
20. Are the means of access to land for food production in this neighborhood easily 
accessible? 1= Yes, 0= No                                                                                                                                                
21. Which resources are difficult to come by for farming? 1=Land, 2=Farm labor, 3= Credit, 
4= Extension officers, 5= Other, specify. List all 
22. What is the main reason for the above occurrence? 1=Landowners prefer giving land for 
mining, 2= the employable labor ‘youth’ have less interest in farming, 3=farming is not 
attractive compared to mining, 4=other, specify                                      
23. How will you describe the situation? 1= Becoming very difficult, 2= Less difficult, 3= 
Same, 4= Other, specify                                      
24. Has the household ever exchanged a land or cash crops such as cocoa plantation for 
mining? 1= Yes, 0= No   
25. What is the main reason for giving up cash crops or land resource for mining? [         ] 






FA: Availability of food for the household 
26. How many times do you eat in a lean period?  Code:     1=1, 2=2, 3=3.    [       ] 
27. How many times do you eat in the average period?             1=1, 2=2, 3=3.   [       ] 
28. How many times do you eat during sufficient period?          1=1, 2=2, 3=3.    [       ] 
29. When is food highly available?                                                                 [       ]  
Code 1=Mining season when there are intense mining activities, 2=off -mining periods 
when there are less mining activities, 3= Farming Season-Cultivation period, 4= Period of 
harvesting farm produce in nearby villages, 5= When there are land conflicts associated with 
mining, 6= Other (specify). 
 
30. When is food less available?                                                              [        ] 
Code 1=Mining season when there are intense mining activities, 2=off -mining periods when 
there are less mining activities, 3= Farming Season-cultivation period, 4=Period of harvesting 
farm produce, 5= Other, specify. 
 
AF: Household access to food 
 
31. Do you have access to enough food supply? 1=Yes, 0=No 
32. Reasons for your current food access status. [              ] 
Code: 1 = Able to buy, 2 = Enough food in the area, 3 = Family farm/garden, 4 = 
Borrow/credit  
Code: 5= Expensive, 6= Buy from other communities, 7= Food in this area not enough, 8= 








HHL: The rural livelihood. The annual income of household head/respondent in Ghana 
cedis 
          
33. What is the average annual earning of this household from your main employment under 
HD1 (after tax)? [        ]  
Code: 1=Less than 100, 2 = Between 100-150, 3=200-250, 4 = Above 500, 5 = Above 1000 
34. What is your alternative sources of income or remittances? [     ]  
Code: 1 = Siblings abroad, 2 = Siblings in the city, 3 = Religious z, 4 = NGO, 5 = Sales of 
land assets, 6 = Pension, 7 = Other (specify).  
 
 
IF1: Farm income 
 
NB., produce include crops, animals, and animal products such as eggs, milk, etc. If the 
harvest is not sold at the market, please use the market price at the time when the produce 
was used 
 
35. What is the major agricultural activity? [            ] 
Code: 1= Cash crop cultivation, 2= Food crop cultivation, 3= Bio-energy/fuel crops 
















































Code 1:1= rice, 2 = maize, 3 = millet, 4=cocoa beans, 5= cassava, 6 = peanut, 
7=cowpea/beans, 8 = tomatoes, 9= sweet potatoes, 9 = plantain, 10 = Cotton, 11= eggplant, 
12= pepper, 13= okra, 14=banana, 15=mango, 16 = orange, 17=cashew nut, 18=cocoyam, 19 
= yam, 20=cattle, 21=poultry, 22=pig, 23=bee, 24= other, specify 
 
Code 2: 1= Sell at home, 2= Sell at farm gate/field, 3= Sell at the village market, 4 = Sell to 
state buyer, 5=private buyer, 6 = Others.  
Code 3: 1= Siblings abroad, 2 = Siblings in the city, 3 = Religious z, 4 = NGO, 5 = Sales of 
land assets, 6 = Pension, 7 = Other, specify 
 
Code 5: 1=10, 2=20, 3=40, 4=60, 5=80 
 
36. What is the household’s average annual expenditure?  
37. What major benefits do you as a household enjoy from the small-scale mining in this 
community? 






Appendix 1E: Other key informant and opinion leaders in-depth interviews 
 
This study is for academic purpose only, information given is treated confidential. 
You are free to participate, not to participate or end discussions in this survey. Thank you for 
your permission. 
 
Is mining activity common in this community? 
Reported cases, causes of ASM conflict and mitigation programs 
Knowledge of ASM child labor, causes and mitigation programs 
Knowledge of ASM and adverse environmental effects, and mitigation programs 
What are some of the community benefit from small-scale mining?  
What are some of the negative effects of small-scale mining?  
What are your expectations for gold and other precious metals buyers about discussed issues 
(environment, child labor and violence)? 
 
 
 
